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Kathryn Barbara Francis 
 
Moral cognition: An interdisciplinary investigation of moral judgment versus moral 
action 
In the past, experiments on human morality have predominantly utilised 
theoretical moral dilemmas to shed light on the nature of moral judgment. However, 
little attention has been given to determining how these judgments might translate into 
moral actions. In this thesis, I utilised novel and state-of-the-art Virtual Reality 
environments and combined approaches from social psychology, experimental 
philosophy, computer science, robotics, and speculative design. Over the course of six 
experiments with more than 200 participants, simulated moral actions made in Virtual 
Reality were found to be dissociated from moral judgments made in conventional 
paradigms. The results suggest that moral judgment and action may be driven by 
distinct mechanisms. The association between personality traits and moral judgments 
versus actions, was also investigated. In two experiments, psychopathic and associated 
traits predicted moral actions and the power with which these were simulated, but failed 
to predict moral judgments. With research suggesting a mediating role for empathy in 
this relationship, two further experiments examined empathic and affective processing 
in moral judgment versus action. In the first of these, alcohol consumption successfully 
lowered affective empathy and arousal in virtual dilemmas, but moral judgment and 
action remained unaffected. In the second, an investigation of professionally trained 
paramedics and fire service incident commanders, revealed distinct differences in 
empathic and related personality traits, reduced emotional arousal, and less regret 
following moral action. Taken together, this research suggests that novel virtual 
technologies can provide insights into self-referent actions, which sit in contrast to 
judgments motivated by social norms. Ethically, incorporating Virtual Reality in 
investigations of morality of harm offers a balanced approach; protecting participant 
wellbeing while increasing the ecological validity of moral investigations. The roles of 
personality traits and associated emotional processes in moral judgment and action 
remain multifaceted and as such, I outline the necessity of considering both the 
characteristics of the decision-maker and the context in which the decision is undertaken, 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
TRANSITIONING FROM MORAL JUDGMENT TO MORAL ACTION 
Questions of morality emerge early on in the history of humanity; consider the 
moral narrative of Adam and Eve which opens the Bible (Haidt, 2008). These tales of 
moral transgressions highlight our fascination with moral regulation; “…what we did, 
could have done, or should have done” (Tague, 2016, p. 118).  From a philosophical 
perspective, explorations of the origins of good and bad have appeared in works from 
ancient Greek philosophy and across Western philosophy in general (e.g., Fieser, 2001).  
Morality, as a topic in philosophy, has been predominantly considered in the context of 
normative ethics rather than through empirical investigation (Doris, 2010). It was the 
emergence of moral psychology that marked the fusion of both theoretical and 
experimental approaches in investigating the nature of morality, but more specifically, 
moral judgment (Doris, 2010; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). 
Despite advances in the field, little research has investigated moral actions and their 
relationship to moral judgments due to ethical constraints. Firstly, I will review models 
of moral decision-making investigating morality of harm using moral judgments. I will 
then present recent evidence from personality, clinical, and neuroscience research 
suggesting dissociation between moral judgment and moral action. Secondly, I will 
review methodological considerations when assessing moral judgments versus moral 
actions and how recent advances in Virtual Reality (VR) technologies can be used to 
investigate harmful moral actions for the first time.  
Morality, Reason, and Emotion 
Investigations of moral judgment have primarily centred round debates 
regarding emotion (Hume, 1739/2012) and reason (Kant, 1785/2002) and their 
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influence on moral decision-making (G. Miller, 2008). If you were to ask a moral 
psychologist about the history of this extensive debate, they might begin with the work 
of Kohlberg (1969). Inspired by the cognitive-developmentalist approach pioneered by 
Piaget (1997) and rooted in Kantian theories of ethics, Kohlberg conceptualized moral 
development in the framework of cognitive development; the assumption being that 
moral judgment is accomplished by conscious reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). 
This moral reasoning is often referred to as a “cool” process comprising conscious 
mental evaluations in order to attain a moral judgment (Haidt, 2007).   
However, the viewpoint that moral phenomena must be operated by rational 
deliberation is considered a “…fading paradigm” (Narvaez & Vaydich, 2008, p. 292). In 
fact, sentimentalist theories of morality first appeared in modern moral philosophy 
(Cooper, 1699-1714/2001; Hume, 1751/2012) and pioneered the viewpoint that 
emotions were central to moral judgment with reason remaining peripheral. In the 
context of later empirical research, “emotions” became of interest in psychology and 
sociobiology in the 1980s during the so-called “affective revolution” (Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Haidt, 2008). In the years prior to this, E.O Wilson had claimed that ethics needed 
to be “biologicized” (Wilson, 1975/2000, p. 562) arguing that both moral philosophers 
and developmentalists consult “…emotive centres of their own hypothalamic-limbic 
system…even when they are being their most severely objective” (Wilson, 1975/2000, 
p. 563). The new synthesis of moral psychology that subsequently emerged from this 
emphasis on emotion and evolution, arguably laid the foundations for the intuitivist 
perspectives of moral decision-making (e.g., Haidt, 2008; Hauser, 2006). In moral 
psychology and from an empirical perspective, Haidt has pioneered these intuitivist 
theories, arguing that moral judgment is in fact driven by fast intuitive processes (Haidt, 
2001). These processes are often affective in nature with moral evaluations arising in 
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consciousness with no apparent steps preceding them (Haidt, 2007). Moral reasoning 
subsequently follows as a “…post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been 
reached” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Indeed, this viewpoint has been supported in studies 
examining “moral dumbfounding” or the inability to articulate a rational for strong and 
intuitive moral convictions (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; 
Prinz, 2005). It has also been supported in neuroscientific studies evidencing an 
association between moral decision-making and emotion centres in the brain (e.g., 
Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007).  
Whilst the support for this intuitive framework in moral decision-making is 
convincing, “…it does not follow from this that emotional intuition is the whole story” 
(Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010, p. 48). Pioneers of “universal moral grammar” for 
example, argue that deliberative information processing is necessary in moral decision-
making and often precedes affective responses (Cushman et al., 2010; Hauser, 2006). In 
recent years and in an attempt to reconcile these perspectives, focus has been placed on 
dual-process approaches (e.g., Cushman, 2013; Greene et al., 2001). These argue for the 
role of both intuitive (or affective) and rational (or cognitive) processes in moral 
judgment (Cushman et al., 2010).    
Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment 
Traditionally, provocative moral dilemmas pitting characteristically utilitarian 
versus deontological ideologies have played a central role in the investigation of moral 
judgment (e.g., Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2015; Cushman et al., 
2010). Perhaps the most acknowledged example of these dilemmas is the “Trolley 
Problem”, incorporating two contrasting dilemmas, which have been extensively 
discussed in the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology (e.g., Foot, 1978; 
Greene et al., 2001). In the switch dilemma, individuals must decide whether to flick a 
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switch, redirecting a trolley car to kill one worker on the tracks instead of five. 
Alternatively, in the footbridge dilemma, individuals must decide whether to push a 
large person in front of the trolley, in order to stop it from killing the five workers on 
the tracks (see Figure 1.1). This problem has generated interest for the reason that 
individuals tend to give the typically consequentialist or utilitarian judgment (they judge 
that maximising the number of lives saved is morally acceptable) in the switch case but 
refuse to do so in a characteristically deontological sense (harm is wrong and the ends 
don’t justify the means) in the footbridge case (Thomson, 1976). 
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Figure 1.1.  The Trolley Problem comprising the switch (left) and footbridge (right) 
dilemmas. This diagram shows the five-for-one trade-off in both dilemmas. Diagram 
created by the author for a conference in 2015.  
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 Several theories have attempted to understand these divergent responses given 
their structural similarity in entailing the five-for-one trade off (Thomson, 1976). 
According to dual-process models of moral judgment, contrasting features in these 
dilemmas drive competing responses from distinct systems.  
 Perhaps the most recognised dual-process approach is Joshua Greene’s dual 
process model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001) distinguishing between 
“personal” dilemmas like the footbridge and “impersonal” dilemmas such as the switch.  
In this model, personal dilemmas are defined as those “involving actions that are (a) 
likely to cause serious bodily harm, (b) to a particular person, where (c) this harm does 
not result from deflecting an existing threat onto a different party” (Greene et al., 2001, 
p. 2107). These dilemmas are thought to trigger an immediate, emotional, and aversive 
response; an “alarm bell” associated with emotional systems in the brain (Cushman, 
Young, & Greene, 2010, p. 50) resulting in a deontological or non-utilitarian response 
(i.e., refusing to endorse harmful actions). In the absence of this negative alarm bell in 
impersonal dilemmas, the utilitarian option of killing one to save many dominates the 
response, driven by increased activations in brain areas associated with controlled 
cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2001). Importantly, the endorsement of a harmful 
action or a utilitarian response in a personal dilemma, leads to an interference effect as 
mechanisms in the cognitive system attempt to override the immediate emotional 
response (Greene et al., 2001).  
 Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment has received attention and 
investigation across many research domains (e.g., Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 
2010; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007). In support of the 
notion of interplay between cognitive and emotion-based systems, Greene et al. (2004) 
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found that making utilitarian judgments in personal dilemmas was associated with 
increased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a brain area 
associated with “cognitive control” (Cushman et al., 2010); corroborating the model’s 
argument that making a utilitarian response requires the cognitive system to compete 
with and override initial emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001).   
 Due to the correlational nature of these initial studies, the evidence supporting 
this dual process approach was “…compelling but limited” (Greene et al., 2008, p. 
1146). As such and in order to establish a causal relationship, Greene et al. (2008) 
examined the effects of cognitive load on both utilitarian and deontological judgments 
in response to personal dilemmas. As predicted and supporting Greene’s dual process 
model, cognitive load slowed utilitarian judgments but had no effect on deontological 
judgments. Following from this, neurological evidence for Greene’s dual process 
approach has come from research examining patients with deteriorating or impaired 
emotional processing. For example, individuals with frontotemporal dementia (Mendez, 
Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) and focal ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) damage 
(Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) have been 
found to be more utilitarian in personal moral dilemmas, lending support to the model’s 
theory regarding the role of emotion in deontological judgments and cognitive control 
in utilitarian judgments (Cushman et al., 2010; Greene et al., 2001).  
  Arguably, Greene’s model centres on the antagonism between reason and 
emotion (Greene et al., 2004). In fact, in terms of dualism, research has suggested that 
this arbitrary division of cognition and emotion might be somewhat artificial (Greene et 
al., 2004) and “…overly simple” (Cushman et al., 2010, p. 54). For example, while the 
initial study by Koenigs et al. (2007) examining patients with damage to the VMPFC 
supports the notion that emotional blunting may result in utilitarian preferences, or more 
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broadly “rational decisions”, a second study produces conflicting results (Koenigs & 
Tranel, 2007). This study utilised the ultimatum game in which individuals must decide 
whether to accept an unfair but financially gainful offer (the supposedly rational choice) 
or whether to reject the unfair offer (a supposedly emotional choice). Patients with 
VMPFC damage made more emotional choices. This fails to support the theory that 
making rational choices may result “…from a general emotional blunting” (Moll & de 
Oliveira-Souza, 2007, p. 321). In this case, deficits in brain areas previously associated 
with rational and utilitarian preferences, resulted in more emotionally-driven responses 
(Koenigs & Tranel, 2007).
1
 Furthermore, from a philosophical perspective, it is 
certainly possible for deliberative reasoning to lead to non-utilitarian judgments 
(Cushman et al., 2010). 
  In an attempt to remove this distinction between emotion and reason, Cushman 
(2013) proposed a second dual-process framework in his action, outcome and value 
model, relating moral decision-making back to reinforcement learning mechanisms. 
Rather than distinguishing between reason and emotion, this model distinguishes two 
processes; one process that assigns a value to an action (e.g., pushing the person off the 
bridge in the footbridge dilemma) and one process that selects actions based on the 
value assigned to their outcome instead (e.g., causing the person severe harm). 
Cushman argues that both processes involve emotional and cognitive elements and are 
not mutually exclusive. According to this model, the switch dilemma is processed by a 
model-based system (that contains an explicit model of the environment including the 
consequences of actions) which weighs up the potential outcomes in the scenario 
against one another. The system selects the utilitarian decision having assigned positive 
                                                          
1
 Although Greene developed his dual-process model to explain moral judgment specifically and not 
social decision-making, arguably both personal moral dilemmas and ultimatum game variants are thought 
to demonstrate the extent to which affective versus cognitive considerations can influence decision-
making (Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007).  
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value to the outcome of saving the most lives (outcome-based value). The footbridge 
dilemma on the other hand, involves a model-free system, which operates without 
explicit knowledge of the environment and relies on retrospective experience instead. 
Rather than assigning positive value to outcomes, this system assigns negative value to 
the action of pushing (action-based value) as this typically leads to negative outcomes. 
Essentially, the act of pushing is thought to carry with it a history of learned moral 
violations; in the past, we have learned that pushing often results in harm to another and 
punishment to ourselves. As such, we are less likely to condone the pushing of a person 
as it is a typical moral violation. Flicking a switch on the other hand is an atypical moral 
violation as we typically associate this action with completing everyday tasks such as 
turning the lights on or off (for a full review of this model see Cushman, 2013).  
While Cushman’s model addresses limitations of Greene’s dual process model, 
it also has its own limitations (Cushman, 2013). Cushman (2013) notes that the role of 
learning in moral decision-making may be limited to certain moral norms. For example, 
our action-based aversion to sibling incest (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) is thought to 
have an innate origin (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2003) and is not likely driven 
by learning (Cushman, 2013). However, adopting these principles from reinforcement 
learning can improve on the “old division” of emotion and reason, providing a more 
precise characterisation of dual-process models of moral judgment (Cushman, 2013, p. 
288).  
Moral Action as Distinct from Moral Judgment 
To date, investigations of moral decision-making have been dominated by 
theories that emphasise the role of reasoning (Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 2006; Kohlberg, 
1969) and/or emotion in moral judgment (e.g., Cushman, 2013; Greene et al., 2001; 
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Haidt, 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003) but the relationship between 
moral judgment and moral action remains unclear (S. Thoma, 1994).   
Morality and action possibility have been linked in adaptive frameworks 
examining perceptions of morality and how this subsequently regulates social 
behaviours (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013). The predictive element of morality is 
thought to play a subsequent role in social perception, aiding the identification of 
potentially beneficial or harmful group members (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). For 
example, individual’s expressing non-utilitarian values are perceived as more 
trustworthy and are subsequently preferred as partners in a social context (Everett, 
Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016); demonstrating this adaptive function. This finding that 
moral judgments influence behavioural regulation raises an important distinction in the 
present research; here I aim to examine the relationship between moral judgment and 
moral action rather than moral judgments and implications for action. 
When considering the relationship between judgment and action, we might look 
to real life examples of not “practicing what you preach” (e.g., Monin & Merritt, 2012); 
numerous examples of moral inconsistencies can be found for individuals who 
demonstrate a disparity between how they say they will act and how they actually act 
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012). In line with everyday examples of hypocrisy, research has 
questioned whether moral actions are driven by different mechanisms to those used for 
moral judgments (e.g., Camerer & Mobbs, 2017; Tassy, Deruelle, Mancini, Leistedt, & 
Wicker, 2013; Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013). Tassy et al. (2012) found that 
application of rTMS to the DLPFC, altered moral judgments (“Is it morally 
acceptable?”) but not action-choices (“Would you do it?”). This disparity can also be 
seen in the finding that action-choice questions elicit a greater proportion of utilitarian 
responses when compared to judgment questions (Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013). Tassy et 
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al. (2013) argue that these moral inconsistencies may arise from differences in 
perspectives; judgments may centre on allocentric evaluations influenced by cultural 
norms as opposed to actions which involve self-focused perspectives (e.g., Saltzstein, 
1994; Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013). This idea of self-focused versus allocentric 
perspectives also relates to findings that responses to moral dilemmas phrased in the 
third person or the first person result in differing degrees of utilitarianism, with third 
person perspectives eliciting a greater proportion of utilitarian responses (e.g., 
Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008).  
Moral Inconsistency in Anti-Social Personalities 
“I am not what I am” – “Iago”  
(Shakespeare, 2005, p. 7)  
Consider Shakespeare’s Iago as the classic hypocrite for example; a modest 
character in public but an immoral character when alone declaring that “I am not what I 
am” (Shakespeare, 2005, p. 7). Indeed, inconsistency between moral judgment and 
action is well established in results demonstrating that institutionalised psychopaths 
have intact understanding of moral codes yet display anti-social behaviours (Cima, 
Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Kiehl, 2008). These findings also translate to non-
institutionalised populations in the finding that healthy individuals with high 
psychopathic traits and low Honesty-Humility endorse utilitarian responses for action-
choice questions (“Would you do it?”) but not for judgment questions (“Is it morally 
acceptable?”) (e.g., Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014; Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013).  
Dysfunction in areas of the prefrontal cortex have been observed in these 
instances of “…sociomoral deterioration” or the dissociation between understanding 
and moral behaviour (Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 2006, p. 352). In early research, H. 
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Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and Damasio (1994) found that patients with 
damage to ventral and medial areas of the frontal lobes, displayed emotional deficits but 
more specifically, failed to apply “somatic markers” or bodily responses with emotional 
significance (A. Damasio, 1994). Further, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson 
(1994) found that these patients demonstrated impaired real-life judgments in the Iowa 
Gambling Task. Participants were sat in front of four virtual card decks and were asked 
to repeatedly select cards in order to win as much money as possible. By selecting a 
card, the participant would receive an amount of money but occasionally, would also 
lose an amount of money. Hence, some decks were deemed good and others bad based 
on whether selecting cards from them would result in long-term gains versus losses. 
When completing the task, healthy participants tended to switch to using good decks, 
anticipating the long-term consequences of selecting bad decks. On the other hand, 
impaired patients tended to remain oblivious to the long-term consequences, repeatedly 
selecting bad decks throughout the task (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, 
& Damasio, 1996). Importantly, while these patients displayed impairment in real-life 
decision making, they demonstrated intact intellectual abilities and knowledge of social 
and moral conventions (e.g., A. Damasio, 1994). Further, in the context of morality 
specifically, Saver and Damasio (1991) found that a patient with VMPFC damage, 
demonstrated impairments in social behaviour while displaying intact social knowledge 
and moral reasoning.   
Research has theorised that deficits in empathic skills, may result in these 
morally inappropriate behaviours (Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009). More 
specifically, psychopathic individuals demonstrate impairments in emotional empathy 
but their cognitive and motor empathy remains intact (e.g., Blair, 2005; Decety & 
Moriguchi, 2007). This has been supported in neuroscientific studies examining high 
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trait psychopaths, who exhibit reduced activity in brain regions involved in moral 
decision-making, including the amygdala, medial frontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and 
angular gyrus (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009) and across the paralimbic system in 
general (Kiehl, 2008). Whilst activity in the amygdala is associated with emotion and 
detecting distress cues in others, activations in these latter regions have been found to be 
involved in emotional perspective taking and self-referential thinking (Glenn, Raine, & 
Schug, 2009). In fact, a recent study found that psychopathy was associated with 
increased activation in the DLPFC, an area associated with cognitive control in moral 
decision-making, when responding to personal moral dilemmas (Glenn, Raine, Schug, 
Young, & Hauser, 2009). Crucially, there was no significant association between the 
proportion of utilitarian endorsements and psychopathy score, supporting the notion that 
psychopaths tend to produce similar moral judgments (Cima et al., 2010; Kiehl, 2008; 
Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013) despite differences in neural activation in the DLPFC 
(Glenn, Raine, Schug, et al., 2009) and areas of the paralimbic system including the 
amygdala (e.g., Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Kiehl, 2008).  
The process of empathising in the context of moral dilemmas, might involve 
taking the perspective of a potential victim and experiencing a vicarious awareness of 
their distress which subsequently influences moral decision-making (Patil, 2015). The 
self-referent nature of action choices means that when individuals are faced with the 
prospect of carrying out the harmful actions described in personal moral dilemmas, they 
refuse to endorse the utilitarian outcome because “…they take into account the suffering 
and pain that such an action would elicit” (Cushman, 2013; Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & 
Mendes, 2012; Patil, 2015, p. 351; Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013). Following from this, it 
might be that the increased propensity in psychopathy to endorse supposedly “utilitarian” 
actions is as a result of diminished aversion to performing harmful actions (Patil, 2015).  
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This has been supported in psychopharmacological studies demonstrating that 
increasing serotonin functioning, which is often diminished in psychopathy, enhances 
harm aversion in moral decision-making (Crockett et al., 2010). With judgments, on the 
other hand, being driven by a supposedly allocentric perspective, individuals scoring 
high in psychopathy retain an intact knowledge and understanding of moral norms (e.g., 
Cima et al., 2010) and may be inclined to respond to judgment questions in a way that 
will make them appear “normal” to others (Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013).  
Overall, evidence for diminished harm aversion and disparity between moral 
judgment and moral action in these populations (e.g., Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013), endorses the view that moral 
judgments and actions may be driven by at least partially distinct mechanisms (Tassy, 
Deruelle, et al., 2013; Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013). 
Measuring Moral Judgment and Moral Action 
To further the discussion regarding the relationship between moral judgment and 
moral action, the current measures adopted in the moral domain as a means of assessing 
morality must be addressed.  
At the methodological level, researchers tend to present trolley-like problems to 
participants in text-based paradigms that require a subsequent moral judgment. 
Typically, participants are asked whether the utilitarian act described in the dilemma is 
“appropriate” or “acceptable”. In their conception, these hypothetical moral dilemmas 
were not intended to reveal insights into real-life decisions but instead, in their 
experimental simplicity, allow moral scientists to explore the “…foundational 
psychological processes that underlie human moral cognition” (Christensen & Gomila, 
2012, p. 1250). The level of experimental control available to scientists in incorporating 
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these paradigms is paramount; allowing moral conflicts to arise in artificial contexts 
with anonymous agents (e.g., Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Hauser et al., 2007).  
Despite the prevalent use of these paradigms, concerns have been raised about 
the preciseness with which moral dilemmas have been constructed (Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012). Differences in several factors including framing, word count, 
perspective, situational circumstances, and type of question have been shown to 
influence moral judgments (e.g., Bartels et al., 2015; Christensen & Gomila, 2012). In a 
well-known framing study for example, participants were found to endorse utilitarian 
outcomes when the phrasing “save” was used as opposed to “kill” (Petrinovich & 
ONeill, 1996). I can also refer back to research examining the distinction between 
judgment questions and action-choice questions, which elicit distinct moral judgments 
(Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013).  
In addition to disagreement over the formulations of these moral dilemmas, 
research has also questioned the ability of these paradigms to reflect genuine 
deontological or utilitarian responses (e.g., Bartels et al., 2015; Kahane, Everett, Earp, 
Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). According to classical utilitarianism, individuals should 
maximise welfare for the greatest number of people (Bentham, 1789/2007). When 
individuals consider the self-sacrifice necessary to follow such a principle, it becomes a 
“…highly demanding moral view” (Kahane et al., 2015, p. 193). As such, labelling 
endorsements of harm in personal and impersonal moral dilemmas as being “utilitarian” 
might implicate impartial concern for the greater good in sacrificial dilemmas, which 
does not appear to be the case (e.g., Gawronski, 2016; Kahane, 2012; Kahane et al., 
2015). The same might be said for deontology which classically denotes a moral ideal 
formed around rights and duties (Kant, 1785/2002).   
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Further, there appears to be no way of separating the motives behind moral 
decisions made in trolley-type problems. For example, in the footbridge dilemma, 
researchers have no clear method for distinguishing the action of pushing the person as 
(i) a utilitarian moral decision grounded in the belief that killing one to save the 
majority is most important, or as (ii) an “un-deontological” decision driven by less 
aversion to harm (Bartels et al., 2015; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cushman et al., 
2012; Patil, 2015). This has implications for previous research showing that people 
possessing antisocial personality traits tend to endorse more harmful actions; these 
would be masked as being utilitarian with alternative motives hidden (e.g., Bartels & 
Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014; Gao & Tang, 2013).  
Greene has attempted to address these criticisms by arguing that responses are 
“characteristically” utilitarian or deontological (Cushman et al., 2010; Greene, 2008). 
For example, in Greene’s model, a “characteristically deontological” or “non-utilitarian” 
judgment is also concerned with certain moral rules (Greene, 2008) but more 
specifically, the rule that it is wrong to harm “…despite the benefits” (Greene, 2008, p. 
361) and a “characteristically utilitarian” judgment favours consequentialist outcomes 
and more specifically, the conclusion that it is better to save more lives (Greene, 2008). 
Essentially, specific characteristics of these moral ideologies do apply to sacrificial 
moral dilemmas (e.g., “better to save more” versus “wrong to harm despite benefits”) 
(Cushman et al., 2010; Greene, 2008) even if they do not reflect the overall and 
demanding moral ideology itself (Kahane et al., 2015). Here, and in line with previous 
literature, I adopt the labels “utilitarian” and “non-utilitarian” as defined using Greene’s 
“characteristically” non-utilitarian and utilitarian framework.  
Recent attempts to validate moral dilemmas have addressed previous 
inconsistencies in formulation (e.g., Christensen, Flexas, Calabrese, Gut, & Gomila, 
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2014) and previous attempts to label individuals as either utilitarian or deontological 
have been challenged with research arguing that people instead, tend to adopt a 
“…particularist approach to morals that takes the details of each case into account” 
(Christensen et al., 2014, p. 16).  Whilst the methodology is valuable in shedding light 
on the mechanisms underlying moral judgments (Christensen et al., 2014), there remain 
gaps in our understanding; again, research has asked how declarations made in response 
to these text-based paradigms, translate into real-world moral behaviours (Parsons, 2015; 
Teper, Tullett, Page-Gould, & Inzlicht, 2015).   
Attempts to explicate moral behaviour have largely explored non-harmful 
actions in economical paradigms (Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012) and so 
the investigation of harmful moral actions has made little headway. While text-based 
moral dilemmas possess an advantage in producing unambiguous outputs, these 
questionnaire-based paradigms “…only offer a very low degree of immersion” 
(Skulmowski, Bunge, Kaspar, & Pipa, 2014, p. 2). In fact, FeldmanHall et al. (2012) 
found that these contextually impoverished scenarios, elicited distinct moral decisions 
to those made in real counterparts of the same scenario. Critically, by increasing the 
amount of contextual information available in the hypothetical scenario, the researchers 
were able to bring hypothetical moral choices in keeping with real moral choices. This 
line of research would suggest that contextual richness alters moral decisions and raises 
further questions regarding the reliance on text-based moral dilemmas in moral 
psychology (FeldmanHall et al., 2012).   
Moral Actions in “Virtual Reality” 
The evidence supporting a partial dissociation between moral judgments and 
moral actions (e.g., Cima et al., 2010; Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013) and the potential for 
contextual information to bridge the gap allowing assessment of moral actions 
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(FeldmanHall et al., 2012), highlights the need for a contextually rich testing tool. 
Fortunately, the emergence of contextually salient VR technologies, have opened 
opportunities to explore simulated harmful moral actions in environments free from 
issues concerning de-contextualisation (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009; Navarrete et 
al., 2012; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014; Skulmowski et al., 2014).  
VR systems adopt sensory-tracking, most commonly head-tracking, to immerse 
participants within life-size simulated environments (see Figure 1.2). In these dynamic 
environments, researchers can begin to investigate theoretical and normative decisions 
in the framework of moral action (Navarrete et al., 2012); “would someone … actually 
resort to this course of action when the full repertoire of contextual features comes into 
play?” (Patil et al., 2014, p. 95). Crucially, while previous research has examined 
action-choice questions (“Would you do it?”) as distinct from judgment questions (“Is it 
morally acceptable?”), both of these remain self-reported moral judgments; an action-
choice question is only “…what the participants think their action could be if they were 
to make the decision in real-life” (Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013, p. 2). 
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Figure 1.2. Head-tracking VR systems. The Oculus Rift is a headset device that 
immerses individuals within a life-size simulated virtual world. The picture shows a 
participant wearing the Oculus Rift 1. Photograph taken and edited by the author; June, 
2016.  
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In this virtual domain of moral psychology, attempts to reproduce moral 
dilemmas in VR have revealed mixed findings regarding the relationship between moral 
judgment and action (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014). To date, virtual 
moral simulations have incorporated impersonal moral dilemmas only (Navarrete et al., 
2012; Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 2014; Skulmowski et al., 2014). In an early study, 
Navarrete et al. (2012) created a virtual version of the switch dilemma. In this paradigm, 
virtual simulated actions were compared to theoretical moral judgments and 
electrodermal activity was measured to assess arousal. In both the action and judgment 
conditions, the majority of people endorsed utilitarian outcomes with increased 
emotional arousal associated with decreased utilitarian judgments. This supports the 
generalisation of Greene’s model to the context of moral action (Greene et al., 2001; 
Skulmowski et al., 2014).   
More recently, Skulmowski et al. (2014) advanced this research and created the 
switch dilemma in VR with the user acting as the driver of the train rather than being a 
passive onlooker. The authors presented the same dilemma multiple times predicting a 
behavioural pattern of responses moving from immediate and automatic, to socially 
desirable. Participants showed response patterns similar to that of previous studies using 
hypothetical dilemmas (e.g. Greene et al., 2001) with the majority of responses being 
utilitarian in nature. The authors used eye-tracking as opposed to electrodermal analysis 
and found that participants tended to look at the virtual character in danger for an 
extended time. A limitation of this study was that some trials involved responding to 
one-to-one dilemmas and may not be comparable to the classic moral dilemma 
frameworks frequently used in this field (Skulmowski et al., 2014).  
On the contrary, further virtual studies have found that utilitarian responses were 
greater for impersonal dilemmas in VR when action was required than for their 
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judgment counterparts (Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 2014). In research carried out by 
Patil et al. (2014), the authors incorporated a desktop VR hardware system and 
presented four virtual impersonal dilemmas to participants. Electrodermal activity was 
measured to assess arousal. Unlike the findings from Navarrete et al. (2012), Patil et al. 
(2014) found that virtual dilemmas increased arousal to a greater extent than text-based 
dilemmas with greater utilitarian actions endorsed in VR. They argue that Cushman’s 
action-outcome model explained their findings; the saliency of the virtual environment 
meant that the outcome-based value associated with not acting to save endangered 
victims had a stronger negative value, than choosing to carry out a harmful action 
against one individual (Patil et al., 2014).When contextual features are available, the 
“…influence of harm aversion diminishes as the impact of other motivational 
forces…become more salient” (FeldmanHall et al., 2012, p. 440). Taken together, these 
studies support previous findings regarding the disparity between judgment and action 
(Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013).   
Overall, while some research has demonstrated consistency between judgments 
in original text-based paradigms and simulated actions in virtual counterparts (Navarrete 
et al., 2012; Skulmowski et al., 2014), contrasting research has demonstrated a disparity 
with greater utilitarian endorsements observed in virtual dilemmas (Pan & Slater, 2011; 
Patil et al., 2014).  
Virtual Morality: Ethics and Realism 
VR systems offer considerable advantages as, unlike other domains in which 
actions can be examined both in the laboratory and in the field, the domain of morality 
presents unique ethical challenges (Navarrete et al., 2012; Slater et al., 2006). While 
economic paradigms have begun to shed light on non-harmful actions (e.g., Gold, 
Pulford, & Colman, 2015), studies investigating morality of harm have remained largely 
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non-behavioural (Navarrete et al., 2012) for the reason that, ethically, harmful 
behaviours prove difficult to test (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014; Rovira, 
Swapp, Spanlang, & Slater, 2009). Although the incorporation of harm-based moral 
dilemmas, whether text-based or virtual, is a somewhat limited approach (Cushman et 
al., 2010) helping us to investigate “…only a fragment of our moral psychology”, it is a 
“…potentially significant one” (Hauser et al., 2007, p. 4). The application of VR to 
study harm-specific moral actions, for example, has significance for professions 
exposed to sensitive and emotionally arousing moral decision-making on a regular basis. 
Emergency service professionals have begun to adopt VR systems for several reasons; 
not only do they offer full immersion but they are also both cost-effective and safe in 
contexts where there is little room for error (e.g., Andreatta et al., 2010). This 
application of VR demonstrates its broader value (e.g., Rovira et al., 2009); 
investigating real-world moral decision-making beyond that of hypothetical scenarios 
centred round normative theories (Parsons, 2015).  
The level of “realism” available in virtual environments not only relies on visual 
saliency but also on “sensorimotor contingencies” or the congruence between motor 
actions and sensory simulation (e.g., Rovira et al., 2009; Skulmowski et al., 2014). 
Presently, VR systems can only “…offer crude approximations” of sensorimotor 
contingencies (Rovira et al., 2009, p. 2) and subsequent plausibility. Despite this 
shortcoming, research has shown that even basic virtual environments can elicit a range 
of realistic responses (e.g., Rovira et al., 2009; Slater et al., 2006) providing 
opportunities to bridge the “reality gap” in social domains (Rovira et al., 2009, p. 2). 
Essentially, if the virtual environment can deliver the subjective experience of “being 
there” (Carassa, Morganti, & Tirassa, 2005, p. 384), life-like thoughts and emotions can 
be elicited (Rovira et al., 2009; Skulmowski et al., 2014). Importantly, research has 
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shown that VR systems can offer successful collaboration between the experimental 
control available in laboratory settings and components of ecological validity in 
providing enhanced affective experiences (e.g., Parsons, 2015; Rosenberg, Baughman, 
& Bailenson, 2013; Rovira et al., 2009; Teper et al., 2015).  
In fact, with regards to making virtual environments true-to-life, we face a 
paradox in research settings; preserving the distinction between reality and VR is 
essential for ethical reasons (Slater et al., 2006). If the boundary were to breakdown, 
then the potentially hazardous reasons for not evaluating moral choices in the field in 
the first place would become of concern in VR paradigms (Rovira et al., 2009). Despite 
the compromise here between bridging the reality gap and preserving the technological 
boundary, fundamentally, VR systems can generate experiences and trigger emotions 
that de-contextualised and impoverished text-based paradigms cannot (Parsons, 2015; 
Patil et al., 2014; Rovira et al., 2009; Skulmowski et al., 2014).  
General Hypotheses 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine whether moral actions and moral 
judgments are distinct and to identify the role of personality traits and associated 
emotional processes in these moral judgment and moral action frameworks.  
In terms of VR paradigms specifically, research has produced mixed findings 
regarding the association between moral judgments in text-based paradigms and moral 
actions made in VR paradigms (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014).  If 
Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment also applies to moral actions (e.g., 
Navarrete et al., 2012; Skulmowski et al., 2014), individuals might make as few 
utilitarian actions in VR as utilitarian judgments in traditional paradigms (Greene et al., 
2001). On the other hand, if Cushman’s action-outcome model applies, as described by 
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Patil et al. (2014), a stronger negative value might be assigned to outcomes in the virtual 
scenario, leading to a greater number of utilitarian actions (Cushman, 2013). Chapters 2 
and 3 of this thesis incorporate virtual moral dilemmas in order to address this.  
Beyond VR paradigms and in terms of examining moral inconsistency, previous 
research has suggested that the distinction between moral judgment and moral action 
may be driven by anti-social traits such as psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010; Kiehl, 2008; 
Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013) which result in diminished aversion to performing harmful 
actions (e.g., Patil, 2015). If anti-social personality traits (and associated traits) are 
predictors of harmful actions, they might predict utilitarian actions in VR but not 
utilitarian judgments in text-based counterparts. Here, I define moral actions as those 
simulated in virtual moral dilemmas as opposed to action-choice questions (e.g., 
“Would you do it?”) which I argue remain moral judgments in their theoretical nature. 
Across the experimental chapters in this thesis, the relationship between anti- and pro-
social traits, and moral actions are investigated.  
In the following two chapters, four primary experiments will be presented that 
incorporate novel VR paradigms to study simulated moral actions, comparing them to 
moral judgments. Across all experimental chapters, I will investigate psychopathy and 
associated traits and their roles in moral judgment versus moral action. In the final two 
experimental chapters of this thesis, I will present two experiments that investigate the 
emotional processes underlying personality trait profiles in order to identify the 
motivations driving moral judgments versus moral actions. Taken together, the 
investigations presented in this thesis, will subsequently allow a methodological critique 
of the incorporation of VR technologies within the domain of moral cognition.  
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CHAPTER 2: UTILITARIAN MORAL ACTIONS IN VIRTUAL REALITY 
Introduction 
The present experiments investigated the relationship between simulated moral 
actions made in a VR dilemma and moral judgments made in a text-based counterpart. 
Whilst previous studies incorporating VR within moral frameworks have provided the 
foundations for further virtual studies in the moral domain (Navarrete et al., 2012; Pan 
& Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 2014; Skulmowski et al., 2014), they have yet to incorporate 
up-close and personal moral dilemmas in VR. This is significant, as the distinction 
between the switch dilemma and footbridge dilemma allows the examination of 
principles such as action, intention, contact, and personal force (Cushman & Greene, 
2012). Importantly, in personal dilemmas, the proportion of utilitarian responses varies 
significantly due to conflict (Patil et al., 2014). As such, the investigation of personal 
dilemmas in action frameworks is essential in interpreting the influence of highly 
arousing scenarios on the moral decision-making framework (Patil et al., 2014; 
Skulmowski et al., 2014). To my knowledge, these experiments are the first to 
implement a personal dilemma (the footbridge dilemma) in immersive VR.  
Specific Hypotheses 
Based on my general hypotheses, the experiments presented here, explored the 
relationship between moral judgments and moral actions to investigate whether they 
were associated or distinct using a personal moral dilemma. These experiments also 
assessed the role of personality traits, including trait psychopathy, in predicting moral 
judgments and/or moral actions.  
Additionally, physiological arousal was measured in the form of heart rate 
response. Given the novelty and visual saliency of VR, heart rate response was assessed 
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in control (non-moral) tasks and also experimental (moral) tasks to primarily examine 
whether arousal was triggered by modality or moral context. Additionally, according to 
existing dual-process models of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001) and previous 
virtual paradigms assessing arousal (Navarrete et al., 2012), heart rate change is 




Forty participants comprising 35 females and five males, (Mage = 26.00, SD = 
9.77 years, age range: 18 - 52 years)
2
  were recruited from the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The majority of participants were 
right-handed (92.5%). This research received ethical approval from the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee with written consent obtained from all individuals.  
Personality Measures 
All participants were asked to complete an electronic questionnaire comprising 
three self-report questionnaires assessing pro- and anti-social traits associated with 
psychopathy: 
 The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) (Levenson, Kiehl, & 
Fitzpatrick, 1995) is a self-report measure of psychopathy intended for research 
purposes. It has a two-factor structure assessing both primary (i.e., selfishness) (16 
                                                          
2
 Gender differences in moral decision-making are vastly debated. There is no clear evidence for why 
gender differences should exist and the evolutionary basis for these is unknown (Christensen et al., 2014). 
As such, any considerations regarding these are sensitive and require explicit investigations that go 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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items; α = .81) and secondary psychopathic traits (i.e., impulsivity) (10 items; α = .68) 
in non-institutionalised populations. The scale contains 26 items total, rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The scale includes items 
such as “For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with”.   
The Hexaco-IP-PR (Ashton & Lee, 2009) is a personality inventory designed to 
assess six dimensions of personality. The inventory assesses the characteristics of 
Honesty-Humility (Items 10; α = .82), Emotionality (Items 10; α = .85), Extraversion 
(Items 10; α = .67), Agreeableness (Items 10; α = .82), Conscientiousness (Items 10; α 
= .80) and Openness to experience (Items 10; α = .84). The inventory contains 60 items 
with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree).  The inventory contains items such as “I wouldn’t pretend to like 
someone just to get that person to do favours for me”. 
 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983) is an inventory designed 
to measure dispositional empathy. It contains four subscales to measure Perspective 
Taking, Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy Seeking.  The inventory 
contains 28 items with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = Does not 
describe me well to E = Describes me very well). The scale contains items such as “I 
really get involved with the feelings of characters in a novel” (αs = .80 - .85). 
Moral Judgment and Action Measures  
The experiment comprised two conditions to which participants were randomly 
allocated; a judgment condition (N = 20) and an action condition (N = 20). In the action 
condition, participants were first given a virtual non-moral task that required them to 
push a virtual object in space after hearing a tone. This task was included to ensure that 
increased arousal could be attributed to the moral nature of the experimental scenario as 
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opposed to the saliency of the virtual modality. The virtual moral task was an audio-
visual VR version of the footbridge dilemma as described in Foot (1978). In the 
scenario, the participant viewed the scene in first person view. The landscape in the 
virtual scenario was kept neutral with hills in the background and a neutral “skybox” or 
representation of the sky was incorporated. Specifically, participants stood on a 
footbridge with a large virtual human standing in front of them. Next, a trolley car 
(modern train railcar) approached from behind and travelled towards five virtual 
humans standing on the tracks in front of the participant (Figure 2.1). Participants had to 
decide whether they wanted to push the large person off the bridge to stop the trolley 
car’s progress or to allow the trolley car to continue and kill the five people standing on 
the tracks. Both the non-moral task and moral task were programmed in JavaScript 
within the Unity 3D game software environment. Verbal instructions played during the 
3D scenario and specific instructions were given prior to the moral task, explaining that 
this task involved using a joystick but that participants would be given a choice about 
whether they wanted to interact with the virtual object or not. The VR dilemma began 
with a 30 second period of ambient noise and no verbal instructions to allow the 
participants to familiarise themselves with the virtual environment. After 30 seconds, 
verbal instructions informed participants that a trolley car was approaching (“Look 
behind you, a train is coming.”). After a further 25 seconds, a second verbal dialogue 
then followed (“Hey I am too far away but if you want to save the people you could 
push the large person on to the tracks and derail the train. If you’re going to push them, 
do it now, but it is your choice.”). Participants were then given a maximum of ten 
seconds to respond to the dilemma by either pushing the person with the joystick or by 
choosing to do nothing.
3
 As the trolley car approached and at a marked time interval, 
the people on the tracks began to shout for help. If the large person was pushed, they 
                                                          
3
 The response time was selected based on that adopted in previous virtual paradigms (Patil et al., 2014).   
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would also shout. The virtual environment also included other salient features including 
the sound of the trolley car approaching. After the trolley car had either collided with 
the large person’s body or with the people on the tracks, participants were left in the 
virtual environment for a further five seconds to ensure that they had seen and 
understood the consequences of their actions.  
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Figure 2.1. Virtual Reconstruction of the Footbridge Dilemma 
 
Figure 2.1.  Stereoscopic image showing a scene from the footbridge virtual dilemma 
through the Oculus Rift head-mounted display. The image is taken from the perspective 
of the participant at the end of the scenario in which the trolley car is about to collide 
with five virtual avatars standing on the tracks below. Participants are able to rotate in 
the virtual environment with voice commands included to ensure full understanding of 
the events being played out.                
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In the judgment condition, participants were first given a text-based non-moral 
task that comprised a set of instructions displayed in the format of the pending 
dilemmas. In the text-based moral task, participants were given a vignette describing the 
footbridge dilemma embedded in a further nine distracter moral dilemmas (see 
Appendix 2.1). These moral dilemmas were selected from those originally used in 
Greene et al., (2001; 2008) and were presented electronically in a random order. In the 
final section of each dilemma, participants were asked a judgment question (“Is it 
morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”). After a response was given, a 
second action-choice question was displayed asking (“Would you do it?”). Participants 
were given ten seconds to respond to each question, matching the response time given 
in the virtual moral task. Participants responded by selecting “Yes” (Y - key) or “No” 
(N - key) and responses were recorded.
4
   
Physiological Measures  
 Heart rate was recorded using a Cateye PL-6000 heart rate monitor in both 
conditions before and after non-moral and moral tasks. This provided a means of 
examining arousal (Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014). The ear lobe clip was 
attached before participants began the electronic questionnaire to ensure that the device 
was working and to ensure that participants could adjust to the set-up. Given that rate of 
heart rate change (bpm) is not stable and can be either gradual or abrupt, heart rate 
readings were taken at onset and offset of the current task. The duration of time between 
onset and offset heart rate readings was dependent on task type and for the judgment 
task, determined by self-paced reading speed.   
                                                          
4
 Response times in the action condition were recorded in Unity while those in the judgment condition 
were recorded in E-prime. Both software have different time recording sensitivities and as such, I could 
not carry out a reliable comparison between reaction times. 
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In the action condition, heart rate readings were taken at the onset and offset of 
the virtual non-moral task. The onset was defined as the moment in which the VR task 
started. Offset was defined as the moment when the VR task automatically stopped after 
participants had pushed the object. This task was self-paced.  Heart rate readings were 
also taken at the onset of the virtual moral task (when the virtual moral task started) and 
at the offset, which was defined as five seconds after the temporal events in the virtual 
scenario had played out (i.e., the train had collided with the large person or the five 
people on the tracks). The time between onset heart rate and offset heart rate was 90 
seconds. Heart rate sampling was performed to assess whether changes in arousal were 
a result of the moral nature of the dilemma itself rather than the novelty of being in VR.  
In the judgment condition, heart rate measurements were taken at the onset and 
offset of the text-based non-moral task. The length of the task was self-paced as a result 
of individual reading speeds. In the text-based moral task, heart rate readings were taken 
on presentation of the first text section of the footbridge dilemma (onset) and after 
participants had responded to the dilemma (offset). Heart rate change was calculated for 
the text-based non-moral task and for the text-based moral task (footbridge).  
Procedure  
 All participants first completed the personality trait assessments electronically 
before being randomly allocated to one of the two conditions. In the judgment condition, 
all scenarios were presented on a computer running E-prime software. In the action 
condition, participants first completed an electronic pre-questionnaire assessing their 
gaming experience (hours per week of video game play and number of games played 
annually) (see Appendix 2.2). Both the virtual non-moral task and virtual moral task 
were presented via the Oculus Rift head-mounted display which was setup using the 
Oculus SDK 1 development kit. The Oculus Rift is a head mounted VR system that 
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provides an immersive, motion tracked, 3-D experience. The device uses a 7-inch 
screen with a colour depth of 24 bits per pixel generating a VR environment with a wide 
field of view (110º diagonal) and resolution of 1280 x 800 pixels (640 x 800 per eye). 
Head orientation tracking is enabled via a head tracker which runs at 250 Hz. During the 
tasks, the participants also wore a pair of Sennheiser headphones and interacted with the 
scene using a joystick.  
Results 
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
For the action condition, endorsing a utilitarian outcome and pushing the person 
in VR was not associated with prior gaming experience (ps >.105).
5
  
Moral Responses  
Judgments made in response to the text-based footbridge moral dilemma were 
compared with actions made in response to the virtual footbridge dilemma. In the 
judgment condition, when asked if the action described was morally acceptable, 20% of 
participants endorsed a utilitarian response (i.e., judged that they regarded pushing the 
person as morally acceptable). In the action condition, 70% of participants endorsed a 
utilitarian response, significantly more than in the judgment condition, (χ²(1) = 10.10, p 
= .001). The odds of participants endorsing a utilitarian response were 9.33 times higher 
in the action condition than in the judgment condition. When asked if they would 
perform the action (action-choice question) in the judgment condition, 10% of 
participants endorsed a utilitarian response to the footbridge dilemma, compared to the 
70% who endorsed the action in the virtual dilemma, (χ²(1) = 15.00, p < .001) (see 
Figure 2.2).  
                                                          
5
 For notes regarding statistical assumption checks and analysis decisions for all chapters, please see 
Statistical Note (p. 191). 

























Figure 2.2. Responses (%) in the action condition and judgment condition in response 
to the footbridge dilemma. In the judgment condition, participants were asked whether 
the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of 
utilitarian outcomes were endorsed in the action condition. Error bars represent +- 1 SEp. 
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In the judgment condition for the text-based version of the footbridge dilemma, 
no significant difference was found when comparing responses to the judgment question 
(i.e., moral acceptability) and the action-choice question (i.e., whether they would do it), 
(p = .625).  
Heart Rate Analyses 
In both the judgment and action conditions, heart rate change was computed by 
calculating the difference between heart rate readings (bpm) taken at the onset of the 
task and readings taken at the offset of the task. Heart rate changes were computed for 
each participant in the non-moral task and in the moral task of their assigned condition. 
These were averaged to produce mean heart rate change for non-moral and moral tasks 
in each condition. In the judgment condition, heart rate decreased during the non-moral 
task (M = -2.45, SD = 4.19) and in the moral task (M = -0.45, SD = 1.79). In the action 
condition, heart rate decreased for the non-moral task (M = -3.95, SD = 3.75) but 
increased for the moral task (M = 5.15, SD = 5.84) (see Figure 2.3).  
  
** 


































Figure 2.3. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for moral and non-moral tasks in both the 
judgment and action conditions. Increased heart rate was observed in the virtual moral 
dilemma. Error bars represent +- 1 SE. 
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A mixed ANOVA was conducted with task (non-moral task; moral task) as the 
within-subjects factor and condition (judgment; action) as the between-subjects factor. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (F(1, 38) = 41.51, p < .001, ηp² = .52) condition, 
(F(1, 38) = 4.28, p = .045, ηp² = .10) and a significant interaction of task x condition, 
(F(1, 38) = 16.99, p < .001, ηp² = .31). To further investigate this interaction, simple 
effects analyses were performed comparing heart rate change in non-moral and moral 
tasks in both conditions (see Statistical Note (2.1)). This analysis suggested that for the 
non-moral task, heart rate changes were not significantly different between judgment 
and action conditions, (p = .240). However, for the moral task, analysis suggested that 
heart rate changes were significantly different between conditions, (F(1, 38) = 16.80, p 
< .001, ηp² = .31). Specifically, in the action condition, heart rate changes were 
significantly greater in the virtual moral task than in the virtual non-moral task, (F(1, 38) 
= 55.80, p < .001, ηp² = .60).
6
  
I assessed whether heart rate change was associated with an increase in 
utilitarian responses in logistic regression models incorporating heart rate change and its 
interaction effect with condition (judgment [judgment question, action-choice question], 
action). As expected, the regression supported previous chi-square analyses (see Figure 
2.2) revealing a positive relationship between condition (referencing action condition) 
and the odds of endorsing a utilitarian response. This was the case when using the 
judgment question, (b = 2.23, Wald X²(1) = 9.06, p = .003) and also the action-choice 
question, (b = 3.05, Wald X²(1) = 11.68, p = .001). However, the analysis revealed no 
significant relationship between heart rate changes and the likelihood of endorsing a 
utilitarian response in either condition (ps > .359).   
                                                          
6
 The ratio of greatest and least variance in heart rate change was >3 and as such, this analysis was 
repeated and findings replicated using Generalised Estimating Equations, which does not assume 
homogeneity of variance (see Statistical Note (2.2)).   
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Personality Trait Analyses 
In order to assess any differences in personality trait scores between the 
judgment and action conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait 
measures. No significant differences between the judgment and action conditions were 
found (all ps > .313), except for Conscientiousness, (F(1, 38) = 4.25, p =.046, ηp² = .10) 
which was higher in the action condition. Emotionality, (F (1, 38) = 3.84, p = .058) and 
Openness, (F(1, 38) = 3.63, p = .064) were marginally significantly different between 
conditions (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1   
Means and Standard Deviations for LSRP, HEXACO-PI-IR and IRI Subscales 
Measure Subscale 
Condition 
Judgment  Action 
M(SD)  M(SD) 
1. LSRP     
 Primary 28.70(6.62)   28.70(5.36) 
 Secondary 21.60(4.52)  19.70(4.03) 
2.  HEXACO     
 H 3.58(0.73)  3.53(0.60) 
 Em 3.32(0.70)  3.74(0.67) 
 Ex 3.23(0.50)  3.37(0.51) 
 A 3.11(0.78)  3.03(0.65) 
 C 3.47(0.70)*  3.86(0.47)* 
 O 3.53(0.72)  3.11(0.67) 
3. IRI      
 PT 19.45(5.29)  18.10(5.10) 
 EC 17.80(5.86)  19.15(5.63) 
 PD 11.35(5.11)  12.45(6.39) 
 FS 20.40(6.04)  21.35(3.95) 
Note. H = Honesty-Humility, Em = Emotionality, Ex = Extraversion, A = 
Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, O = Openness to experience. PT = Perspective 
Taking, EC = Empathic Concern, PD = Personal Distress, FS = Fantasy Seeking.   
*p <.05   
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First, in order to determine whether psychopathic traits predicted utilitarian 
responses as in previous studies (e.g., Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013), univariate logistic 
regressions were performed with condition (judgment; action) as the selection variable, 
primary and secondary psychopathy as the continuous predictors and response as the 
categorical outcome (non-utilitarian; utilitarian). In the judgment condition, responses to 
both action-choice and judgment questions were analysed. For the judgment condition, 
neither dimension of psychopathy was a significant predictor of utilitarian responses to 
each question (ps > .159). In the action condition, primary psychopathy was a 
marginally significant predictor of utilitarian responses, (b = 0.21, Wald X²(1) = 3.54, p 
= .060) (see Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2  
Logistic Regression with Primary Psychopathy as Predictor 
 
 
 95% CI for Odds Ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included      
Constant  -4.98 (3.09)    
Psychopathy      
       Primary 0.21* (0.11) 0.99 1.23 1.53 
 
Note. R² = .18 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .20 (Cox & Snell), .28 (Nagelkerke).  Model 
X²(1) = 4.38, p = .04. (SE) = standard error. 
*p = .06  
 
Honesty-Humility, a trait negatively correlated with primary psychopathy, (r(40) 
= -.73, p < .001), was found to be a significant negative predictor of utilitarian responses 
in a second univariate logistic regression (including all HEXACO traits) in the action 
condition, (b = -2.53, Wald X²(1) = 3.95, p = .047) (see Table 3). For the judgment 
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condition, Honesty-Humility was not a significant negative predictor of utilitarian 
responses (ps > .256).   
Table 2.3 
Logistic Regression with Honesty-Humility as Predictor  
  
 95% CI for Odds Ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included      
Constant  1.19 (0.67)    
HEXACO      
  H -2.53* (1.27) 0.07 0.08 0.97 
 
Note. H = Honesty-Humility. R² = .25 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .26 (Cox & Snell), .37 
(Nagelkerke).  Model X²(1) = 6.01, p = .01. (SE) = standard error. 
*p = .05 
 
In order to control for the shared association between primary psychopathy and 
Honesty-Humility, principal component analysis (PCA) was used to combine the 
correlated variables into one single factor (see Statistical Note (2.3)). The new factor 
represented the shared variance contributed by primary psychopathy and Honesty-
Humility and represented traits captured by primary psychopathy that are contrary to 
those underlying the prosocial trait, Honesty-Humility. As such, this new factor was 
termed “anti-social tendency”.  
Subsequently, univariate logistic regressions were conducted with condition 
(judgment; action) as the selection variable, personality trait (anti-social tendency) as 
the continuous predictor and response as the categorical outcome (non-utilitarian; 
utilitarian). For the judgment condition, anti-social tendency did not significantly 
predict utilitarian responses to either question (ps > .161). In the action condition, anti-
social tendency was a significant predictor of utilitarian responses, (b = 1.55, Wald X²(1) 
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= 4.20, p = .041) (See Table 2.4). The higher the new composite score, the more likely 
participants were to endorse a utilitarian outcome in the action condition.  
Table 2.4 
Logistic Regression with Composite Anti-Social Tendency Score as Predictor  
  
 95% CI for Odds Ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included      
Constant  1.14 (0.64)    




1.55* (0.76) 1.07 4.70 20.64 
 
Note. R² = .24 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .25 (Cox & Snell), .36 (Nagelkerke).  Model 
X²(1) = 5.87, p = .02. (SE) = standard error. 
*p = .04 
 
The four components of empathy were not found to be significant predictors of 
response type in the judgment condition (ps > .271) or the action condition (ps > .073).   
Summary and Discussion 
In Experiment 1, participants endorsed the utilitarian response of pushing the 
person off the bridge when action was required in VR, but refused to endorse the same 
response when judgment was required in the text-based counterpart.  
Heart rate change was primarily assessed to determine whether arousal was 
triggered by modality or moral content. In the present experiment, heart rate change was 
highest in the action condition when participants completed the virtual moral task while 
there was no difference between groups in arousal in the non-moral tasks. This suggests 
that the VR modality alone was not responsible for this increased arousal. Subsequent 
analysis found that heart rate change did not predict moral responses in either condition. 
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This contradicts previous dual-process models that would argue that personal moral 
dilemmas elicit aversive emotional reactions and subsequently non-utilitarian responses 
(Greene et al., 2001). However it is important to note that arousal responses in the 
present action paradigm were assessed not only across the moment of decision-making 
as in previous research (Navarrete et al., 2012) but also during the time in which 
participants witnessed the consequences of their actions (or omissions of action). This 
may explain why arousal did not predict moral actions in the present experiment.  
Additionally, previous gaming experience did not predict utilitarian responses in 
the action condition; this might suggest that responses in the virtual moral dilemma 
were not akin to those of a gaming environment.  
As a secondary finding, primary psychopathy was found to be a marginal 
predictor of the endorsement of action responses. Honesty-Humility was found to be a 
negative predictor of this endorsement in the action condition only. This can be 
explained given the association between Honesty-Humility and traits such as fairness 
and sincerity. These traits are contrasted with those associated with the Dark Triad of 
personality (Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism) (Ashton & Lee, 2005) 
giving it an inverse association with psychopathy (Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014).  
Given the high correlation between primary psychopathy and Honesty-Humility, the 
underlying shared variance between these was extracted into a composite variable 
termed anti-social tendency and this was found to positively predict utilitarian 
endorsements in the action condition. Although I found that empathy was not a 
significant predictor in either condition, this may have been a result of “…questionable 
levels of content validity” in the present assessment of both cognitive and emotional 
empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012, p. 795). With cognitive empathy often remaining 
intact in individuals who display psychopathic traits (e.g., Blair, 2005), it is important to 
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incorporate empathic assessments that can accurately attribute deficits to either 
cognitive or affective systems (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). In order to address this, 
previous research has assessed cognitive and affective empathy by monitoring 
individual responses to emotional stimuli as opposed to relying on self-report measures 
(Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Future research seeking to understand the role of empathy 
and harm aversion in virtual moral actions should consider adopting a similar paradigm 
(see Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
In the present methodology, it could be argued that the incorporation of a 
joystick device in the virtual moral dilemma, compared to key-based responses in the 
text-based dilemmas, resulted in game-related affordance effects; the joystick itself may 
have primed pushing responses. In order to inspect this further, I carried out a short 
follow-up experiment in which participants refused or endorsed the actions described in 
text-based personal moral dilemmas using either a keyboard (“Y”; “N”) or a joystick 
(pushing forward; pulling back) (see Appendix 2. 3). There were no differences in the 
proportion of utilitarian responses endorsed in these dilemmas based on the response 
device, suggesting that the greater endorsement of utilitarian actions observed in 
Experiment 1 was not likely due to affordance effects.  
However, the nature of the sample in Experiment 1 may constrain the 
generalizability of these results.  The present sample was narrowed in its representation, 
comprising undergraduate psychology students (35 females, 5 males, Mage = 26.00 
years old, SD = 9.77 years). Thus in Experiment 2, I replicated the existing 
methodology but with a qualitatively different sample.   
 
 




In Experiment 2, I examined the same research hypotheses as in Experiment 1, 
leaving all methodological procedures identical. The personality variables included in 
this study were limited to dimensions of psychopathy (αs = .43- .72) and Honesty-
Humility (10 items; α = .76), as these were found to be associated with moral responses 
in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty two participants comprising 41 females and 21 males (Mage = 31.10 years 
old, SD = 15.54 years, age range: 18 - 71 years) were recruited from the public in 
Plymouth, Devon (UK) and the surrounding area using online advertisements. 
Participants were paid for their participation in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The majority of participants were right-handed 
(81.7%). Two participants were excluded from the experiment as they failed to 
complete the task due to lack of understanding. As such, 60 participants comprising 41 
females and 19 males (Mage = 30.05, SD = 14.55 years, age range: 18 - 68 years) 
comprised the final sample. As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly allocated 
to a judgment condition (N = 30) or an action condition (N = 30). This research received 
ethical approval from the Plymouth University Ethics Committee. 
Results  
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
For the action condition, endorsing a utilitarian outcome and pushing the person 
in VR was not associated with prior gaming experience (ps > .307).  
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Moral Responses   
First, responses from the footbridge moral dilemma in the judgment condition 
were compared with those from the virtual action condition. In the judgment condition, 
when asked if the action was morally acceptable, 10% of participants endorsed a 
utilitarian response (i.e., judged that they regarded pushing the person as morally 
acceptable). In the virtual action condition, 63.3% of participants endorsed a utilitarian 
response, significantly more than in the judgment condition, (χ²(1) = 18.37, p < .001). 
The odds of participants endorsing a utilitarian response were 15.55 times higher in the 
action condition than in the judgment condition. When asked if they would perform the 
action (action-choice question) in the judgment condition, the same responses were 
observed with 10% of participants endorsing a utilitarian response to the footbridge 
dilemma, compared to the 63.3% who endorsed the action in the virtual dilemma, (χ²(1) 
= 18.37, p < .001) (see Figure 2.4).  
 
  
























Figure 2.4. Responses (%) in the action condition and judgment condition in response 
to the footbridge dilemma in Experiment 2. In the judgment condition, participants were 
asked whether the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A 
greater number of utilitarian outcomes were endorsed in the action condition. Error bars 
represent +- 1 SEp. 
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In the judgment condition for the text-based version of the footbridge dilemma, 
no significant difference was found when comparing responses to the judgment question 
(i.e., moral acceptability) and the action-choice question (i.e., whether they would do it), 
(p = 1.00). 
Heart Rate Analyses 
In the judgment condition, heart rate decreased during the text-based non-moral 
task (M = -1.37, SD = 1.92) and increased in the text-based moral task (M = 1.47, SD = 
3.27). In the action condition, heart rate decreased for the virtual non-moral task (M = -
2.30, SD = 2.83) and also increased for the virtual moral task (M = 5.63, SD = 6.25) (see 
Figure 2.5).  
  




































Figure 2.5. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for non-moral and moral tasks in both the 
judgment and action conditions. Heart rate change was significantly higher in the virtual 
moral dilemma. Error bars represent +- 1 SE. 
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A mixed ANOVA with task (non-moral task; moral task) as within-subjects 
factor and condition (judgment, action) as the between-subjects factor was performed.  
Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (F(1, 58) = 57.50, p < .001, ηp² = .50) condition, 
(F(1, 58) = 5.03, p = .029, ηp² = .08) and a significant interaction of task x condition, 
(F(1, 58) = 12.90, p = .001, ηp² = .18). To further investigate this interaction, simple 
effects analyses were performed, comparing heart rate change in non-moral and moral 
tasks in both conditions. Analysis suggested that heart rate changes were significantly 
greater in the moral tasks than in the non-moral tasks in both the action condition, (F(1, 
58) = 62.43, p < .001, ηp² = .52) and the judgment condition, (F(1, 58) = 7.96, p = .007, 
ηp² = .12). However, for the moral task, heart rate changes were significantly higher in 
the action condition compared to the judgment condition, (F(1, 58) = 10.47, p = .002, 
ηp² = .15). For the non-moral task, heart rate changes were not significantly different 
between the judgment and action conditions, (p = .140).
7
  
As in Experiment 1, I assessed whether heart rate change was associated with an 
increase in utilitarian responses in logistic regression models. As expected, the 
regression supported previous chi-square analyses (see Figure 2.4) revealing a positive 
relationship between condition (referencing action condition) and the odds of endorsing 
a utilitarian response. This was the case when referencing the judgment condition using 
the judgment question, (b = 2.74, Wald X²(1) = 14.65, p <.001) and also the action-
choice question, (b = 2.74, Wald X²(1) = 14.65, p = .008). However, the analysis 
revealed no significant relationship between heart rate changes and the likelihood of 
endorsing a utilitarian response in either condition (ps > .088).  
 
                                                          
7
 Again, the ratio of greatest and least variance in heart rate change was >3 and as such, this analysis was 
repeated and findings replicated using Generalised Estimating Equations, which does not assume 
homogeneity of variance (see Statistical Note (2.4)).   
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Personality Trait Analyses 
In order to assess any differences in personality trait scores between the 
judgment and action conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait 
measures. A significant difference was found in both primary psychopathy, (F(1, 58) = 
22.09, p < .001, ηp² = .28) and secondary psychopathy, (F(1, 58) = 7.55, p = .008, ηp² 
= .12) between the action and judgment conditions; higher primary psychopathy and 
secondary psychopathy scores were observed in the action condition. No differences 
were found between Honesty-Humility scores (p = .529) (see Table 2.5).  
Table 2.5  
Means and Standard Deviations for LSRP and Honesty-Humility 
Measure Subscale 
Condition 
Judgment  Action 
M(SD)  M(SD) 
1. LSRP     
 Primary 30.60(6.54)**  37.07(3.75)** 
 Secondary 19.67(3.52)*  21.97(2.94)* 
2.  HEXACO     
 H 3.40(0.60)  3.50(0.62) 
Note. H = Honesty-Humility.   
*p <.05  ** p <.001 
 
As in Experiment 1, univariate logistic regressions were conducted with 
condition (judgment; action) as the selection variable, psychopathy subscales as the 
continuous predictors and response as the categorical outcome (non-utilitarian; 
utilitarian). In the judgment condition, responses to both action-choice and judgment 
questions were analysed. Psychopathy subscales were not significant predictors of 
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utilitarian responses in either the judgment condition for both questions (ps > .802) or in 
the action condition (ps > .207).  
Additionally, Honesty-Humility was not a significant negative predictor of 
utilitarian responses in either the judgment condition for both questions (ps > .601) or in 
the action condition (p = .787).
8
   
Summary and Discussion 
Experiment 2 supported the finding that participants endorse the utilitarian 
response of pushing when action is required in VR. However, they refuse to endorse the 
same response when judgment is required in a text-based version of the footbridge 
dilemma. As in Experiment 1, heart rate significantly increased for the virtual moral 
task in the action condition whereas no differences were found between conditions in 
arousal in non-moral tasks. As before, this indicates that the VR modality alone was not 
responsible for increased levels of arousal. Subsequent analysis found that arousal did 
not predict moral responses. As in Experiment 1, this may have been due to the heart 
rate sampling period which incorporated the time in which participants witnessed the 
consequences of their actions. Again, previous gaming experience did not predict 
utilitarian responses in the action condition. Contrary to Experiment 1, primary 
psychopathy and Honesty-Humility did not predict moral actions in VR.  
General Discussion 
Overall, participants behaved differently in judgment-based formulations and 
action-based virtual formulations of the same moral dilemma. In both Experiments 1 
and 2, participants who responded to a virtual personal dilemma, endorsed a greater 
                                                          
8
 In this instance, PCA was not performed given that neither primary psychopathy nor Honesty-Humility 
predicted utilitarian actions. 
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proportion of utilitarian responses than those who responded to the same text-based 
dilemma.  
Given previous theories arguing that personal moral dilemmas elicit immediate 
and aversive emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001), it was theorised that a virtual 
personal dilemma might elicit the same or fewer utilitarian endorsements as in the 
judgment counterpart. However, this cannot explain the results of the present 
experiments as individuals endorsed greater utilitarian actions in VR. At this early stage, 
these results appear to fall in line with the theory of Cushman (2013) regarding outcome 
and action-based value representations. Given the contextual saliency of the virtual 
footbridge dilemma, outcome-based value representations for not pushing the person 
and allowing the people on the tracks to be killed, might have had a greater negative 
value (Cushman, 2013). This may have been greater than the action-based negative 
value representation for pushing the person to their death. Indeed, in Patil et al. (2014), 
the authors propose a similar theory in which there may have been greater outcome-
based value representations for not acting and allowing individuals to be harmed, 
leading to a greater number of utilitarian responses. As adapted from Patil et al. (2014), 
I suggest that the saliency in the present experiments may have been generated by the 
personal nature of the dilemma and the ability to see potential victims on the tracks. In 
the text-based dilemmas, the absence of salient features and reliance on imagination 
might have led to the assignment of negative value to the action of harming, as opposed 
to the outcome of not acting (Cushman, 2013). More broadly, this interpretation of the 
present findings also falls in line with the work of FeldmanHall et al. (2012) exploring 
contextually rich versus contextually impoverished paradigms (as outlined in Chapter 1). 
The introduction of contextual features diminishes the impact of aversion to harm as 
other motivational forces “…become more salient” (FeldmanHall et al., 2012, p. 440). 
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In this instance and in line with action-outcome accounts (Cushman, 2013; Patil et al., 
2014), the visual saliency in VR may have generated new motivational forces, 
promoting the need for action to prevent an aversive outcome, over the aversion to 
carrying out the harmful action.  
Emotional Arousal 
Heart rate change was monitored in order to determine whether increases in 
emotional arousal would be triggered by modality or moral content. In Experiment 2, 
both the moral text-based dilemma and virtual moral task were more arousing than their 
non-moral counterparts with the virtual moral task eliciting the greatest increase in 
arousal overall. In Experiment 1, the virtual moral task was more arousing than the non-
moral counterpart and also the moral text-based dilemma. This suggests that the 
modality of VR alone was not responsible for changes in heart rate but rather the moral 
nature of the virtual task.   
Given previous theories regarding the association between non-utilitarian 
responses and emotional arousal in personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001), it 
was hypothesised that an increase in heart rate might predict non-utilitarian responses. 
Previous virtual studies have measured emotional arousal and have yielded mixed 
findings; whilst Navarrete et al. (2012) found that autonomic arousal was negatively 
related to utilitarian actions in VR, Patil et al. (2014) found that arousal was highest in 
virtual moral dilemmas and this corresponded with a greater proportion of utilitarian 
responses. In the present research, I also found an overall increase in emotional arousal 
in the action conditions for the virtual moral dilemma. However, in both Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2, I did not find that increased heart rate predicted either non-utilitarian 
judgments or actions, contradicting the role of emotional arousal as defined in Greene’s 
dual-process model.   
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However, it is important to note here that heart rate change in the action 
condition also incorporated the moment in which participants witnessed the 
consequences of their actions and, as such, recorded arousal beyond the decision-
making process itself. The main purpose of arousal assessment in the present research 
was to examine whether changes in arousal were as a result of modality or moral 
content. Whilst the finding that arousal was greatest in the virtual moral task suggests 
that modality alone is not responsible for this increase, it is important to acknowledge 
an additional explanation; witnessing consequences in the action condition may have 
led to greater emotional arousal compared to imagining consequences in the judgment 
condition. As a result of this, and given that this research is the first to implement a 
personal moral dilemma in VR, implications of these physiological results for Greene’s 
dual process model remain unclear.  
Personality Traits 
In Experiment 1, psychopathic traits marginally predicted and Honesty-Humility 
negatively predicted utilitarian endorsements in the action condition in VR but not in 
the text-based judgment condition. Given that a low Honesty-Humility level is often 
associated with traits such as fairness and sincerity; the opposite of which are associated 
with the Dark Triad of personality (Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism) 
(Ashton & Lee, 2005), the correlation between primary psychopathy and Honesty-
Humility was strong. A latent variable was extracted from these associated traits (anti-
social tendency) and this was also found to positively predict utilitarian endorsements in 
the action condition in VR. These results might support previous research finding that 
psychopaths have distinct moral judgments and actions (Cima et al., 2010; Kiehl, 2008).  
More generally, it might give support to the viewpoint that moral judgment and moral 
action remain dissociated.  However, these conclusions are given tentatively as 
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Experiment 2 failed to support these findings. Further examination of the role of pro- 
and anti-social traits in these action frameworks is required prior to further 
interpretation.  
Alternative Interpretations 
Whilst Cushman’s action, outcome and value model seems to offer a convincing 
interpretation of these experiments’ findings, there are alternative explanations that need 
addressing.  
Firstly, the potential interpretation that the increase in virtual utilitarian actions 
could be a result of artificial gaming behaviours, as opposed to moral-based decision 
making, is not supported in the present research. Decisions made in the virtual moral 
dilemma were not influenced by previous gaming experience; as such, video game 
desensitization cannot explain these findings. Additionally, there was no evidence of 
game-related affordance effects when incorporating a joystick device in a short-follow 
up experiment; as such, I argue that the increased utilitarian response pattern found in 
VR was not likely induced by this.  
In terms of further differences between the modalities of the virtual moral 
dilemma and its text-based counterpart, whilst I attempted to match the temporal nature 
of the paradigms, it might be argued that salient auditory cues in the virtual dilemma 
resulted in the present outcome. Specifically, in the virtual dilemma, the victims on the 
track began to yell at a fixed time interval during the dilemma whilst the person on the 
bridge did not yell until pushed; potentially leading to the victims calling attention to 
themselves, whilst the person remained mute until after the participant had responded. 
In an attempt to investigate this, I compared those individuals who gave a utilitarian 
response prior to hearing the victims yell, to those who acted after hearing the victims 
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yell. In Experiment 1, of the 70% of individuals that endorsed a utilitarian response, 7.1% 
executed the action after the victims had begun to yell. In Experiment 2, of the 63.3% 
utilitarian responses, 16.6% elicited this response after hearing the victims yell. This 
indicates that in both experiments, the majority of participants in VR chose to push 
before the victims had called attention to themselves. As such, the response patterns 
found in the virtual moral dilemma were not likely triggered by these salient auditory 
cues.  
Differences in auditory cues, with regards to instructions, must also be 
considered. In the judgment condition, the text-based vignette explicitly draws equal 
attention to the acts of killing and saving; “the stranger will die if you do this, but the 
five workmen will be saved” (Greene et al., 2008). In the action condition however, the 
verbal instructions explicitly refer to saving; “…if you want to save the people, you 
could push the large person…”. As such, it could be argued that the lack of conflict 
created in the virtual scenario biased participant’s attention to the act of saving (e.g., 
Broeders, van den Bos, Müller, & Ham, 2011). Despite this, I would argue that the 
visual saliency of the virtual scenario makes the act of killing the person explicit; there 
is no reliance on imagination in the virtual scenario and the consequences of your action 
(or omission of action) can be processed visually. In order to address this point, I later 
asked a sample of 15 participants who took part in Experiment 1, “Did you know that 
the person would die if you pushed them?” to which all responded “Yes”. This supports 
the view that participants had explicit knowledge that their actions would result in the 
person dying in VR. Despite this, it must still be acknowledged that the incorporation of 
auditory instructions may have actively encouraged or coerced individuals into 
endorsing the utilitarian outcome. As such, future research should ask participants 
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whether they felt coerced when responding in the virtual dilemma (see Chapter 4 of this 
thesis).  
Finally, it might be that an alternative explanation for these findings rests in an 
embodied-cognition perspective of moral decision-making. Situated-embodied 
perspectives argue that physical experiences or bodily states can map onto cognitive 
states and actions (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012). In 
this case, perceiving the physical or concrete context and consequences of moral actions 
in VR, may have reactivated learned or memorised experiences. This may have resulted 
in individuals experiencing greater involvement in the action compared to when facing a 
more abstract text-based dilemma. This theory is arguably an extension of Patil et al.’s 
action-outcome account (2014) and FeldmanHall et al.’s contextual account (2012) of 
the present findings. In this case, embodied states are triggered by the contextual 
saliency available in VR. This embodied perspective should be investigated within 
future virtual paradigms perhaps through the incorporation of realistic haptic feedback. 
This would allow exploration of the physical components of VR and subsequent effects 
on simulated moral actions (see Chapter 3 of this thesis).   
Methodological Considerations 
Although this research addressed the problem of excluding personal dilemmas in 
VR research (Patil et al., 2014), I acknowledge the limitation of including a single 
virtual reconstruction of the footbridge dilemma in the present research; as such, the 
generalizability of our results is limited in the broader moral decision-making literature. 
However, given that previous virtual paradigms have considered only impersonal moral 
dilemmas, this research has offered initial insights into the immediate emotional 
responses prompted by a novel simulation of a personal moral dilemma. Future research 
might consider constructing multiple personal moral dilemmas in VR in order to 
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investigate further personal factors such as personal force in this action framework (see 
Chapter 3 of this thesis).  
Further, given that I discuss moral inconsistency in light of the disparity between 
moral actions and moral judgments, one criticism of the present experiments is that I did 
not compare participant’s actions with their own judgments (Patil et al., 2014). With 
research in moral decision-making suggesting that both between and within-subjects 
designs should be utilised (Bartels et al., 2015), future research should consider 
incorporating the present paradigm in a within-groups design to allow examination of 
the relationship between judgments and actions for the same individual (see Chapter 4 
of this thesis).  
Additionally, given increases in the use of virtual simulation training paradigms 
across emergency and healthcare services as a means of assessing emotionally 
conflicting decision-making processes, future research should consider expanding the 
present virtual paradigms to include life-like scenarios or to examine virtual moral 
actions in these specialised populations (see Chapter 5 of this thesis), extending the 
generalization of findings concerning moral actions.  
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CHAPTER 3: UTILITARIAN MORAL ACTIONS AND HAPTIC FEEDBACK 
Introduction 
In experiments reported in the previous chapter of this thesis, moral judgments 
made in text-based moral dilemmas were found to be distinct from moral actions 
simulated in VR (see Chapter 2). More specifically, virtual moral actions in a personal 
moral dilemma (footbridge dilemma) elicited greater utilitarian endorsements than 
moral judgments made in a text-based counterpart. I argued that one explanation for this 
finding can be adapted from Cushman’s action-outcome model (Cushman, 2013) and 
theories regarding contextual richness (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014); 
visual saliency in virtual dilemmas may prompt the assignment of negative value to the 
outcome of not acting and seeing the majority of people die. This then outweighs the 
action-based negative value representation for sacrificing one person and motivates 
individuals to endorse the utilitarian action in VR. However, I have also argued that 
situated-embodied perspectives may be able to explain the disparity between moral 
action and moral judgment in this case, as experiencing the concrete consequences of 
actions in contextually salient VR may have made people feel more involved in the 
action.  
In the present chapter, I investigated this further by incorporating haptic 
feedback within VR paradigms, examining its subsequent influence on moral action. 
Whilst the virtual footbridge dilemma incorporated into Chapter 2 of this thesis is “up 
close and personal” (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2106), sensorimotor qualities and aspects of 
embodiment are still absent (Skulmowski et al., 2014). In Experiment 3, I utilised a VR 
robotic system (vBOT) to simulate performing a realistic physical action in response to 
moral dilemmas involving personal force (Howard, Ingram, & Wolpert, 2009). The 
vBOT system can simulate the physical resistance force that would be experienced if 
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touching or pushing a physical object. For example, it can generate the sensation of 
moving through water or touching a spherical object. Thus, it is able to generate 
realistic haptic feedback. To my knowledge, this is the first experiment to use a vBOT 
system within a moral dilemma framework and thereby adds a novel sensorimotor 
aspect to existing moral paradigms. Further, in Experiment 4, I combined a realistic and 
life-like interactive sculpture that simulated the sensation of pushing a real person with 
the VR footbridge dilemma (introduced in Chapter 2) to explore the combined effects of 
visual and physical saliency on moral actions.  
Moral Principles: Introducing Personal Force 
“There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom” 
(Nietzsche & Parkes, 1883/2005, p. 30)  
As outlined in Chapter 1, research in the field of moral psychology has largely 
focused on examining what drives distinct responses to personal dilemmas (such as the 
footbridge) and impersonal dilemmas (such as the switch) (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). 
One way in which to examine moral judgments is to consider the moral principles that 
influence moral judgments (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). For example, the 
intention principle posits that the crucial difference in the Trolley Problem is that the 
person in the footbridge case is used as a means of saving the five, whereas the death of 
the single worker in the switch case is simply a side-effect of the trolley’s diversion 
away from the five (Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010). The conceptual factor of 
inevitability also plays a role in the footbridge-switch distinction (e.g., Christensen et al., 
2014); harmful actions that lead to inevitable consequences are often judged as more 
morally acceptable (Christensen & Gomila, 2012).  
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In contrast to these principles, the contact principle has received little attention 
(Cushman et al., 2006). It states that using physical contact to harm someone is worse 
than doing so without physical contact; hence pushing the person in the footbridge case 
is judged more harshly than flicking a switch. However, a mistake commonly made is to 
assume that personal moral dilemmas such as the footbridge, require physical contact 
but this is not the case given the definition provided by Greene (Greene et al., 2001). 
For this reason, Greene et al., (2009) established a new factor known as “personal force” 
exacted when “the force that directly impacts the other [person] is generated by the 
agent’s muscles” (Greene et al., 2009, p. 365). This factor is distinguished from 
physical contact in that the personal force can be exacted through other objects; in a 
modified version of the footbridge dilemma, for example, a pole can be used to transfer 
personal force onto the stranger on the bridge, with no physical contact being required 
(Greene et al., 2009).  
In an investigation of this new moral principle, Greene et al., (2009) found that 
if personal force was required, utilitarian moral judgments were significantly lower. 
This supports the “simulated motor plan” hypothesis suggesting that when faced with a 
personal dilemma, we imagine carrying out the harmful action ourselves (Cushman & 
Greene, 2012). In the footbridge dilemma, we might imagine ourselves pushing the 
person, shaping our hands and preparing our bodies in such a way as to direct our 
personal force onto them. In doing so, we are faced with an immediate emotional 
aversion to this act (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) and so we judge it as unacceptable 
(Cushman & Greene, 2012). This theory relates back to Greene’s dual process model 
(see Chapter 1 for full description); responding in a utilitarian manner to personal 
dilemmas requires suppression of an affective response (Greene et al., 2001). Further, in 
Cushman’s action, outcome and value model (see Chapter 1 for full description), 
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personal force and physical contact are related back to reinforcement learning 
mechanisms (Cushman, 2013). For humans, simply the act of pushing carries with it a 
history of learned moral violations. In the past, individuals have learned that pushing 
someone results in harm to another and punishment to themselves. As such, individuals 
are less likely to condone pushing as it is a typical moral violation (Cushman, 2013).  
Personal Force and Moral Action 
Despite the embodied nature of the theories regarding personal force, research 
has largely explored this principle in the context of moral judgment (e.g., Greene et al., 
2009) with little research examining how these theories might relay into moral actions 
(Patil et al., 2014).   
In one experiment, Cushman et al. (2012) did utilise an active behavioural 
paradigm in order to investigate simulated harmful actions. In their study, the authors 
had participants simulate harmful actions such as hitting a plastic baby doll or hitting a 
PVC leg with a hammer and found that individuals experience a strong aversion to 
performing these actions. They argued that findings from previous moral judgment 
paradigms showing fewer utilitarian judgments when personal force is present (e.g., 
Greene et al., 2009), can subsequently translate into active behaviours (Cushman et al., 
2012). However, one criticism of this behavioural paradigm, is that harmful actions did 
not result in specific outcomes such as saving more lives (Cushman et al., 2012). As 
such, this paradigm may not be comparable to the classic one-for-many dilemmas 
frequently adopted in the moral domain (e.g., Greene et al., 2001).   
Addressing Limitations  
In terms of addressing the limitations outlined in the previous chapter, multiple 
personal moral dilemmas are incorporated within the present VR paradigm as opposed 
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to a single scenario. Further, in order to shed light on the relationship between moral 
actions and anti- and pro-social traits given the mixed findings in the previous chapter, I 
include trait assessments in Experiment 3.    
Specific Hypotheses 
Based on our general hypotheses, the following experiments examined the 
relationship between moral judgment and moral actions but more specifically and based 
on the outcomes of Chapter 2, the influence of sensorimotor aspects of personal force 
(and subsequent haptic feedback) on simulated moral actions. Given theories regarding 
our tendency to imagine ourselves carrying out harmful actions (Cushman & Greene, 
2012) and Cushman’s theories regarding negative value assignment for harmful actions 
(Cushman, 2013), the incorporation of haptic feedback within personal force dilemmas, 
could lead to increased aversion for harmful acts and subsequently, the same or fewer 
utilitarian actions as compared to judgments.  
However, in the previous chapter of this thesis, virtual moral dilemmas 
prompted a greater proportion of utilitarian actions. As I outlined, this may result from 
increased contextual saliency and differences in action-outcome value assignment in 
virtual dilemmas (Cushman, 2013; FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014). 
Additionally, I have also argued, from an embodied perspective, that experiencing the 
concrete consequences of actions may have resulted in individuals feeling more deeply 
involved in actions in VR. If theories centred on contextually saliency in VR extend to 
physical saliency and the situated-embodied theory stands, greater utilitarian actions 
may be endorsed when action is required (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014). 
In order to address this hypothesis, in Experiment 3 of this thesis, the visual aspects of 
VR were removed in order to isolate the influence of haptic feedback on moral actions.  
In Experiment 4, both visual aspects and physical features of VR were combined.  
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Further, in Experiment 3, the incorporation of the vBOT system not only 
enabled the generation of haptic feedback but also allowed the measurement of new 
moral measures including the speed of movement, the force exerted, and subsequently, 
the overall power exerted when simulating moral actions. The novel measure of power 




Forty participants comprising 34 females and six males (Mage = 20.23, SD = 
2.97 years, age range: 18 - 31 years) were recruited from the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were right-handed. This 
research received ethical approval from the Plymouth University Ethics Committee.    
Measures 
Participants were asked to fill out an electronic questionnaire comprising the 
LSRP (αs = .66 - .90) and HEXACO-IP-R (αs = .74 - .87) and the pre-questionnaire 
assessing prior gaming experience (see Chapter 2). In the present experiment, measures 
of arousal could not be obtained as a result of the excessive movement (repeatedly 
simulating actions) in the action condition. 
Moral Judgment and Action Measures  
The experiment comprised two conditions to which participants were randomly 
allocated; a judgment condition (N = 20) and an action condition (N = 20). In both 
conditions, participants were presented with vignettes describing the footbridge 
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dilemma and 14 further personal force dilemmas. These moral dilemmas were selected 
from those originally used in Greene et al. (2001) and also included five personal force 
dilemmas adapted from this database (see Appendix 3.1). Of the dilemmas originally 
used in Greene et al. (2001), personal dilemmas were modified to ensure that each 
involved personal force. For example, consider the “euthanasia” dilemma: 
You are a leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your way back from a completed mission deep 
in enemy territory when one of your men has stepped in a trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly 
injured. The trap is connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your presence. They 
will soon be on their way. 
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him 
behind, but if you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent 
this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him yourself. 
This dilemma, while categorised as personal, does not involve personal force 
according to its original definition (Greene et al., 2009). As such, in the present 
experiment it was adapted as follows: 
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him 
behind, but if you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent 
this injured soldier from being tortured is to kill him yourself by stabbing him. 
Replacing a gun with a knife ensures that “the force that directly impacts the 
other [person] is generated by the agent’s muscles” (Greene et al., 2009, p. 365).  
In the judgment condition, dilemmas were presented to participants via a 
computer display. After each dilemma, participants were asked a judgment question (“Is 
it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”) followed by an action-choice 
question (“Would you do it?”). Responses were given by selecting “Yes” (Y-key) or 
“No” (N-key).  
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In the action condition, participants were first presented with three non-moral 
dilemmas (see Appendix 3.1) selected from an existing database (Greene et al., 2001) to 
provide a baseline measure of force. The personal force moral dilemmas were then 
presented. All dilemmas were completed using the VR robotic system (vBOT) (see 
Figure 3.1). The participant held the handle of the vBOT and moved it to respond to 
each dilemma. In this system the handle position of the manipulandum is measured 
using optical encoders sampled at 1000 Hz and it uses motors operating under torque 
control to allow the application of end-point forces. A force transducer (Nano 25; ATI) 
is mounted under the handle to measure the applied forces. The vBOT arm simulated 
the physical resistance force that would be experienced by pushing an object or person, 
thereby generating haptic feedback to the participant.  
Participants were able to read the vignettes in the semi-silvered mirror. After the 
end of each dilemma had been reached, upon a final button click the participant was 
asked (“Are you going to [specific to scenario]?”) followed by the phrase (“If so, move 
the arm forward to [specific to scenario]. If not, then pull away [specific to scenario]”). 
A final button press was then used to cue the response action and this generated the 
message (“Act now”). Responses were then given by pushing forward with the vBOT 
arm to endorse a utilitarian action or by pulling away with the arm to reject an action 
(non-utilitarian endorsement).   
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Figure 3.1. The diagram shows the side-view of the set-up with a participant holding 
the handle of the vBOT arm whilst viewing the monitor via a semi-silvered mirror. 
Text-based vignettes of dilemmas were displayed on the monitor for participants to read.   
  




In the action condition, the vBOT system provided additional measures 
including force and speed. 
Force. Baseline force measurements were calculated for each participant in 
order to control for varying strengths among participants. The vBOT arm allowed 
participants to push forward when endorsing an action (utilitarian) or to pull away when 
refusing to endorse an action (non-utilitarian). Baseline measurements were first created 
by averaging the force of endorsements of actions in non-moral dilemmas (baseline 
force for endorsements) and by averaging the force of refusals to endorse actions in 
non-moral dilemmas (baseline force for refusals). The normalised force (for utilitarian 
or non-utilitarian actions) applied by each participant in each dilemma was then 
calculated as a proportion of their baseline force.  
Speed. Speed was defined as the maximum speed (cm/s) that a participant 
moved the vBOT arm across the movement trajectory. Using the same procedure for 
force measurements, normalised maximum speed was conditionally calculated (for 
utilitarian actions or non-utilitarian actions). Baseline measurements were conditionally 
created by averaging the speed of endorsements and refusals of actions in non-moral 
dilemmas. The utilitarian or non-utilitarian normalised speed was then calculated as a 
proportion of baseline speed.  
Power. The relative force and speed with which individuals simulated harmful 
actions (utilitarian actions) were strongly correlated, (r(18) = .51, p = .021).
9
 Given that 
the product of speed and force equates to a measure of power, a normalised force and 
speed score were used to create a relative measure of power for each participant. This 
                                                          
9
 There was no correlation between relative force and speed with which individuals simulated non-
utilitarian actions (p = .335). 
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measure of power represented the power exerted by an individual when giving a 
utilitarian response and simulating a harmful action with the vBOT arm.  
Procedure  
 In both conditions, participants first completed the electronic questionnaire 
comprising the trait assessments. All personal force dilemmas were presented in a 
randomised order. In the judgment condition, dilemmas were presented on a computer 
running E-Prime software and each dilemma was presented in three blocks of text that 
could be read at a speed determined by the participant. Having read each dilemma, 
participants were given eight seconds to respond.
10
  
In the action condition, participants initially completed the electronic pre-
questionnaire assessing their gaming experience (see Chapter 2). When responding to 
both non-moral dilemmas and personal force dilemmas, vignettes were presented using 
the vBOT system. At the start of each trial the vBOT handle first pulled the participants 
hand to the starting position, which was at a central location (in the mid-sagittal plane 
30 cm below the eyes and 30 cm in front of the chest). Participants were prevented from 
viewing their hand directly, and the VR system was used to overlay images of the hand 
cursor (0.5 cm radius red disk). As in the judgment condition, dilemmas were presented 
in blocks of text that could be read at a speed determined by the participant. Participants 
used a button press with their left hand to scroll forward through these blocks of text. 
Matched to the judgment condition, after reading each dilemma in full, participants 
were given eight seconds to respond. A utilitarian endorsement was achieved when the 
handle was pushed forward into a soft object (which required the application of force) 
                                                          
10
 This time frame was selected as it was long enough to allow responses that were not time-pressured but 
short enough to prevent a long elaborate decision-making process that would be unrealistic in an action 
framework. It was also within a similar time frame window adopted in previous VR moral action 
paradigms (Patil et al., 2014) and the VR footbridge task previously adopted in this thesis (see Chapter 2). 
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by more than 2cm. The simulated soft object was located immediately forward of the 
start position and implemented using the combined effect of a weak spring (k = -4Ncm
-1
) 
and a resistive viscous field (k = -0.5Ncm-
2
). A refused (non-utilitarian) response was 
achieved when the handle was pulled backwards more than 1.25cm from the start 
position.  No resistance was experienced when pulling back.  
In the judgment condition, the proportion of utilitarian endorsements for 
judgment and action-choice questions was recorded. In the action condition, the 
proportion of utilitarian actions, force, and speed were all recorded for further 
analyses.
11
   
Results 
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
For the action condition, endorsing a utilitarian action using the vBOT system 
was not associated with previous gaming experience (ps > .096). 
Moral Responses 
 Analyses compared responses to personal force moral dilemmas in the action 
condition (using the vBOT system) versus the judgment condition. In the action 
condition, there was a greater proportion of utilitarian responses in personal force 
dilemmas (M = 0.54, SD = 0.17) when compared to the judgment condition in response 
to both the judgment question (M = 0.33, SD = 0.26) and the action-choice question (M 
= 0.41, SD = 0.24) (see Figure 3.2).  
  
                                                          
11
 Response times in the action condition were recorded by the vBOT system while those in the judgment 
condition were recorded in E-prime. As in the previous chapter, both programmes had different time 
recording sensitivities and as such, a reliable comparison between reaction times could not be performed. 


































Figure 3.2. Responses (%) (utilitarian or non-utilitarian) in the action condition and 
judgment condition in response to personal force dilemmas. In the judgment condition, 
participants were asked both a judgment question and action-choice question. A greater 
number of utilitarian endorsements were observed in the action condition when the 
vBOT system was used to respond. Error bars represent +- 1 SE. 
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One-way ANOVAs with condition (judgment; action) as the between-subjects 
factor were performed. Separate one-way ANOVAs were utilised with responses to the 
judgment question and action-choice question (from the judgment condition) as 
dependent variables. 
Is it morally acceptable? The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated and as such, the Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is reported. Analysis revealed a main 
effect of condition, (F(1, 32.64) = 8.89, p = .005, ηp²  = .20) with a greater proportion of 
utilitarian endorsements observed in the action condition compared to the judgment 
condition.  
Would you do it? Analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of 
condition, (F(1, 38) = 3.92, p = .055, ηp²  = .10) with a greater proportion of utilitarian 
responses observed  in the action condition compared to the judgment condition.
12
 
Personality Trait Analyses 
In order to assess any differences between personality traits across both the 
judgment and action conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait 
measures. No significant differences between the judgment and action conditions were 
found (all ps > .071), except for Honesty-Humility, (F(1, 38) = 6.31, p = .016, ηp²  = .14) 
which was higher in the judgment condition (M  = 3.63, SD = 0.47) than the action 
condition (M  = 3.17, SD = 0.67).  
Traits and moral responses. In order to determine whether traits predicted 
utilitarian responses in the action or the judgment framework, univariate linear 
                                                          
12
 As in Chapter 2, in the judgment condition specifically, no significant difference was found when 
comparing responses to the judgment question (i.e., moral acceptability) and the action-choice question 
(i.e., whether they would do it), (p = .378).  
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regressions were conducted with personality traits as predictors and proportion of 
utilitarian responses as the outcome variable.
13
 In both conditions, no personality traits 
predicted utilitarian responses (ps > .208).  
Traits and action variables. In order to determine whether personality traits 
were related to the measure of power unique to the action condition, bivariate 
correlations were performed between traits and the power exerted for utilitarian 
actions.
14
 Correlations revealed a significant positive correlation between the power 
exerted when simulating a utilitarian action and primary psychopathy, (r(18) = .51, p 
= .022) and a significant negative correlation between utilitarian power and Honesty-
Humility, (r(18) = -.55, p = .013). In order to determine whether these traits predicted 
the proportion of force endorsed by each participant, two univariate regressions were 
conducted. When the LSRP dimensions were entered as continuous predictors and 
power exerted as the outcome variable, primary psychopathy (LSRP dimension) was 
found to explain 26% of the variance in the model, (R 
2
= .260, F(1,18) = 6.33, p = .022) 
predicting the power exerted when simulating a utilitarian response using the vBOT 
system (β  = .51, p = .022) (see Figure 3.3). Honesty-Humility, was a significant 
negative predictor of power exerted (β = -.55, p = .013) when entered in an additional 
univariate regression with all HEXACO traits, explaining 30% of the variance in the 
model, (R
2 




                                                          
13
 As in Chapter 2, separate linear regressions were performed for psychopathy dimensions and HEXACO 
dimensions. 
14
 Given that power was not calculated for non-utilitarian actions. Bivariate correlations were performed 
between traits and force and speed variables for non-utilitarian actions. Analysis revealed no relationship 
between the speed or force for non-utilitarian actions (refusals to endorse harm) and any personality traits 
(ps > .070).  
15
 In terms of the relationship between power exerted and moral responses, bivariate correlations revealed 
that the proportion of utilitarian responses was not correlated with the power exerted when simulating a 
utilitarian action (p = .230). 









































Figure 3.3. Primary psychopathy scores plotted against power exerted when simulating 
utilitarian actions with the vBOT. The power exerted when simulating a utilitarian 
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 Note. The high reading at 3.25 power and low reading at 0.40 power were investigated following visual 
inspection. Power had a significant positive skewness of 1.35 (p < .05) and as such data were log-
transformed (base 10) prior to outlier analysis. Following transformation, three outliers were identified 
using Tukey’s interquartile range (IQR) method, including the points at 3.25 and 0.40 power. Prior to 
outlier removal, primary psychopathy was a significant predictor of transformed power, (R
2 
= .201, 
F(1,18) = 4.53, p = .047) and the model fit improved following outlier removal, (R
2 
= .234 , F(1,15) =  
4.59, p = .049) suggesting that the relationship between psychopathy and power was robust when 
controlling for potential confounds. 









































Figure 3.4. Honesty-Humility scores plotted against power exerted when simulating 
utilitarian actions with the vBOT. The power exerted when simulating a utilitarian 
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 Note. The robustness of this relationship was examined in light of the high reading at 3.25 power and 
low reading at 0.40 power. Prior to outlier removal, Honesty-Humility was a significant predictor of 
transformed power, (R
2 
= .210, F(1,18) = 4.78, p = .042) and the model fit improved following removal 
of three outliers, (R 
2
= .280 , F(1,15) = 5.92, p = .028) suggesting that the relationship between Honesty-
Humility and power was robust when controlling for potential confounds. 
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In order to control for the shared association between primary psychopathy and 
Honesty-Humility, principal component analysis (PCA) was used to combine primary 
psychopathy and Honesty-Humility (r(38) = -.70, p < .001) into one single factor using 
identical procedures to those adopted in Chapter 2. All criteria were met for PCA (see 
Statistical Note (3.1)) and “anti-social tendency” scores were extracted as before. In a 
further linear regression, with this new variable entered as a continuous predictor and 
power exerted as the outcome variable, anti-social tendency was found to explain 31% 
of the variance in the model, (R 
2
= .309, F(1,18) = 8.07, p = .011) predicting the power 
exerted when simulating harmful actions (endorsing a utilitarian response) using the 
vBOT system (β  = .56, p = .011).
18
  
Summary and Discussion 
 Experiment 3 found that participants endorsed utilitarian responses when 
simulated action was required using the vBOT, but were less inclined to endorse the 
same responses when judgment was required in the same dilemmas. Previous gaming 
experience did not predict utilitarian endorsements when simulated action was required, 
suggesting that responses in the action condition were not comparable to detached 
responses that might be made in a gaming context. These findings replicate those of 
Chapter 2.  
 Additionally, whilst personality traits did not predict moral responses in either 
condition (as in Experiment 2 of Chapter 2 in this thesis), primary psychopathy was a 
significant predictor of the power exerted when simulating a utilitarian response in the 
action condition. Honesty-Humility was found to be a negative predictor of this power 
in the action condition only. Again, this contrasting relationship can be explained given 
                                                          
18
 The composite score (anti-social tendency) was not a significant predictor of utilitarian endorsements in 
the judgment condition to either question (ps > .604) or to utilitarian endorsements in the action condition 
simulated with the vBOT (p = .096). 
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that the Honesty-Humility facets, sincerity and fairness, negatively map on to primary 
psychopathic traits (e.g., Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014). Again, the composite factor 
extracted from these traits (anti-social tendency) also significantly predicted the power 
exerted when simulating a utilitarian action. Given that the power exerted when 
carrying out a utilitarian action, relates to anti- and pro-social traits, the measure of 
power collected here should correspond to individual differences. Hence, this measure 
of power should not correspond to the imagined force an individual thinks they may 
need to carry out a utilitarian action. In order to investigate this, in a follow-up study 
(see Appendix 3.2), I presented participants with personal force dilemmas and asked 
them to rate the physical force that they thought would be required to carry out the 
harmful action described in each of these moral dilemmas. There was no relationship 
between the physical force that participants imagined would be required to carry out an 
action and the power exerted in the present experiment.  As such, the measure of force 
collected in Experiment 3 likely corresponds to individual differences rather than the 
imagined force thought necessary to carry out a particular action.  
One limitation of the present experiment is the difference in framing of the text-
based dilemmas between conditions. In the judgment condition, dilemmas were framed 
using the judgment question and action-choice questions. In the action condition 
however, the same dilemmas were framed using the phrase “Are you going to [specific 
to scenario] followed by “Act now”. Given that a significantly greater proportion of 
utilitarian endorsements in the action condition were observed, it could be argued that 
this was due to framing effects rather than the haptic feedback generated by the vBOT 
system. In order to explore this explanation further, I carried out a short follow-up study 
(see Appendix 3.3) presenting participants with personal force dilemmas. Having read a 
dilemma, participants were either presented with a judgment question, an action-choice 
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question, or the phrasing adopted in the present experiment (Are you going to [specific 
to scenario]?” followed by “Act now”). There were no significant differences between 
the proportion of utilitarian responses given, based on phrasing. This suggests that it 
was the influence of haptic feedback as opposed to framing effects that influenced 
moral actions in personal force dilemmas.  
Further, whilst I included a VR device (vBOT system) in order to allow 
simulations of moral actions, I acknowledge the limitation of relying on text-based 
formulations of personal force dilemmas. In Chapter 2, I investigated the influence of 
visual contextual saliency on moral actions but in the present experiment, the impact of 
haptic feedback on moral responses was separated from the influence of visual 
immersion. Previous research examining simulated murder has predominantly 
incorporated life-like stimuli such as PVC arms (Cushman et al., 2012), while the 
present experiment incorporated text and an abstract response device (vBOT arm) 
which may “…lack salient properties reliably associated with victim distress” 
(Cushman et al., 2012, p. 5). Consequently, these may have failed to trigger the same 
affective responses, resulting in greater utilitarian endorsements (e.g., Greene et al., 
2001). As such, future research might consider adopting an interdisciplinary approach to 
combine state-of-the-art VR technologies and life-like response devices to examine 
multisensory immersion on moral actions (Briazu, Francis, & Haines, 2015).  
Experiment 4 in this chapter aimed to do just that, incorporating haptic feedback and 
physical presence within a visually salient virtual moral dilemma.  
Experiment 4 
In order to examine the combined effects of visual immersion in state-of-the-art 
VR technologies and haptic feedback on simulated moral actions, Experiment 4 
combined the visually immersive virtual footbridge dilemma (described in Chapter 2) 
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and an interactive sculpture mechanism designed to generate haptic feedback and the 
sensation of pushing the person off the bridge. This experiment is presented as a 




Twenty-five participants comprising 13 females and 12 males (Mage = 33.80, SD 
= 13.51 years, age range: 19 - 64 years) were recruited from the public in Plymouth and 
the surrounding area of Devon and took part on a voluntary basis at a public 
engagement event at Plymouth University. Data were collected in a separate room 
divided from the main foyer of the event with the primary investigator and a research 
collaborator present. This research received ethical approval from the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee.    
Moral Action Measure 
 The virtual version of the footbridge dilemma (incorporated in Chapter 2) was 
also incorporated into the present experiment. All elements of the virtual dilemma were 
kept the same including the audio descriptions. In the original paradigm, a joystick 
device was used to respond in the dilemma but this was replaced in the present 
experiment. As part of a multidisciplinary project, the interactive sculpture was 
designed in the shape of a large person’s back (see Figure 3.5). This response device 
had several key features designed to generate haptic feedback and create an immersive 
experience for participants: 
(i) The body of the sculpture itself was created using expandable foam and finished with 
platinum grade silicon. When fabric was placed over this textured surface, the feeling of 
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the sculpture mirrored that of a real person. Heated wiring was also built in beneath the 
silicon coating to warm the sculpture, generating a life-like touch (see Figure 3.5). 
(ii) Sections of rubber were added to the front of the sculpture ensuring that enough 
resistance would be generated if someone attempted to push the sculpture forward. 
These rubber sections would hit the surrounding frame of the sculpture if it was only 
pushed tentatively. If pushed hard enough, and with a more realistic force, the rubber 
sections would move past the frame causing the sculpture to fall.  
(iii) Upon falling, the sculpture would trigger the joystick mechanism, resulting in the 
person in the virtual dilemma falling off the bridge. This established synchronisation 
between the physical sensation of pushing and seeing the person fall in VR. 
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Figure 3.5. (a) The diagram shows the side-view of the interactive sculpture. The 
participant stood behind the back of the torso wearing the Oculus Rift. If they chose to 
endorse a utilitarian action, they would then apply pressure to the back of the torso with 
their own hand. Rubber sections on the outside of the sculpture would generate 
resistance when pushed and would spring forward to release the body of the sculpture if 
pushed hard enough. A wooden runner would then capture the weight of the body as it 
fell, pushing the joystick forward, subsequently triggering the virtual action of pushing 
in the VR headset. (b) Photograph displaying the silicon beneath the fabric covering the 












Participants were given the pre-questionnaire incorporated within Chapter 2 
assessing previous gaming experience. Participants then entered a quiet room and were 
asked to place the Oculus Rift headset on and a pair of Sennheiser headphones. 
Subsequently, participants were guided forward into a separate room which held the 
interactive sculpture. This set-up was designed to ensure that participants did not see the 
sculpture in real-life. Based on the participant’s height, they were placed at the correct 
distance from the sculpture in order to synchronise the sculpture location in real-life 
with the man’s location in VR. Once the virtual dilemma had loaded, participants were 
verbally informed of the following; “You can interact with the person standing in front 
of you, by reaching out with your right arm”. Upon hearing this information, 
participants would extend their right arm and make contact with the interactive 
sculpture familiarizing them with its location. No further information was given 
following this and participants continued to listen to the audio descriptions as the 
scenario played out in VR (as described in Chapter 2).  
Results 
 Responses made using this novel setup (haptic-VR action condition) were 
compared to responses made in Experiment 2 (Chapter 2) in the original virtual moral 
dilemma (VR action condition) and text-based moral dilemma (judgment condition). 
Experiment 2 was deemed an adequate comparable sample having also been sampled 
from the public in Plymouth and the surrounding area with similar gender and age ratios.  
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
Endorsing a utilitarian action using the interactive sculpture was not associated 
with previous gaming experience (ps > .163). 




 Responses from the haptic-VR action condition (N = 25) from the present 
experiment were compared to responses from the VR action condition (N = 30) and 
judgment condition (N = 30) in Experiment 2 (Chapter 2). In the judgment condition, 
when asked if the action was morally acceptable, 10% of participants endorsed a 
utilitarian response (i.e. judged that they regarded pushing the person as morally 
acceptable). In the VR action condition, 63.3% of participants endorsed a utilitarian 
response (i.e. pushed the person off the bridge using the joystick). In the haptic-VR 
action condition in the present experiment, 56% of participants endorsed a utilitarian 
response (i.e. pushed the person off the bridge using the interactive sculpture). A chi-
square analysis revealed a significant difference between these three conditions, (χ²(2) = 
20.18, p < .001) .  
Chi-square follow-up tests with Bonferroni corrections (p < .016) were 
performed to determine which conditions were significantly different. As reported in 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 2), utilitarian endorsements were significantly higher in the VR 
action condition compared to the judgment condition, (χ²(1) = 18.37, p < .001). 
Utilitarian endorsements were also significantly higher in the new haptic-VR action 
condition when compared to the judgment condition, (χ²(1) = 13.51, p < .001). The odds 
of participants endorsing a utilitarian response were 11.55 times higher in the VR-haptic 
condition than in the judgment condition. There was no significant difference between 
moral actions in the VR action condition from Experiment 2 (Chapter 2) and moral 
actions in the new haptic-VR action condition (p = .580). When asked if they would 
perform the action (action-choice question) in the judgment condition, the same 
responses were observed with 10% of participants endorsing a utilitarian response in the 
text-based footbridge dilemma, compared to the 63.3% who endorsed the action in the 
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VR action condition, (χ²(1) = 18.37, p < .001) and the 56% of participants who endorsed 
the action in the new haptic-VR action condition, (χ²(1) = 13.51, p < .001) (see Figure 
3.6).  
  











Would you do it?






















Figure 3.6. Responses (%) in the haptic-VR action condition from the present 
experiment and VR action and judgment responses from Experiment 2 (Chapter 2). In 
the judgment condition, participants were asked whether the action was morally 
acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of utilitarian actions were 
simulated in both the haptic-VR action and VR action conditions. Error bars represent 
+- 1 SEp. 
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Summary and Discussion 
The results presented in this experiment suggest that combining the visual 
aspects of VR with multisensory and life-like haptic feedback, continues to promote 
greater utilitarian endorsements in an emotionally arousing personal dilemma when 
simulated action is required. As such, the greater utilitarian actions observed in 
Experiment 3 were not likely due to the abstract nature of the text-based dilemmas 
combined with the contrived, or less realistic, robotic response device; responses remain 
the same when controlling for visual saliency and life-like stimuli.  
General Discussion 
Overall and in line with findings from Chapter 2, in the present experiments 
participants respond differently in text-based moral dilemmas requiring judgment 
compared to VR dilemmas that require simulated actions. In Experiment 3, participants 
who simulated actions and received haptic feedback using the vBOT system, endorsed 
greater utilitarian responses compared to those who responded to judgment and action-
choice questions for the same moral dilemmas. In Experiment 4, when including visual 
saliency and providing a more life-like response device, participants continued to 
endorse greater utilitarian responses when simulated action was required compared to 
those who responded to judgment and action-choice questions in a text-based 
counterpart.  
Given the findings of Greene et al. (2009), it was predicted that simulations of 
personal force in actions might lead to a decrease in utilitarian endorsements as these 
responses would require suppression of an affective response (Greene et al., 2001). This 
directly maps onto theories regarding the simulated motor plan hypothesis as 
individuals imagine themselves carrying out a harmful action and are faced with an 
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immediate emotional aversion to the harmful act (Cushman & Greene, 2012). This 
evidence combined, fails to explain the present findings. In this case, the physical 
simulation of a moral action resulted in an increase in utilitarian endorsements.  
The results of the present chapter appear to fall in line with an alternative 
hypothesis. In previous research in this thesis (see Chapter 2), I argued that greater 
contextual information in the form of visual saliency, may have resulted in greater 
negative emphasis being placed on witnessing victims die than on performing a harmful 
action itself (Patil et al., 2014). From an embodied perspective, I have also extended 
these theories arguing that perceiving the concrete consequences of actions in 
contextually salient VR, may have made people feel more involved in the action when 
compared to facing an abstract text-based dilemma. This subsequently results in greater 
utilitarian endorsements when action is required in VR. While the application of these 
theories in previous research (Patil et al., 2014) and in this thesis (see Chapter 2) have 
rested on the assumption that individuals can “see” new motivational forces in virtual 
moral dilemmas, the present findings suggest that these theories may extend beyond 
visual features of VR to the physical features of VR. In Experiment 3 specifically, 
incorporating haptic feedback resulted in greater utilitarian actions, despite the absence 
of visual features. This suggests that increasing contextual saliency (FeldmanHall et al., 
2012), whether visual or physical, may result in greater value assignment to outcomes, 
whether driven by reinforcement learning mechanisms (Cushman, 2013; Patil et al., 
2014) or embodied states. This explanation is somewhat tentative given the novelty of 
these virtual paradigms. As such, and when technological advancements allow it, future 
virtual research should consider investigating the incorporation of varying degrees of 
physical contextual information, exploring subsequent effects on simulated moral 
actions.  
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Previous research examining simulated harmful actions has incorporated 
realistic or life-like stimuli such as PVC limbs (Cushman et al., 2012). Arguably, a 
criticism of the incorporation of the vBOT system in Experiment 3 is that participants 
were still responding to a text-based moral dilemma with an abstract response device, 
making it less aversive and incomparable to previous studies investigating personal 
force. However, in Experiment 4, utilising a life-like body as an interactive device and 
replacing text-based descriptions with a visual simulation, resulted in the utilitarian 
preference remaining when action was required. In the original simulating murder 
paradigm, Cushman et al. (2012) investigated simulated harmful actions in the absence 
of a moral outcome, while the present research utilised moral consequences. While 
Cushman et al. (2012) found an aversion to performing harmful actions, the present 
research found greater endorsement of harmful actions, suggesting that the inclusion of 
the one-for-many trade-off has a considerable influence on decision-making, despite 
harmful actions being involved. 
Power 
Whilst anti-social and pro-social personality traits did not predict endorsements 
of utilitarian responses in either the judgment condition or the action condition, primary 
psychopathy was found to predict the power exerted when simulating utilitarian 
responses in the action condition. Honesty-Humility, a pro-social trait negatively 
associated with the Dark Triad, negatively predicted this power. Further, a composite 
factor (anti-social tendency) extracted from these highly associated traits, predicted the 
power exerted when simulating a utilitarian action. In previous research in this thesis, 
findings regarding the relationship between these traits and moral actions have been 
mixed (see Chapter 2). Perhaps the novel measure of power introduced in Experiment 3, 
may provide a more sensitive measure of the influence of these trait profiles in moral 
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action frameworks, beyond that of moral responses. These results contribute to the line 
of research examining disparity between moral judgment versus action in individuals 
possessing anti-social traits (e.g., Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013).  
Alternative Interpretations 
Whilst these perspectives might offer a convincing interpretation of this 
chapter’s findings, there are alternative explanations that need addressing. 
Firstly, the theory that the increase in utilitarian endorsements observed here 
could be a result of gaming-related behaviours is not supported in the current research. 
As in Chapter 2, simulated moral actions were not predicted by previous game-related 
experiences in either Experiment 3 or 4. Additionally, research in this thesis assessed 
gaming affordance effects and found that the incorporation of joystick devices did not 
influence moral responses (see Appendix 2.3) and therefore it is unlikely that the vBOT 
arm itself in Experiment 3 or the interactive sculpture in Experiment 4, influenced 
subsequent moral actions.  
Secondly, it is also important to note that differences existed between the 
judgment and action conditions in Experiment 3, in terms of the framing of the 
judgment-based or action-based instructions. Specifically, in the action condition, when 
responding to dilemmas using the vBOT system, participants were presented with the 
phrase “Are you going to [specific to scenario]?” prior to responding, whereas 
participants in the judgment condition were presented with the judgment and action-
choice questions. It could therefore be argued that the greater utilitarian endorsement in 
the action condition was a result of coercion generated by framing effects. However, 
results from a follow-up study failed to support the presence of framing effects. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the increased utilitarian endorsements in the action 
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condition in Experiment 3 were generated by coercive framing effects. Further, findings 
in Experiment 4 demonstrated that preference for utilitarian action remained when 
haptic feedback was given via an interactive sculpture and any possible text-based 
framing effects were removed altogether.  
Methodological Considerations 
Given that moral actions simulated using the interactive sculpture and VR 
paradigm in Experiment 4 were collected during a public engagement event, I was 
unable to assess personality traits. As such, future research should investigate moral 
actions simulated using these multidisciplinary approaches in lab-based settings in 
which personality traits can also be assessed. Further, given that Experiment 4 was a 
preliminary investigation of this multisensory paradigm, I was unable to incorporate a 
measure of power with which participants interacted with the sculpture as was possible 
in Experiment 3 with the vBOT system. However, with further development, pressure 
sensors could be incorporated within the interactive sculpture indicating where and with 
how much pressure, participants interacted with the sculpture when choosing to carry 
out a harmful action.  
Despite the present shortcomings, the novel approaches to the investigation of 
moral actions presented in this chapter, could offer insights beyond that of moral 
responses. For example, with regards to the study of morality of harm specifically, 
researchers can now begin to investigate not only whether a moral action was endorsed 
but how hard that action was simulated.   
Chapter 4 – EMOTIONAL PROCESSES AND MORAL DECISION-MAKING 
92 
 
CHAPTER 4: EMOTIONAL PROCESSES IN MORAL ACTION AND JUDGMENT 
Introduction 
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, I have presented research demonstrating that 
simulated moral actions in VR paradigms contradict theoretical moral judgments. 
Utilitarian endorsements are significantly greater when action is required in personal 
virtual dilemmas (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3) with arousal being highest in virtual 
dilemmas (see Chapter 2). These results are in contrast to Greene’s dual-process model, 
which argues that personal moral dilemmas trigger immediate emotional responses, 
subsequently resulting in a greater proportion of non-utilitarian responses (Greene et al., 
2001). One explanation for these findings can arise after adapting existing theories to 
account for contextual differences in VR (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014); 
both visual features (see Chapter 2) and physical features (see Chapter 3) in VR may 
have formed new motivational forces for action; through altering reinforcement learning 
mechanisms (Cushman, 2013) and/or embodied states.  
In this thesis, I have also presented evidence that pro- and anti-social traits 
(associated with psychopathy and subsequent diminished empathy and harm aversion), 
predict actions (see Chapter 2) and predict the power with which actions are simulated 
in VR (see Chapter 3). However, they are not associated with theoretical moral 
judgments (see Chapter 2 and 3). This supports previous theories regarding the 
differences in processing involved in action and judgment; with actions eliciting self-
referent processing and judgments prompting evaluations from an allocentric 
perspective (e.g., Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013). However, these findings have been 
inconsistent (see Experiment 2 Chapter 2) and require further investigation. 
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As such, and to further the investigation of the role of emotional processes 
underlying psychopathic and associated traits in moral judgment versus moral action, in 
this experiment, I adopted behavioural assessments of empathy and harm aversion and 
introduced a psychopharmacological manipulation of social functioning.  
Deliberation and Empathy 
As outlined previously in this thesis, there is a strong body of research indicating 
that deliberative reasoning results in greater utilitarian moral judgments originating 
from Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001) (see Chapter 
1). However, the proposed link between utilitarian response and increased reasoning has 
been challenged (e.g., Kahane et al., 2015) with research suggesting that increased 
utilitarian preference may derive from a decreased aversion to harming others as a result 
of deficits in social processing (Patil, 2015). For example, research suggests that the 
increased apparent “utilitarianism” found in psychopathic populations results from 
deficits in affective empathy (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014; 
Gao & Tang, 2013). As mentioned previously, support for this association can also be 
found in pharmacological studies; Citalopram (a drug that enhances serotonin and 
subsequent pro-social behaviour) actually enhanced non-utilitarian moral responses 
(Crockett et al., 2010), while increased levels of testosterone (Carney et al., 2010) and 
increased levels of anger (e.g., Choe & Min, 2011) have been associated with increased 
utilitarian responses. 
Alcohol and Moral Judgments 
One way in which research has sought to investigate the relationship between 
social and cognitive functioning in moral decision-making, is to study populations in 
which affective empathy and higher-order cognitive abilities are impaired. For example, 
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previous research has examined individuals with deficits in emotional processing either 
as a result of brain lesions (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2007), neurological disorders (e.g., 
Mendez et al., 2005) or alcohol and drug dependence (Martina Carmona-Perera, Clark, 
Young, Perez-Garcia, & Verdejo-Garcia, 2014; M. Carmona-Perera, Reyes Del Paso, 
Perez-Garcia, & Verdejo-Garcia, 2013; Khemiri, Guterstam, Franck, & Jayaram-
Lindstrom, 2012).  
To date, there have been few investigations of the acute effects of alcohol on 
moral judgments made in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas. A recent 
investigation, carried out by Duke and Begue (2015), examined the acute effects of 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels on moral decision-making in participants 
recruited at bars in France. Across two studies, they found that BAC levels were 
positively correlated with utilitarian preferences in response to the footbridge dilemma. 
This effect was not mediated by self-reported feelings of behavioural disinhibition or 
self-reported positive mood.  
The finding that acute alcohol consumption promotes utilitarian moral 
judgments in response to personal moral dilemmas supports previous research 
examining moral decision-making in alcohol-dependent individuals (Martina Carmona-
Perera et al., 2014; Khemiri et al., 2012). These studies have found that prolonged 
effects of alcohol dependence result in greater utilitarian moral judgments as a result of 
affective processing deficits. Crucially, these findings are in contention with Greene’s 
dual process model which would argue that alcohol intoxication triggers emotional 
reactivity and impaired higher order functioning, which in turn prompts increased non-
utilitarian moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001). Duke and Begue (2015) argue that 
their finding instead, implicates a strong role for impaired social cognition in predicting 
utilitarian preferences. Alcohol intoxication results in a “…decreased capacity for 
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empathy” or more specifically, decreased aversion to harming others which 
subsequently promotes the utilitarian option (Duke & Begue, 2015, p. 125). The 
psychopharmacological effects of alcohol consumption are not reviewed in length here 
as alcohol has several mechanisms of action on the central nervous system (Carlson, 
2010); alcohol produces a complex effect that is mediated by distinct receptor systems 
that are not evenly amplified with ethanol dosage (Stoleman, 2010). For example, 
alcohol facilitates GABA transmission, inhibits glutamatergic transmission, and 
increases serotonin transmission, among other effects (Stoleman, 2010). Each of these 
prompts and mediates various anxiolytic, sedative, stimulant, and reinforcing effects 
(Carlson, 2010). From a broader perspective, the theory that alcohol intoxication 
produces utilitarian responses as a result of impaired empathic processing, is consistent 
with the connection between utilitarianism and certain deficits in social functioning as a 
result of brain damage (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007) and psychopathic traits (e.g., Patil, 
2015).  
While Duke and Begue (2015) theorise the relevance of alcohol-induced deficits 
in empathic processing and utilitarian moral decision-making, very few studies have 
investigated empathic processing in alcohol-dependent individuals specifically (P. 
Thoma, Friedmann, & Suchan, 2013). Of the few studies examining empathic 
processing in alcohol-dependent individuals, some argue that impairments in premorbid 
trait empathy compromise social functioning, leading to more social problems, which 
could then predispose individuals to use alcohol as a coping strategy (P. Thoma et al., 
2013). However, the specific effects of acute alcohol intake on affective empathic 
processing have yet to be investigated and this is particularly important following 
suggestions that it is this, which mediates the relationship between alcohol consumption 
and utilitarian moral decision-making (Duke & Begue, 2015).  
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Further, whilst the research by Duke and Begue (2015) may have shed further 
light on the role of social deficits on utilitarian moral judgments, research has yet to 
investigate similar manipulations within the domain of moral action. This is significant 
given the findings presented in this thesis, demonstrating the disparity between moral 
judgments and moral actions. Further, with previous research in moral psychology 
revealing an association between moral action and personality traits associated with 
empathy decline and harm aversion (e.g., Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013), exploring the 
effects of a diminished capacity to process social cues seems highly relevant in the 
domain of moral action.   
Addressing Limitations 
The quasi-experimental setup adopted in the research carried out by Duke and 
Begue (2015), raises questions regarding the influence of social atmosphere, potential 
social awareness, and uncontrolled alcohol dosages on moral decision-making. The 
present experiment addressed these limitations through a laboratory-controlled adapted 
replication, examining the effects of low and moderate dosages of alcohol consumption 
on both moral judgments and moral actions.  
The present experiment was also adapted in response to methodological 
considerations previously raised in this thesis. Firstly, regarding concerns that 
individuals were coerced into endorsing a utilitarian action (pushing the person off the 
footbridge) (see Chapter 2), in the present experiment, I asked participants whether they 
did indeed feel coerced into carrying out actions in VR. Secondly and regarding the 
limitations of incorporating a between-subjects design (as in Chapter 2; Chapter 3), a 
within-subjects design was incorporated into the present experiment, allowing 
comparison between moral actions and moral judgments made by the same individual. 
Additionally, whilst this thesis has identified relationships between moral actions and 
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certain personality traits, these findings require further investigation. As such, in the 
present experiment, I incorporated behavioural assessments of empathy and harm 
aversion as well as physiological assessments of these traits in an attempt to shed light 
on the relationship between these traits and moral decision-making, beyond that of 
questionnaire assessments.  
Specific Hypotheses 
Behavioural Empathy 
In previous research, self-reported valence towards facial displays of emotion 
has been used as a measure of affective empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Self-
reported valence towards happy faces was negatively predicted by psychopathy, with 
valence towards sad faces showing the inverse effect (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2009; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). If behavioural assessments of affective 
empathy provide a valid measure of empathic traits, performance in them is expected to 
correlate with existing trait assessments of primary psychopathy and associated traits, as 
in previous research (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). 
As an additional measure, previous research has adopted empathy for pain tasks 
as a means of assessing affective responses to the pain of others (Decety & Jackson, 
2004; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005). If these provide a valid assessment of 
empathy for pain, reduced empathy for harm might be observed in individuals scoring 
higher in psychopathy and associated traits based on previous research (Bartels & 
Pizarro, 2011; Patil, 2015). 
The second purpose of incorporating these behavioural empathy tasks was to 
provide a baseline with which to compare performances in post-intervention empathy 
tasks following alcohol consumption. If acute alcohol intake does affect social 
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processing, by reducing the capacity for empathy and decreasing harm aversion, then 
alcohol consumption is expected to reduce performance in these behavioural empathy 
tasks. Self-reported valence towards happy and sad faces and self-reported empathy 
towards painful images may be reduced as a result of impaired social processing and 
emotional blunting (Duke & Begue, 2015). For facial displays of emotion specifically, 
self-reported valences following alcohol consumption may mirror the inappropriate 
responses given by individuals scoring high in psychopathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 
2012).
19
    
Physiological measures in these behavioural empathy tasks should support 
behavioural findings. If pupil diameter changes reflect affective processing (Bradley, 
Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003), then reduced pupil diameter 
variation towards painful images and facial displays of emotion in post-intervention 
tests following alcohol consumption are expected. 
Moral Responses 
If existing research examining acute effects of alcohol (Duke & Begue, 2015) 
and alcohol dependence (Martina Carmona-Perera et al., 2014) on moral judgments in 
personal moral dilemmas is supported, increased utilitarian preferences may be 
observed. If this relationship is mediated by deficits in social processing and reduced 
aversion to harm, performance in behavioural empathy tasks should mediate this 
relationship. 
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 There has been evidence supporting gender differences in subjective ratings of facial displays of 
emotion (e.g., Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Montagne, Kessels, Frigerio, de Haan, & 
Perrett, 2005) and neural mechanisms underlying the processing of the pain of others (e.g., Han, Fan, & 
Mao, 2008). However, these findings have been mixed with research arguing that subjective reports are 
often “contaminated by…a bias to confirm the sex-role stereotypes” (Han et al., 2008, p. 86). For results 
regarding facial tasks and pain tasks, I report (in footnotes) follow-up analyses examining potential 
gender effects given the ambiguity of findings in previous research.   
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If, on the other hand, existing dual-process models of moral judgment can be 
supported, then alcohol consumption might lead to increased preference for non-
utilitarian moral judgments as a result of increased emotional reactivity and decreased 
cognitive functioning (Greene et al., 2001).  
Predictions regarding moral actions are less certain. Given previous research 
demonstrating the link between utilitarian moral actions and traits associated with 
empathy decline and less aversion to harm (e.g., Patil, 2015), alcohol intoxication might 
result in greater utilitarian actions if empathic processing is diminished in behavioural 
empathy tasks. However, the latter hypothesis supporting Greene’s dual process model 





Fifty participants comprising 33 females and 17 males (Mage = 21.60, SD = 4.65 
years, age range: 18 - 42 years) were recruited from the Plymouth University, School of 
Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The majority of participants were right-handed 
(84.1%). Two participants were excluded from the experiment; one having failed to see 
clearly in the non-moral virtual task as a result of vision problems and one having failed 
to complete the non-moral virtual task due to lack of understanding. As such, 48 
participants comprising 31 females and 17 males (Mage = 21.44, SD = 4.63 years, age 
range: 18 - 42 years) formed the final sample. This research received ethical approval 
from the Plymouth University Ethics Committee.  




Participants were asked to fill out the electronic questionnaire incorporated in 
Chapter 2, comprising the LSRP (αs = .72 - .84), the HEXACO-IP-R (αs = .66 - .79)
 20
, 
and the IRI (αs = .72 - .84). In the present study, an additional measure of moral identity 
was also included as individuals with psychopathic traits often demonstrate a reduced 
sense of moral identity (Glenn, Koleva, Iyer, Graham, & Ditto, 2010).  
The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) provides a 
measure of moral identity. It contains two subscales that assess symbolization (i.e., 
public dimension of moral identity) (5 items; α = .69) and internalization (i.e., private 
dimension of moral identity) (5 items; α = .87). The inventory contains 10 items with 
responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = Does not describe me well to E = 
Describes me very well). The scale contains items such as “It would make me feel good 
to be a person who has these characteristics”. In the present experiment, personality 
traits were assessed in order to investigate their relationship with behavioural empathy 
measures, subsequently allowing validation of these behavioural approaches (Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012). 
Behavioural Empathy Measures 
In the present experiment, additional behavioural measures of affective and 
cognitive empathy were included. These were completed pre- and post-intervention: 
Facial task. The self-assessment manikin (SAM) (Bradley & Lang, 1994) 
assesses an individual’s response to emotional stimuli rather than relying on self-report 
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 The HEXACO scale was minimised to the Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness facets given their 
overlapping association (Ashton & Lee, 2005) and relevance to reciprocal altruism (Ashton, Lee, & de 
Vries, 2014). Agreeableness was also significant to the present investigation given its inverse association 
with anger and aggression (Ashton & Lee, 2007); states also associated with alcohol consumption 
(Giancola, 2004). 
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questionnaires, in an attempt to assess affective empathy. Adopting a procedure similar 
to that of previous research (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) images depicting specific facial 
expressions (happy, sad, and neutral) were presented to participants. These images were 
sampled from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE) (Beaupré, 
Cheung, & Hess, 2000) and comprised eight images per emotion, gender-balanced and 
comprising only Caucasian faces. All images were presented in the same size and in 
greyscale. Following presentation, participants were asked to indicate how they felt 
towards the face on the SAM valence scale (1 (negative) – 9 (positive)) (see Appendix 
4.1). In the pre-intervention task, four images of each emotion were presented to 
participants with the remaining 50% of images presented during the post-intervention 
task to prevent carryover effects.  
Pain task. The empathy for pain paradigm included in the present experiment 
has been adopted in previous research as a means of assessing affective responses when 
perceiving the pain of others (Jackson et al., 2005) and has been argued to be a way in 
which to address the processes involved in empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004). 
Adopting procedures from previous research (e.g., Jackson et al., 2005), images of 
hands and feet in painful and neutral conditions were presented to individuals. 
Following this, participants were asked to indicate on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
(0 (no pain) - 10 (worse pain ever)) the intensity of pain they thought the person in the 
image would feel in that situation (see Appendix 4.2). Our image group, sampled from 
an existing set (Jackson et al., 2005), comprised 18 painful images of familiar events 
and 18 neutral counterparts of the same events taken at “…angles that promoted first-
person perspective” (Jackson et al., 2005, p. 772). The types of pain included in these 
images were mechanical, thermal, and pressure-related with individuals in the images 
varying in both gender and age. All images were displayed in the same size. In the pre-
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intervention task, nine of the neutral and nine of the painful images were presented to 
participants with the remaining images presented during the post-intervention task to 
prevent carryover effects.  
The presentation of facial displays of emotion and pain image blocks were 
counterbalanced across participants in both the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
completion of the tasks. No image was displayed more than once throughout the whole 
experiment.   
Moral Decision-Making Measures  
In all conditions, participants completed a moral action and a moral judgment 
task. For the moral action task, participants completed the same non-moral virtual task 
and moral virtual task as described in Chapter 2. 
For the judgment task, participants were given the text-based non-moral task 
from Chapter 2. Given that participants completed both the moral action and moral 
judgment tasks, I could not present the footbridge dilemma in both tasks as a result of 
carryover effects (e.g., Bartels et al., 2015). As such, in the text-based moral task, 
participants were given a vignette describing a validated comparable dilemma (see 
Appendix 4.3 for validation studies) as opposed to the footbridge dilemma. This was 
embedded in nine additional distractor dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). In total, five of 
these dilemmas were classified as personal and four as impersonal and were selected 
from those originally used in Greene et al. (2001) and from those incorporated in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
All dilemmas were presented electronically in a random order. As in Chapter 2, 
after each dilemma, participants were asked a judgment question (“Is it morally 
acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”). After a response was given, a second action-
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choice question was displayed asking (“Would you do it?”). Participants responded by 
selecting “Yes” (Y- key) or “No” (N - key).  
Physiological Measures  
Alcohol. In order to assess and monitor the effects of alcohol in the low and 
high alcohol conditions, estimated blood alcohol levels (% BAC) were taken at specific 
intervals during the experiment from each participant’s breath air, using a portable 
breathalyser device (AlcoSense Pro Breathalyser and Alcohol Tester) utilised by UK 
police forces. The breathalyser measures the concentration of alcohol vapour in a single 
breath.  
Behavioural empathy tasks. Whilst participants viewed both facial expressions 
and pain images, additional data in the form of pupillary diameters were collected as a 
physiological measure of affective responses (Partala & Surakka, 2003). Pupillary size 
was collected by monitoring each participant’s left eye during stimulus presentation 
(The Eye Tribe). The sampling rate of the system was 30Hz with the Eye Tribe running 
on a PC computer. 
Moral decision-making tasks. Heart rate was recorded using the equipment and 
procedure described in Chapter 2 of this thesis. As in Chapter 2, heart rate sampling was 
completed with the primary aims of assessing whether arousal was modality or moral 
specific and in this experiment specifically, whether blood alcohol level affected 
physiological arousal in response to moral scenarios.          
Procedure  
Prior to arriving at the experiment, participants were reminded to refrain from 
drinking alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of the experiment beginning.  
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Pre-intervention. All conditions first completed the personality trait 
assessments and pre-questionnaire electronically (see Chapter 2) along with a subjective 
mood visual analogue scale (100mm long) assessing disinhibition and positive affect 
(Duke & Begue, 2015) (see Appendix 4.4). Participants then completed the behavioural 
empathy task. Participants were seated 50cm away from a PC and were asked to keep 
their heads as still as possible. Lighting conditions within the lab were kept constant 
across participants using blackout adjustable blinds. Participants first completed an eye-
tracking calibration that involved looking at various fixation points across the computer 
screen. Following this, a resting slide appeared on-screen and participants were 
instructed to look at the fixation cross at the centre of the screen. Sixty seconds from the 
onset of the resting slide, the first stimulus appeared. Following an existing procedure 
(Partala & Surakka, 2003), each image stimulus was presented for six seconds. After 
image offset, the relevant scale was presented for eight seconds to be completed by 
participants (SAM valence scale for facial displays of emotion or VAS for pain images). 
Participants used the computer mouse with their right hand to select a rating along the 
given scale. Following scale offset, a blank slide with a fixation cross would be 
displayed for a randomised interval of 10-15s before the next image stimulus was 
delivered to prevent anticipation of stimuli (see Figure 4.1). Following completion of 
the pre-intervention behavioural empathy task, participants were given an additional 
questionnaire to complete which assessed their alcohol consumption (units per week) 
and their current weight (kg) (see Appendix 4.5).
21
 Participants were then randomly 
allocated to one of the three conditions (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) and an 
estimate baseline BAC was taken (participants were asked to blow into a sterile tube 
attached to the portable breathalysing device).   
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 This questionnaire also assessed exclusion criteria for the present experiment including alcohol naivety, 
alcohol dependence (including that of family members) and current medication use. These criteria had 
been outlined to participants prior to signing up to the experiment but were also included during the 
experiment as a precautionary measure.  
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Figure 4.1. Diagram of experimental procedure in behavioural empathy tasks for facial 
and pain tasks. The same procedure was adopted in both the pre-intervention and post-
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Intervention. In an attempt to reach target BAC levels predefined in existing 
research and subsequently shown to affect moral decision-making (0.04%) (Duke & 
Begue, 2015), the low alcohol condition received a dose of 0.40g/kg vodka (37.5% 
alcohol by volume) and the high alcohol condition received 0.80g/kg vodka (37.5% 
alcohol by volume). All alcoholic drinks were mixed with two-parts lemonade and were 
flavoured with fresh lime juice. Participants in the placebo condition were given 
lemonade flavoured with lime and alcohol was sprayed around the edge of the glass in 
order to provide an alcohol odour, ensuring that condition assignment was unknown. 
Given the influence of alcohol expectancy on social behaviours (e.g., Assefi & Garry, 
2003), additional alcohol cues such as floating a small amount of alcohol on top of each 
placebo glass (e.g., Roberts, Fillmore, & Milich, 2012), were not adopted here. The aim 
of this manipulation was to ensure that condition assignment was unknown and not to 
deceive placebo participants into accepting that they had consumed alcohol. In all 
conditions, participants were given ten minutes to consume the beverage. In order to 
control for awareness of condition assignment, an awareness check was performed (see 
Appendix 4.6) asking participants whether they knew which condition they had been 
assignment to and if so, how they knew. A waiting period of 20 minutes followed in 
order for alcohol to be absorbed into the blood and to reach a predefined optimal level.
22
 
Following this, a second BAC reading was taken (estimated peak BAC). 
Post-intervention. All participants completed a second subjective mood 
assessment of disinhibition and positive affect, followed by the moral action and 
judgment tasks. The order of the moral tasks was counterbalanced. Having completed 
the virtual moral task, participants completed the post-questionnaire (see Chapter 2). 
Further, as an addition to this post-questionnaire, participants were also asked “Did you 
                                                          
22
 Peak BAC was estimated using previous research (Mitchell, Teigen, & Ramchandani, 2014) and initial 
pilot testing; participants (N = 7, Mage = 27.72, 3 females, 4 males) who consumed alcohol at low and 
high dosage reached peak BAC between approximately 20 – 40 minutes. 
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feel coerced into carrying out these actions in Virtual Reality?” and could response with 
“Yes” or “No” addressing previous concerns regarding utilitarian actions and coercion 
(Chapter 2). Participants then completed the post-intervention behavioural empathy task 
using a procedure identical to that of the pre-intervention behavioural empathy task. 
Following completion of this task, a final estimate BAC reading was taken. Participants 
were invited to leave the experiment after their BAC level had returned to a 
predetermined limit (< 0.01%).  
Results 
Order Effects 
Across groups, no order effects were found based on task presentation when 
referencing the judgment question (p = .437) or action-choice question (p = .775).  
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
Additionally, as in previous chapters (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3), endorsing a 
utilitarian outcome in the moral action task (pushing the person in VR) was not 
associated with prior gaming experience (ps > .381).  
Control Variables and Checks 
 BAC level. In order to determine if the low and high alcohol interventions had 
increased BAC levels, a comparison between peak BAC levels (20 minutes after alcohol 
consumption) was first completed. Average peak BAC levels (%) were highest in the 
high alcohol condition (M = 0.03%, SD = 0.01, Range = 0.01% - 0.05%), moderately 
high in the low alcohol condition (M = 0.01%, SD = 0.01, Range = 0% - 0.03%), and as 
expected, were absent in the placebo condition. A one-way ANOVA was performed 
with condition entered as the between-subjects variable (placebo; low alcohol; high 
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alcohol) and peak BAC level entered as the dependent variable. Analysis found a 
significant difference in peak BAC levels between conditions, (F(2, 45) = 51.97, p 
< .001, ηp² = .70) with follow-up tests revealing significant differences between the 
placebo and low alcohol conditions, (p = .005), the placebo and high alcohol conditions, 
(p < .001), and the low and high alcohol conditions, (p < .001).
23
   
Awareness check. Awareness checks revealed that 87.5% of participants in the 
placebo condition were unaware of condition assignment and did not know whether 
they had consumed alcohol or not. In the low alcohol condition, 68.75% of participants 
reported that they did not know whether they had consumed alcohol or not and this 
decreased to 31.25% in the high alcohol condition. However, reported awareness of 
condition assignment was not associated with either moral actions (p = .383) or moral 
judgments (when referencing either the action-choice and judgment question) (ps > .450) 
when controlling for condition. As such, awareness checks were not included in further 
analyses.  
Drinking habits. Having measured drinking habits (total units of alcohol 
consumed weekly), preliminary analyses were performed to identify possible 
confounding effects of alcohol tolerance on condition assignment and BAC level. A 
one-way ANOVA with condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as the between-
subjects variable and drinking habits as the dependent variable, found no significant 
differences between the total units of alcohol consumed weekly between conditions (p 
= .328). Further, self-reported total units of alcohol consumed weekly did not correlate 
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 Previous research has reported mixed findings regarding gender differences in ethanol metabolic rates 
and subsequent blood alcohol levels (e.g., Frezza et al., 1990; Thomasson, 1995). In order to control for 
potential differences in BAC levels, the same analysis was performed with gender as an additional 
between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed no main effect of gender on BAC level (p = .151) and no 
interaction between gender x condition (p = .331). Supporting previous analysis, a significant main effect 
of condition was found, (F(2, 42) = 42.14, p < .001, ηp² = .67).    
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with peak BAC level (p = .975). As such, drinking habits were not included in further 
analyses.  
Subjective mood. With previous research suggesting that the relationship 
between alcohol and moral decision-making may be mediated by feelings of 
disinhibition or positive affect (Duke & Begue, 2015), subjective mood ratings 
(disinhibition; positive affect) were compared before and after the alcohol intervention. 
A two-way mixed model ANOVA with disinhibition as the dependent variable, 
condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as the between-subjects factor and time 
completed (pre-intervention; post-intervention) as the within-subjects variable, revealed 
no effect of condition (p = .740) or time completed (p = .938) or subsequent interaction 
effects (p = .096) on subjective reports of disinhibition. Therefore, disinhibition was not 
included in further analysis. A second ANOVA with positive affect entered in the 
model as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect of time on subjective reports of 
happiness, (F(1, 45) = 9.18, p = .004, ηp² = .70) with subjective reports of happiness 
significantly lower after the intervention. However, there were no main effects of 
condition (p = .804) and no interaction effects (p = .850). Point-biserial correlations 
revealed no relationship between subjective ratings of positive affect following the 
intervention and moral actions (p = .673) or moral judgments (when referencing either 
the judgment or action-choice question) (ps > .175). As such, positive affect was not 
included in further analysis.  
Moral Responses and Alcohol 
 In order to compare moral judgments and moral actions, simulated moral 
actions in the virtual version of the footbridge dilemma were compared to the moral 
judgments made in response to the text-based counterpart. In all groups, the proportion 
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of utilitarian responses was higher when simulated action was required in VR compared 
to when judgment was required in the text-based counterpart (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 
Percentage of Utilitarian Responses in Moral Judgment and Action Tasks  
 Moral judgment task Moral action task 
Condition Judgment question Action-choice 
question 
 
Placebo 25% 25% 75% 
Low Alcohol 18.75% 6.25% 68.75% 
High Alcohol 6.25% 6.25% 68.75% 
 
Given that responses to the moral judgment task and moral action task were 
binary, Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) were performed using a binary logistic 
model with task (judgment task; action task) as within-subjects factor and condition 
(placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as between-subjects factor (see Figure 4.2) (see 
Statistical Note (4.1)). Two analyses were carried out, the first using the judgment 




Judgment question. When selecting the judgment question, analysis revealed a 
main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 27.18, p < .001), with a greater proportion of 
utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment tasks. There was no 
main effect of condition (p = .470) and no interaction (p = .566).  
                                                          
24
 This analysis was designed to compare moral actions in VR and moral judgments in text-based 
vignettes, hence the judgment and action-choice questions were referenced in separate analyses (as both 
derived from the same text-based moral dilemma). In order to determine if there were differences in 
responses to questions, an additional GEE analysis incorporating both the judgment and action-choice 
questions, revealed a main effect of task (Wald X
2
[1] = 36.28, p < .001), with a greater proportion of 
utilitarian responses overall in the action task as compared to both questions in the judgment task (ps 
< .001) but no difference between moral responses to the judgment question and action-choice question (p 
= 1.00).  
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Action-choice question. When selecting the action-choice question, analysis 
revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 24.90, p < .001), with a greater proportion 
of utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment tasks. There was 
no main effect of condition (p = .286) and no interaction (p = .480). 
  









Is it morally acceptable
to?




























Figure 4.2. Utilitarian responses (%) in the moral action task (VR footbridge) and the 
moral judgment task (footbridge counterpart) in the placebo, low alcohol and high 
alcohol conditions. In the judgment task, participants were asked whether the action was 
morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of utilitarian 
outcomes were endorsed in the moral action task.
25
 Error bars represent +- 1 SEp. 
  
                                                          
25
 Although GEE analyses revealed no significant response differences between conditions, the 
differences between conditions in their responses to the judgment task appeared to be large (e.g., 6.25% 
versus 25% utilitarian responses). As such, I carried out additional separate chi-square tests comparing 
responses to the judgment question and the action-choice question between conditions. These supported 
GEE analyses showing no significant differences between conditions in their moral judgments made in 
response to either the judgment question (p = .492) or action question (p = .333).     
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 Following statistical analyses adopted in previous research (Duke & Begue, 
2015), analyses were also carried out using BAC level as a predictor of moral responses 
(non-utilitarian; utilitarian) in both the moral action task and moral judgment task. Peak 
BAC level was not a significant predictor of moral responses in the virtual moral action 
task (p = .575) or the moral judgment task when referencing both the judgment and 
action-choice question (ps > .109).   
Heart Rate and Alcohol  
In all groups, changes in heart rate were calculated as in Chapters 2 and 4 by 
subtracting heart rate readings (bpm) taken at the end of the moral (and non-moral) 
tasks to those taken at the start of the moral (and non-moral task) tasks. Mean heart rate 
change was highest for the moral action task (VR footbridge dilemma) across 
conditions. Heart rate change decreased for the moral judgment task (text counterpart 
dilemma) and both the action and judgment non-moral tasks (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
Mean Heart Rate Change across Judgment and Action Tasks  
 Judgment task  Action task 
Condition 
Non-moral   Moral   Non-moral   Moral  
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Placebo -0.63 (0.81)  0.06 (1.18)  -0.25 (2.02)  2.81 (3.35) 
Low Alcohol  -0.75 (0.93)  -0.13 (1.59)  -0.50 (2.37)  2.13 (3.34) 
High Alcohol -0.88 (0.72)  -0.06 (1.39)  -0.06 (1.06)  0.94 (3.59) 
 
 
A mixed ANOVA with task (judgment task; action task) and type (non-moral 
task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high 
alcohol) as the between-subjects factor was conducted. Analysis revealed a main effect 
of task, (F(1, 45) = 23.12, p < .001, ηp² = .34), a main effect of type, (F(1, 45) = 20.70, p 
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< .001, ηp² = .32) and a significant interaction of type x task, (F(1, 45) = 5.92, p = .019, 
ηp² = .12) (see Figure 4.3). There was no main effect of condition (p = .436) and no 
further interactions (ps > .320).  
  










































Figure 4.3. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for non-moral and moral task type in 
judgment and action tasks by condition. Increased heart rate changes were observed in 
the virtual moral action task across conditions. Error bars represent +- 1 SE. 
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To further investigate the interaction of type x task, simple effects analyses were 
performed comparing heart rate changes in non-moral and moral tasks within both 
judgment and action tasks. A significant difference was found between non-moral and 
moral tasks in the judgment task across groups, (F(1, 45) = 8.11, p = .007, ηp² = .15) and 
in the action task across groups, (F(1, 45) = 14.53, p < .001, ηp² = .24) with greater heart 
rate changes observed in moral tasks. There was a significant difference in heart rate 
change between the judgment and action task but for the moral tasks only, (F(1, 45) = 
17.21, p < .001, ηp² = .28) with greater heart rate changes observed overall in the virtual 
moral action task.  Heart rate change for the non-moral tasks was not significantly 
different between action and judgment tasks (p = .129).
26
    
In further analyses accounting for variation in alcohol absorption, bivariate 
correlations were carried out to determine whether heart rate change in tasks was 
associated with peak BAC levels. BAC levels were not correlated with heart rate change 
in the moral judgment task (p = .789) or the judgment and action non-moral tasks 
(ps > .536). Peak BAC level had a moderate negative correlation with heart rate change 
in the moral action task, (r(46) = -.37, p = .009) (see Figure 4.4) and when entered into a 
univariate linear regression, was found to explain 13.8% of the variance in the model, 
(R
2 




                                                          
26
 The ratio of greatest and least variance in heart rate change was >3 and as such, this analysis was 
repeated and findings replicated using Generalised Estimating Equations, which does not assume 
homogeneity of variance (see Statistical Note (4.2)).   
27 In Chapter 2, I also assessed whether arousal was a significant predictor of non-utilitarian moral 
responses based on existing dual-process models (Greene et al., 2001). However, given that heart rate 
change in the virtual moral task also included the time in which individuals witnessed the consequences 
of their moral actions, this analysis cannot shed light on existing dual-process models and the prediction 
of moral responses from arousal. As such, this analysis is no longer performed.  






































Figure 4.4. Heart rate change (bpm) in the virtual moral action task plotted against peak 
BAC levels (%). Peak BAC was a negative predictor of heart rate change in the virtual 
moral task. Linear regression trendline: R
2
 = .14.  
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Alcohol and Behavioural Empathy Assessments 
 Facial task.  The SAM was used to assess self-reported valence to facial 
emotions and subsequent affective empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Valence scores 
were calculated by averaging the self-reported valence scores (1(negative) – 9(positive)) 
across each emotion set of facial expressions (neutral; happy; sad) for the pre-
intervention and post-intervention tests (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 
Valence Scores across Conditions   
 
 Valence and traits. In order to determine if this behavioural assessment of 
affective empathy was related to self-report measures of empathy, psychopathy, and 
associated traits, bivariate correlations were performed between traits and self-reported 
valence to facial emotions collected in the pre-intervention test.
28
 Moderate correlations 
showed that individuals scoring higher in primary psychopathy felt more positively 
when looking at sad facial expressions and more negatively when looking at happy 
facial expressions. Honesty-Humility, on the other hand, correlated negatively with 
                                                          
28
 SAM valence scores in the pre-intervention facial task and VAS scores collected during the pre-
intervention pain task were compared to traits prior to the alcohol intervention. This was done to validate 
the behavioural empathy tasks included here as in previous research (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). The post-
intervention behavioural empathy tests were not included in this analysis given the potential mediating 
effects of alcohol consumption on on-line performances in these tasks. 
 Pre-intervention  Post-intervention 
Condition 
Neutral  Happy  Sad  Neutral  Happy  Sad 
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valence towards sad facial expressions and positively with valence towards happy facial 
expressions. Additionally, individuals scoring higher in Internalization, felt more 
positively towards happy facial expressions and individuals with higher Empathic 
Concern scores, reported feeling more negative towards sad facial expressions (see 
Table 4.4).   
Table 4.4 
Correlation between Valence Scores for Facial Emotions in the SAM Facial Test and 
Trait Measures 
 
Note. r = correlation coefficient; H = Honesty-Humility; A = Agreeableness; PT = 
Perspective Taking; EC = Empathic Concern; PD = Personal Distress; FS = Fantasy 
Seeking. 
a
Valence scores from the SAM facial pre-intervention test only. 
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001 
Trait measure Subscale 





Neutral (r) Happy (r) Sad (r) 
1.   LPS      
 Primary  .13 -.34* .39** 
 Secondary  -.09 -.01 .04 
2.   HEXACO      
 H  -.13 .35* -.47** 
 A  .26 .11 -.08 
3.   IRI      
 PT  .08 .05 -.19 
 EC  -.14 .15 -.30* 
 PD  -.05 -.14 .06 
 FS  .08 .13 .02 
4.   Moral Identity      
 Symbolization  -.12 .26 -.18 
 Internalization  -.18 .29* -.27 
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Valence and alcohol. In order to examine the effects of the alcohol intervention, 
a three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of condition 
(placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), emotion (neutral; happy; sad), and test (pre-
intervention; post-intervention) on self-reported valence to faces. Analysis revealed a 
main effect of emotion, (F(2,90) = 141.04, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .76), a significant two-way 
interaction of  test x emotion, (F(2,90) = 5.95, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .12), and a statistically 
significant three-way interaction between condition x test x emotion, (F(4,90) = 6.03, p 
< .001, ηp
2 
= .21 ). There was no main effect test (p = .195) or condition (p = .990) and 
no further interactions (ps > .463). 
In order to examine the higher-order interaction further, simple effects tests 
follow. Statistical significance of simple two-way interactions and follow-up simple 
main effects were accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted level (p = .017). Analysis revealed 
a statistically significant two-way interaction of test x emotion in the high alcohol 
condition, (F(2, 30) = 21.21 , p < .001, ηp
2 
= .59) (see Figure 4.5 (iii)) but not in the 
placebo (p = .665) (see Figure 4.5 (i)) or low alcohol conditions (p = .933) (see Figure 
4.5 (ii)). In order to investigate this interaction further, the effect of test (pre-
intervention; post-intervention) was examined for each emotion (neutral; happy; sad) 
using simple effects tests. There was a statistically significant simple main effect of test 
for the high alcohol condition in reported valence to happy faces and sad faces but not 
in valence towards neutral faces (p = .309). For participants in the high alcohol 
condition, valence towards happy faces was significantly lower (more negative) in the 
post-test after alcohol consumption, (t(15) = 5.18, p < .001, d = 1.29) and valence 
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towards sad faces was significantly higher (more positive) in the post-test after alcohol 




                                                          
29
 To control for potential interaction effects of gender differences in subjective ratings of facial displays 
of emotion, this analysis was repeated with gender entered as a dummy-coded covariate (male; female). 
Analysis revealed that existing effects and interactions remained significant when controlling for gender. 


































































































Figure 4.5. Simple interaction effects showing average self-reported valence to facial 
expressions in (i) placebo condition, (ii) low alcohol condition, and (iii) high alcohol 
condition. A significant interaction effect was found for the high alcohol condition and 
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Valence and moral responses. Following the finding that valence towards sad 
and happy faces was affected by alcohol consumption, a secondary analysis was 
performed to determine whether this change affected moral decision-making. Changes 
in valence were defined as the difference in valence scores for happy and sad faces 
between the pre- and post-intervention tests. These changes in self-reported valence 
towards happy and sad faces between the pre- and post-intervention tests, were not 
associated with moral actions (ps > .651) or moral judgments (ps > .372).
30
  
Pain task. The pain task was used to assess affective empathy for pain (Jackson 
et al., 2005). Empathy for pain scores were calculated by averaging the responses given 
on the VAS (0 (no pain) – 10 (worse pain ever)) for neutral and painful images for the 
pre-intervention and post-intervention tests (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 
Empathy for Pain Scores across Conditions   
 Pre-Intervention  Post-Intervention 
Condition 
Neutral  Painful  Neutral  Painful 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Placebo 0.75 (0.64)  6.89 (1.17)  0.26 (0.42)  7.16 (1.35) 
Low Alcohol  1.03 (1.16)  7.01 (1.08)  0.61 (0.90)  7.19 (1.40) 
High Alcohol 1.00 (0.91)  6.89 (1.65)  0.62 (0.86)  6.76 (1.89) 
 
Empathy for pain and traits. In order to examine the relationship between self-
reported empathy for pain and personality traits, bivariate correlations were performed 
between traits and pain scores for neutral and painful images in the pre-intervention test 
(see Table 4.6). Moderate correlations revealed that individuals scoring higher in 
primary psychopathy had lower empathy for pain scores when looking at painful images. 
                                                          
30
 Given the test x emotion x condition interaction, partial correlations controlling for BAC levels were 
also performed revealing no relationship between changes in self-reported valence towards happy and sad 
faces and moral responses (ps > .132). 
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Empathic Concern, on the other hand, correlated positively with empathy for pain 
scores on the VAS in response to painful images. Individuals scoring higher in Honesty-
Humility reported greater empathy for pain scores when looking at neutral images.  
Table 4.6 
Correlations between VAS Scores in the Pain Test and Trait Measures 
 
Note. H = Honesty-Humility; A = Agreeableness; PT = Perspective Taking; EC = 
Empathic Concern; PD = Personal Distress; FS = Fantasy Seeking. 
a
VAS scores from the empathy for pain pre-intervention test only. 
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001 
 
Empathy for pain and alcohol. In order to examine the effect of the alcohol 
intervention, a three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of 
condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), image type (neutral; painful), and test 
Trait measure Subscale 
 Empathy for pain
b
 
 VAS score 
 
Neutral  Painful 
1. LPS     
 Primary  -.24 -.35* 
 Secondary  -.06 .11 
2. HEXACO     
 H  -.32* .21 
 A  .12 -.08 
3. IRI     
 PT  .05 -.00 
 EC  .09 .31* 
 PD  -.08 .15 
 FS  -.21 -.03 
4. Moral Identity     
 Symbolization  .18 .04 
 Internalization  .11 .27 
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(pre-intervention; post-intervention) on VAS scores assessing empathy for pain. 
Analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of test, (F(1, 45) = 3.84, p = .056, 
ηp
2 
= .08), a main effect of image type, (F(1, 45) = 1221.51, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .96), and a 
significant two-way interaction of test x image type, (F(1, 45) = 9.23, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .17). There was no main effect of condition (p = .835) and no further interactions 
(ps > .500). 
To further investigate the interaction between test x image type, simple effects 
analyses were performed comparing empathy for pain scores for neutral and painful 
images within both the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests. A significant 
difference was found between pain scores for neutral and painful images in both the pre-
test (F(1, 45) = 948.00, p < .001, ηp² = .95) and post-test (F(1, 45) = 943.13, p < .001, 
ηp² = .95) with painful images eliciting higher VAS scores overall. In the post-test, 
empathy for pain scores in response to neutral images, were significantly lower 
compared to the pre-test, (F(1, 45) = 16.91, p < .001, ηp² = .27) (see Figure 4.6).
31
   
  
                                                          
31
 To control for potential interaction effects of gender differences in subjective ratings of the pain of 
others, this analysis was repeated with gender entered as a dummy-coded covariate (male; female). 
Analysis revealed that the existing main effect of image type remained. The marginally significant main 
effect of test and significant interaction of test x image type were no longer significant following the 
inclusion of gender (ps > .412). Follow-up analyses revealed a marginally significant interaction of test x 
image type x gender (p = .064) with females giving lower VAS scores for neutral images in the post-test 
compared to the pre-test (p < .001). However, there were significant violations of homogeneity of 
variances, likely driven by the difference in the ratio of females (N = 32) to males (N = 17). As such, 
these analyses must be treated with caution. 







































































Figure 4.6. Line graphs showing average empathy for pain scores on the VAS in 
response to (i) neutral images and (ii) painful images. A significant interaction effect 
revealed higher VAS scores for painful images across pre- and post-intervention tests 
and significantly lower VAS scores for neutral images in the post-test. Error bars 
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Empathy for pain and moral responses. Changes in empathy for pain scores 
between the pre- and post-interventions for neutral and painful images were not 
associated with either moral actions (ps > .114) or moral judgments (ps > .344).  
Alcohol and Affective Processing  
Whilst completing the facial tasks and pain tasks, pupil diameters were 
measured as a means of assessing affective processing (Partala & Surakka, 2003). For 
statistical analyses, blinks were removed using a procedure adapted from previous 
research (Skulmowski et al., 2014) by discarding the eye tracking data 120ms before 
and after a pixel diameter of 0 pixels. Artefacts were also removed and identified as 
large changes in pupil diameter (Partala & Surakka, 2003). In this case, these changes 
were defined as any reading more than two standard deviations from average pupil 
diameter and each flagged detection was visually inspected prior to removal (to ensure 
that these parameters identified physically impossible increases in diameter) (Jainta & 
Baccino, 2010). In order to create a visual timeline of pupillary diameter, discarded 
blinks (and artefacts) were interpolated linearly (extrapolated) accounting for pre- and 
post-blink or saccade artefacts
32
 (for a similar procedure see: Bradley et al., 2008; Jainta 




All pupil diameter data were analysed using a baseline correction (subject 
zeroing) by subtracting the initial pupillary reading (at trial onset) from proceeding 
pupillary readings within a trial (for a similar procedure see: Azevedo et al., 2013). The 
                                                          
32
 A custom-built software was developed to carry out this procedure but all raw and corrected trials were 
also visually inspected. 
33
 Over all participants, 178 individual stimulus trials (7.15%) were excluded from subsequent analysis as 
a result of tracking loss, extensive blinks, or excessive corrections (if the number of extrapolated points 
between stimulus onset and 9000ms following offset exceeded 3000ms). 
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data were then analysed by examining the baseline-corrected data over the 6-s stimulus 
interval (of each image).  
Whilst existing research often converts the arbitrary pixel values provided by 
eye-tracking software into mm (using manufacturer’s instructions) (e.g., Skulmowski et 
al., 2014), a conversion tool is currently unavailable for The Eye Tribe. As such, I report 
the average pupil diameter change from baseline (% delta).  
 Facial tasks.  Pupillary diameter changes were averaged across facial emotion 
in the pre- and post-intervention facial tasks (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 
 Pupillary Diameter (% delta) across Conditions in Pre- and Post-Intervention Facial 
Tasks   
Note. Average pupil diameter values = % delta  
 
Pupil diameter and traits. In order to determine if changes in pupil diameter in 
response to facial expressions of emotions were related to self-report measures of 
dispositional traits, bivariate correlations were performed between traits and pupillary 
changes recorded in the pre-intervention facial tasks. There were no significant 
associations between primary psychopathy and pupil diameter changes across facial 
emotions (ps > .083) or any remaining traits and diameter changes (ps > .080). 
 Pre-intervention  Post-intervention 
Condition 
Neutral  Happy  Sad  Neutral  Happy  Sad 
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Pupil diameter and alcohol.   In order to examine the effects of the alcohol 
intervention, a three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of 
condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), emotion (neutral; happy; sad), and test 
(pre-intervention; post- intervention) on pupil diameter change in response to faces. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of test, (F(1,45) = 16.66, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .27) but no 
further main effects (ps > .187) or interactions (ps > .412). Across facial emotions and 




Pupil diameter and moral responses. Changes in pupil diameter were calculated 
as the difference between pupil diameter readings (% delta) in the pre- and post-
intervention facial tasks for neutral, happy, and sad faces. Changes in pupil diameter 
between the pre- and post-intervention tests for all faces were not correlated with either 
moral actions (ps > .103) or moral judgments (ps > .386). 
  
                                                          
34
 Supporting previous research (Partala & Surakka, 2003), including gender as a dummy-coded covariate 
(male; female) in this analysis, did not affect the results. 






















































































































Figure 4.7. Mean pupil diameter change (%) in facial tasks for each facial emotion in 
pre- and post-intervention tests by condition. Lower pupil diameter changes were 
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Pain task.  Pupillary diameter changes were averaged across image type in the 
pre- and post-intervention pain tasks (see Table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8 
Pupillary Diameter (% delta) across Conditions in Pre- and Post-Intervention Pain 
Tasks   
 Pre-Intervention  Post-Intervention 
Condition 
Neutral  Painful  Neutral  Painful 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Placebo 4.81 (2.56)  4.13 (3.16)  3.00 (1.93)  3.07 (1.73) 
Low Alcohol  2.50 (2.41)  4.31 (2.19)  1.68 (2.68)  1.94 (3.21) 
High Alcohol 4.74 (2.77)  4.89 (3.31)  2.97 (3.11)  2.83 (3.01) 
Note. Average pupil diameter values = % delta  
 
Pupil diameter and traits. In order to determine if changes in pupil diameter in 
response to empathy for pain tasks were related to self-report measures of dispositional 
traits, bivariate correlations were performed between traits and pupillary changes 
recorded in the pre-intervention pain task. There were no significant associations 
between pupil diameter changes in response to neutral images and any traits (ps > .070).  
Agreeableness had a small positive correlation with change in pupil diameter when 
viewing painful images, (r(46) = .29, p = .046) but no further traits were associated 
(ps > .080). 
Pupil diameter and alcohol.   In order to examine the effects of the alcohol 
intervention, a three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of 
condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), image type (neutral; painful), and test 
(pre-intervention; post- intervention) on pupil diameter change in response to empathy 
for pain tasks. Analysis revealed a main effect of test, (F(1,45) = 26.13, p < .001, ηp
2 
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= .37) but no main effect of condition (p = .147), image type (p = .376) or any further 
interactions (ps > .128). Across neutral and painful images for all conditions, pupil 
diameter changes were significantly lower in the post-intervention test (see Figure 
4.8).
35
   
Pupil diameter and moral responses. Changes in pupil diameter were calculated 
as the difference between pupil diameters (% delta) in the pre- and post-intervention 
pain tasks for neutral and painful images. These changes in pupil diameter between the 
pre- and post-intervention tests were not correlated with either moral actions (ps > .192) 
or moral judgments (ps > .106). 
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 When including gender as a dummy-coded covariate (male; female) in this analysis, the main effect of 
test remained significant. 





















































































































Figure 4.8. Mean pupil diameter change (%) in pain tasks for painful and neutral 
images in pre- and post-intervention tests by condition. Lower pupil diameter changes 
were observed in the post-intervention pain task across conditions. Error bars represent 












 The majority of the participants in the placebo condition (56.25%), low alcohol 
condition (75%), and high alcohol condition (75%) reported that they did not feel 
coerced in VR. In order to see if coercion predicted action responses in the virtual 
footbridge dilemma, univariate logistic regressions were conducted with condition 
(placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as the selection variable, coerced (yes; no) as the 
categorical predictor and VR action response as the categorical outcome (non-utilitarian 
action; utilitarian action). Coercion did not predict VR action responses in the placebo 
condition (p = .395), in the low alcohol condition (p = .999) or in the high alcohol 
condition (p = .999).  
General Discussion 
Overall, greater utilitarian endorsements were observed when simulated action 
was required in VR compared to when moral judgments were required in the text-based 
counterpart. Whilst alcohol consumption altered self-reported performances in 
behavioural empathy tasks and heart-rate responses in VR, alcohol intake did not affect 
moral actions or moral judgments. This raises questions regarding the replicability of 
previous findings investigating acute alcohol effects on moral decision-making and the 
theorised relationship between empathic processing and moral decision-making.  
Moral Actions versus Judgments 
Participants in the present experiment demonstrated moral inconsistency; greater 
utilitarian actions were observed in the virtual footbridge dilemma, with fewer 
utilitarian judgments observed in the text-based counterpart, regardless of condition 
assignment. These results corroborate existing virtual research that demonstrates 
disparity between saying and doing (Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 2014).  
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With regards to the alcohol intervention, I had hypothesised alternative 
outcomes based on divergent streams of research seeking to understand the roles of 
deliberation versus social processing in moral decision-making (e.g., Duke & Begue, 
2015; Greene et al., 2001; Patil, 2015). Based on a deliberation-focused hypothesis, 
with alcohol increasing emotional reactivity and decreasing cognitive functioning, non-
utilitarian preferences would be predicted (Greene et al., 2001). Alternatively, previous 
research has argued that alcohol intake results in deficits in social processing but more 
specifically, reduced aversion to harm, subsequently resulting in an increase in 
utilitarian moral judgments (Duke & Begue, 2015). 
In terms of moral actions, I outlined similar divergent hypotheses. If dual-
process theories of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001) transfer to the domain of moral 
action (Navarrete et al., 2012), the deliberation hypothesis might also transfer to moral 
actions, resulting in fewer utilitarian endorsements. However, given evidence that moral 
action and judgment are partially distinct (e.g., Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013) and that 
moral inconsistency is often present in populations with social deficits (e.g., Cima et al., 
2010; Patil, 2015), there could be a preference for greater utilitarian actions after 
alcohol consumption following the social processing hypothesis. However, in the 
present experiment, neither moral judgments nor moral actions were affected by alcohol 
consumption, contradicting previous research supporting the social processing 
hypothesis (Duke & Begue, 2015) as well as research supporting the deliberation-based 
hypothesis (Greene et al., 2001).  
Alcohol and Arousal 
In terms of arousal responses in virtual moral dilemmas, heart rate changes in 
the VR footbridge dilemma were assessed (as in Chapter 2). Supporting the previous 
findings presented in this thesis, heart rate changes were highest for VR moral tasks 
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across conditions (see Chapter 2). When taking BAC levels into account, increased 
BAC levels were associated with reduced arousal responses in the VR moral task only. 
This supports the theory that VR paradigms can prompt realistic physiological 
responses (Parsons, 2015) and the theory that alcohol may trigger affective processing 
deficits in emotionally aversive situations (Duke & Begue, 2015).    
Facial Displays of Emotion and Empathy 
Behavioural empathy tasks prior to the alcohol intervention were validated 
against existing personality trait assessments. Replicating previous research (Ali et al., 
2009; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), primary psychopathy was negatively associated with 
self-reported valence towards positive faces and positively related to self-reported 
valence towards negative faces. Wai and Tiliopoulos (2012) argue that the presentation 
of facial displays of emotion using the SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994), may provide a 
more accurate measure of affective empathy than trait questionnaires. They argue that 
picturing another’s emotions generates an emotional contagion. Subsequently, the way 
in which an individual then feels (negatively or positively) about this display of emotion, 
is an empathic measure derived from the appropriateness of that reaction (Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012). The finding that individuals scoring high in primary psychopathy 
demonstrate “…inappropriate responding” to sad and happy faces (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 
2012, p. 797), reflects a deficit in this empathic contagion. The present experiment also 
extends these findings, having observed the opposite trend in individuals scoring high in 
traits negatively correlated with the Dark Triad, including Honesty-Humility, Empathic 
Concern, and Internalization. In these cases, emotional responses to facial displays of 
emotion were appropriately aligned, with happy faces motivating self-reported positive 
valence and sad faces motivating negative valence.  
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Given that alcohol is thought to diminish aversion for harm and hinder social 
processing (e.g., Martina Carmona-Perera et al., 2014; Duke & Begue, 2015), I 
hypothesised that alcohol consumption would impair performance in the SAM as a 
result of these social impairments. This was supported in the present experiment; 
individuals receiving the high dosage of alcohol reported feeling more positively 
towards sad faces and more negatively towards happy faces in the post-intervention 
facial SAM task. These inappropriate responses reflect those of individuals scoring high 
in primary psychopathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) and support the theory that alcohol 
impairs components of affective empathic processing (Duke & Begue, 2015).    
However, in terms of moral responses, differences in the pre- and post-
intervention facial behavioural empathy task, did not relate to either moral actions or 
moral judgments when controlling for alcohol consumption. Despite supporting the 
association between alcohol and impairment of affective empathic processing (Duke & 
Begue, 2015), this impairment did not result in utilitarian decision-making, as the social 
processing hypothesis would suggest.  
Empathy for Pain and Harm Aversion 
Given evidence that harm aversion plays a mediating role in personality traits 
associated with making supposedly utilitarian endorsements (Patil, 2015), evidence for 
the role of these traits in moral inconsistency (Cima et al., 2010), and the theory that 
alcohol reduces harm aversion (Duke & Begue, 2015), I also included an additional 
measure of empathy for pain specifically. Previous research has argued that these 
paradigms provide a means of assessing affective responses to the pain of others 
(Jackson et al., 2005).  
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I had hypothesised that primary psychopathy would negatively correlate with 
empathy for pain scores. This was supported in the present findings; individuals scoring 
higher in trait primary psychopathy demonstrated less intensity when rating the pain of 
others. Extending from this, the inversely related trait, Empathic Concern, was 
positively correlated with empathy for pain. This seems intuitive given that individuals 
scoring higher in Empathic Concern demonstrate a high level of care and consideration 
for the welfare of others (Davis, 1983). Surprisingly, Honesty-Humility was a positive 
predictor of empathy for pain scores in neutral images. There are a few explanations for 
this association. Firstly, follow-up analysis revealed that empathy for pain scores 
between neutral and painful images were positively correlated in the pre-intervention 
task, (r(46) = .37, p = .009) and post-intervention task, (r(46) = .33, p = .022) 
suggesting that similar mechanisms drive ratings of pain or anticipated pain in neutral 
images. Secondly, higher Honesty-Humility has been associated with lower health and 
safety related risk-taking (Weller & Tikir, 2011) which, in this instance, may have 
intensified the anticipation of harmful outcomes pictured in neutral images.   
Following alcohol consumption and based on the assumption that alcohol intake 
reduces aversion to harm (Duke & Begue, 2015), I had predicted reduced empathy 
towards individuals in painful circumstances. However, alcohol dosage did not affect 
empathy for pain scores in the present experiment. Surprisingly, empathy for pain 
scores for neutral images, were significantly lower following the intervention across all 
conditions regardless of alcohol intake. It is likely that this finding reflects a familiarity 
effect as individuals became aware of the distinction between painful and neutral 
images in the present investigation.
36
  
                                                          
36
 Additional analysis controlling for gender differences suggested that this effect existed for females only. 
However, given the ratio of females (N = 31) to males (N = 17) and violations of homogeneity 
(unbalanced data), further research is required prior to interpreting true gender differences. 
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The finding that empathy for harm was not affected by alcohol consumption has 
important implications for existing research exploring the effects of similar alcohol 
dosages on moral decision-making (Duke & Begue, 2015). If empathy for pain is not 
influenced by acute alcohol effects, then the influence of alcohol on moral decision-
making in previous research may be driven by alternative factors.  
Alternative Interpretations: Alcohol, Empathy, and Utilitarianism 
The relationship between acute alcohol effects and utilitarian moral decision-
making found in previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015) may, instead, derive from 
social awareness or social influence. Duke and Begue (2015) collected moral judgments 
made in response to the footbridge dilemma in bars. These social settings may have 
influenced moral judgments in a number of ways. Firstly, the disinhibited atmosphere 
may have made the perception of hypothetical trolley problems less serious, with 
previous research suggesting that these scenarios can be perceived as humorous (e.g., 
Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014). Alternatively, social pressures may have 
resulted in individuals acting in a way that they felt was publicly acceptable under social 
expectation (Gold et al., 2015; Skulmowski et al., 2014). As such, future research 
examining the acute effects of alcohol intake on moral decision-making might consider 
including control measures such as social desirability and self-awareness scales.       
Further, it is important to raise an alternative interpretation based on the 
implications of these findings to the proposed association between affective empathy 
and utilitarian moral decision-making. This thesis has identified evidence of a 
relationship between anti-social traits, and simulated moral actions (see Chapter 2) and 
the power of these simulated actions (see Chapter 3). I expanded this investigation using 
behavioural assessments of affective empathy given evidence that the relationship 
between psychopathy and utilitarian decision-making derives from empathic deficits 
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(e.g., Glenn, Iyer, et al., 2009) and subsequent diminished aversion to performing 
harmful actions (e.g., Patil, 2015). There are two points to discuss following this line of 
investigation. Firstly, in the present experiment, affective empathic processing of faces 
was successfully manipulated following alcohol consumption, but this did not affect 
moral decision-making. This may suggest that is not the un-empathic facets of traits 
such as psychopathy that drive utilitarian moral decision-making but perhaps other 
facets. For example, psychopaths have been found to demonstrate low anxiety and 
fearlessness (e.g., J. D. Miller, Gaughan, & Pryor, 2008) which might instead explain 
their diminished aversion to harm and tendency to respond in a utilitarian manner. 
Indeed, Koenigs et al. (2012) found that low-anxious psychopaths (with inhibitory 
deficits) endorsed a greater proportion of utilitarian moral judgments in personal moral 
dilemmas when compared to high-anxious psychopaths, suggesting a role for facets 
other than empathy in this discussion. Secondly, in the present experiment, alcohol 
consumption did not impair empathy for pain and as such, the association between 
aversion to harm specifically and utilitarian decision-making cannot be evaluated. 
Future research should investigate individuals who are frequently exposed to aversive 
events, who likely demonstrate resilience in the face of these (see Chapter 5 for such an 
investigation).  
Alternative Interpretations: Moral Inconsistency 
Addressing limitations previously raised regarding the incorporation of a 
between-subjects design (see Chapter 2), this is the first experiment to incorporate the 
present VR moral paradigm in a within-groups design. While this allowed a direct 
comparison between moral judgments and moral actions made by the same individual 
(Patil et al., 2014), it might be argued that the comparison of moral judgments and 
moral actions is limited given that each paradigm incorporated a different hypothetical 
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moral dilemma. I chose not to include the footbridge dilemma in both the virtual and 
text-based tasks to remove any potential carry-over effects (Bartels et al., 2015). 
Importantly, in validation studies, I did not find a significant difference between 
responses to the footbridge dilemma and the modified dilemma, suggesting that it could 
be utilised as a reliable comparable dilemma. Further, no order effects were found based 
on the presentation of moral judgment and action tasks suggesting that utilising 
different dilemmas did prevent potential carry-over effects. 
As an alternative interpretation of the present findings and highlighted as a 
potential limitation earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 2), it might be argued that greater 
utilitarian endorsements in VR are elicited as a result of coercion induced by auditory 
instructions. In order to address this, in the present experiment, I asked participants 
whether they felt coerced into carrying out simulated actions in VR. Across the groups, 
the majority of participants reported that they had not felt coerced and reports of 
coercion did not predict virtual moral actions. As such, it is unlikely that the greater 
utilitarian actions observed across VR experiments, were as a result of coercion. Further 
and supporting previous research (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3), self-reported gaming 
experiences did not predict moral actions in VR, reinforcing the argument that the 
responses simulated in these tasks are not akin to that of a gaming environment.  
Methodological Considerations 
It is also important to highlight limitations of the present methodology. Firstly, 
no measure of cognitive functioning or executive functioning was included in the 
present experiment, a criticism mirroring that of previous research (Duke & Begue, 
2015). This is significant given the mediating effect of executive functioning in the 
relationship between alcohol and aggression (e.g., Giancola, 2000, 2004; Godlaski & 
Giancola, 2009) and alcohol-related aggression and empathy (Giancola, 2003). As such, 
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it was difficult to determine the extent to which the present dosages of alcohol affected 
executive functioning and the subsequent effects of this on moral decision-making. 
Future research, should consider exploring the acute effects of alcohol in both social 
processing and executive function-based tasks. 
Secondly, the order of tasks following the intervention, had moral judgment and 
moral actions preceding the post-intervention empathy tasks. This decision was made to 
ensure that moral judgment and moral action tasks were completed during the window 
of peak BAC level. However, it might be that completing moral decision-making tasks 
first, subsequently influenced performance in empathy tasks. Consequently, future 
research should consider counterbalancing the order of these tasks to control for 
possible carry-over effects.  
Furthermore, during behavioural assessments of empathy, changes in pupillary 
size were measured having been shown to reflect affective processing in previous 
research (Partala & Surakka, 2003). However, in the present experiment, changes in 
pupil diameter were not significantly different between conditions or image types. A 
follow-up analysis revealed that all pupil responses in the pre-intervention empathy 
tasks correlated and all pupil responses in post-intervention empathy tasks correlated, 
suggesting that in the present experiment, changes in pupil diameter reflected general 
processing as opposed to affective processing specifically. This supports previous 
research demonstrating that changes in pupil size can reflect low-level arousal responses 
triggered by multiple concepts including, but not limited to, cognitive effort (e.g., Jainta 
& Baccino, 2010; Van Rijn et al., 2012), emotional contagion (Harrison, Singer, 
Rotshtein, Dolan, & Critchley, 2006), decision uncertainty (Urai, Braun, & Donner, 
2017) and interest value more broadly (Hess & Polt, 1960), as well as affective 
processing (e.g, Bradley et al., 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003). As a result, future 
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research might consider adopting measures of arousal response specific to affective 
processing. 
Following from these methodological considerations, it is also important to 
consider the roles of dispositional traits and behavioural states in the current discussion. 
Dispositional traits are thought to reflect core personality profiles (e.g., Haslam, Bastian, 
& Bissett, 2004), with moral traits playing an important role in shaping our personal 
identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Arguably and following from this, it is unlikely 
that the small to moderate dosages of alcohol in the present experiment, would alter 
core moral principles shaped by social and moral norms, despite influencing 
behavioural and state-dependent measures of empathic and social processing (Duke & 
Begue, 2015). Further investigations should advance beyond the manipulation of state-
dependent empathic processing and investigate moral decision-making in populations in 
which there are likely to be distinct dispositional trait profiles (see Chapter 5 for such an 
investigation). 
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CHAPTER 5: PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN MORAL ACTION VERSUS 
JUDGMENT 
Introduction 
Thus far, this thesis has uncovered two primary findings. Firstly, moral actions 
made in emotionally arousing virtual dilemmas are significantly different to theoretical 
moral judgments. Secondly, certain pro- and anti-social personality traits predict moral 
actions (see Chapter 2) and the power with which those moral actions are endorsed (see 
Chapter 3).  
Research has argued that the relationship between these traits and moral actions 
may derive from emotional processes such as reduced empathic processing and less 
aversion to harm (Patil, 2015). In the previous chapter of this thesis, empathic 
processing and harm aversion were manipulated using a psychopharmacological 
paradigm. Reducing behavioural empathic processing with alcohol did not affect moral 
judgments or moral actions. However, I highlighted the importance of extending this 
investigation beyond on-line (state) effects, given the significance of dispositional traits 
in shaping personal and moral identities (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) and I also 
highlighted the importance of investigating populations who are likely to demonstrate 
less aversion to performing specifically harmful actions. As such, in the final chapter of 
this thesis, I examine moral decision-making in individuals who are frequently exposed 
to emotionally aversive events. This provided the opportunity to further investigate the 
roles of empathy and harm aversion in moral judgments and moral actions made by 
specialised populations.  
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Moral Decision-Making and Occupation 
The research presented in this thesis, and previous studies investigating moral 
action and moral judgment, have employed diverse populations in order to shed light on 
moral decision-making (e.g., Cushman et al., 2010; Greene, 2015; Greene et al., 2004; 
Shenhav & Greene, 2014). Recently however, research has begun to question the 
significance of occupation on moral decision-making; more specifically, occupations 
that are directly connected to moral decision-making including those in healthcare 
settings and the military (e.g., Colangeli et al., 2015; Grinberg, Hristova, & Kadreva, 
2016; Ransohoff, 2011; Ransohoff, Wikler, & Greene). 
This line of investigation is significant to this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, 
specialised training in medical and emergency services involves frequent and direct 
exposure to emotionally salient and aversive situations (Grinberg et al., 2016). Secondly, 
recent research has argued that “helping professions” adopt a “rescue personality” 
(Wagner, Martin, & McFee, 2009) which is often associated with emotional resilience 
and coping strategies. For example, emergency service and healthcare professionals 
have been found to have reduced aspects of empathy (e.g., Neumann et al., 2011; 
Williams et al., 2012) and down-regulation of responses to the pain of others (Decety, 
Yang, & Cheng, 2010). Lastly, with VR offering immersive approaches to investigating 
realistic moral actions, emergency and healthcare services have begun to utilise virtual 
simulations in their training programmes (e.g., Colangeli et al., 2015). If moral 
judgments and moral actions in VR are at least partially distinct (e.g., Tassy, Oullier, et 
al., 2013), then this is significant for occupations involved in regular moral decision-
making who begin to utilise VR in their training and assessment. As such, in the 
following chapter, I now focus on investigating moral judgment and moral action in 
these specialised populations.  
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Morality and the Helping Professions 
Grinberg et al. (2016) first investigated moral judgments made by midwives and 
firefighters revealing a strong effect of occupation on moral decision-making; less 
utilitarian judgments were made by helping professions overall with fewest given by 
midwives. The authors initially note that in these professions, decision-making can 
impact human life and that subsequently, training might lessen emotional arousal 
resulting in more utilitarian judgments. However, they later argue that their reverse 
finding suggests that “…these professions share high moral values… respect more 
strongly individual rights” (Grinberg et al., 2016, p. 709).  
The idea that fewer utilitarian judgments can be observed in “helping 
professions” has been further supported in research examining moral judgments made 
by medical doctors and public health professionals (Ransohoff, 2011; Ransohoff et al.). 
Medical doctors are professionally obliged to protect the rights of their patients while 
public health professionals are more likely to be concerned with the bigger picture of 
public health (Greene, 2014). These moral ideals were supported in the finding that 
public health professionals gave more utilitarian judgments than both medical doctors 
and controls, suggesting that they give“…priority to the greater good” (Greene, 2014, p. 
130). 
In line with this research and from a military perspective, Colangeli et al. (2015) 
found that pilots endorsed fewer utilitarian solutions when compared to non-pilots when 
asked to judge the moral acceptability of the proposed utilitarian solution. When asked 
whether they would do the proposed utilitarian action described, no difference was 
found between pilots and non-pilots. The authors argue that fewer ratings of moral 
acceptability may result from their previous experiences; leading to increased awareness 
and sensitivity when faced with emotionally aversive dilemmas (Colangeli et al., 2015).   
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Despite the recent focus on investigating the significance of occupation on moral 
judgment and separate lines of investigation examining the discrepancy between 
judgment and action, research has yet to investigate the impact of specialised training on 
simulated moral actions and moral inconsistency. This is particularly relevant given the 
increased incorporation of VR technologies in healthcare and military training 
(Colangeli et al., 2015) and the need to assess real actions “…in strong time pressure 
conditions” (Colangeli et al., 2015, p. 76).  
In order to address this, in the present chapter, I investigated both moral 
judgments and moral actions made by non-specialised controls and helping professions 
that were both experienced and in training. In the following section, I present specific 
hypotheses for the present experiment with research outlining characteristics of trained 
professionals that may alter moral judgment and moral action and evaluations following 
moral action.  
Specific Hypotheses 
Specialised Training and Moral Decision-Making 
If helping professions are frequently exposed to aversive situations, moral 
judgments might be more utilitarian in nature when compared to normal populations as 
a result of successful emotion management (e.g., Grinberg et al., 2016) and less 
aversion to performing harmful actions (e.g., Patil, 2015). Alternatively, based on 
previous research, and if exposure to single-life saving incidences is prevalent, these 
individuals could prioritise individual rights resulting in non-utilitarian moral judgments 
(e.g., Greene, 2014; Grinberg et al., 2016). However, if the hypothetical nature of these 
trolley-type problems is extensive, it might be that decisions made in response to them, 
bear little resemblance to the real-life decisions made by professionals (Grinberg et al., 
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2016) resulting in no difference in moral responses between untrained and trained 
populations.   
In terms of moral actions specifically, predictions are less certain. Moral actions 
could fall in line with the former hypotheses given the findings of previous research 
(e.g., Grinberg et al., 2016; Ransohoff, 2011; Ransohoff et al.). However, the footbridge 
dilemma, whether text-based or virtual, remains hypothetical in nature and so moral 
actions might also fall in line with the latter prediction (Grinberg et al., 2016).  
Specialised Training and Moral Inconsistency 
Arguably, the professional code of conduct under which helping professions 
operate “…is potent to implicitly bias moral judgment outside the professional context” 
(Grinberg et al., 2016, p. 704); personal moral orientations may alter through training 
and experience to fall in line with professional codes of conduct. For example, strong 
moral convictions in healthcare professionals become less prominent in experienced 
individuals perhaps reflecting this process (Grinberg et al., 2016). Thus, in terms of 
moral inconsistency, specialised training may alter these perspectives with both moral 
judgments and moral actions deriving from the same underlying moral principles or 
codes of conduct prescribed by the profession. This would subsequently result in less 
moral inconsistency in trained professionals.  
Alternatively, if moral judgment and action are driven by distinct mechanisms 
and training does not alter perspectives, moral inconsistency may remain universal and 
unaffected by training.   
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Specialised Training and Resilience 
“Non, je ne regrette rien”  
(Dumont, 1956) 
Evidence that helping professions demonstrate resilience comes from a 
multidisciplinary body of research. For example, in extensive interviews with 
firefighters, Alexander (2016, p. 162) noted that “…they instinctively understood the 
danger of upward counterfactual thinking” or imagining alternative circumstances that 
may have been better than reality (e.g., Roese, 1997). Firefighters also produced fewer 
expressions of regret, taking strength from “…professional pride, sense of duty” 
(Alexander, 2016, p. 212). This association between occupations involving moral 
decision-making and resilience, has also been found in research with physicians; traits 
associated with resilience support functioning in professions that are both 
“…demanding and stressful” (Eley et al., 2013, p. 7). If trained professionals do 
demonstrate this resilience, then post-hoc evaluations of simulated moral actions may 
differ from normal populations in that they reflect this resilience rather than show any 
regret.  
Exposure, Empathy, and Arousal 
Investigations seeking to understand the origins of resilience in helping 
professions have highlighted the role of empathy arguing that lower empathy may 
“…serve as an adaptive function” providing resilience in emotionally aversive 
emergencies (Williams et al., 2012, p. 9). In fact, empathy decline has been observed in 
medical students and medical residents (Neumann et al., 2011). Importantly, this does 
not implicate all aspects of empathy as, arguably, specialist training allows 
professionals to empathise with a patient’s circumstances “…without becoming 
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emotionally entangled” (Williams et al., 2012, p. 9). For example, research has also 
shown that aspects of empathy can increase or remain stable throughout healthcare 
training across professions (e.g., Williams et al., 2014). If certain components of 
empathy are lower in trained professionals, aspects of empathy decline might be 
observed with years of experience working in the profession. Furthermore, if these 
aspects of empathy are lower in trained professionals, then empathy scores and 
associated traits are likely to be significantly lower in helping professions when 
compared to non-specialised individuals. On the other hand, if additional aspects of 
empathy are in fact higher in trained professionals, the opposite outcome might be 
observed.  
Given that “empathy” encompasses a variety of components and is frequently 
used to refer to “…a heterogeneous collection of related phenomena” (Decety & Cowell, 
2015, p. 2), here I investigate aspects of empathy using the Perspective Taking, 
Empathic Concern, and Personal Distress facets of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1983). Although seen as a distinct conceptualisation to empathy (e.g., Batson, 
2009; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007), Personal Distress is included as a measure of 
“…self-oriented, egoistic” reactions (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007, p. 17) with previous 
research indicating that prevalence of Personal Distress over empathy, results in fewer 
helping behaviours (Carrera et al., 2013).  
With trained professionals demonstrating emotional resilience (e.g., Neumann et 
al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012) and an ability to down-regulate responses to the pain of 
others (Decety et al., 2010), repeated exposure to emotionally aversive events is also 
likely to affect arousal during moral decision-making. In previous VR paradigms, 
research has found increased arousal in virtual moral dilemmas as compared to text-
based counterparts (Patil et al., 2014) indicating the value of virtual paradigms in 
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triggering realistic physiological responses to aversive situations. Trained professionals, 
having had repeated exposure to aversive incidents, may prove emotionally resilient in 
virtual simulations showing little or no arousal increase and this should be related to 




Sixty participants were recruited in total from three populations. Participants 
were sampled in order to gain a non-specialised group (control), a specialised group in 
training (paramedic practitioners) and an experienced specialised group (incident 
commanders from the fire service)
 37
: 
-Twenty control participants comprising 17 females and three males, (Mage = 
19.40, SD = 1.67 years, age range: 18 - 25 years) were recruited from the Plymouth 
University, School of Psychology participant pool and completed the study for course 
credit.  
-Twenty paramedic practitioners comprising 12 females and eight males (Mage = 
24.05, SD = 7.67 years, age range: 18 - 50 years) were recruited from Plymouth 
University, School of Health Professions and completed the study on a voluntary basis. 
Paramedic practitioners were currently completing the first year of a BSc Paramedic 
Practitioner course and were predominantly in training at the university.  
                                                          
37
 Although previous research examining moral judgments made by helping professionals has identified 
gender differences in these specialist populations (Grinberg et al., 2016), this is not examined in the 
present experiment for the reason that significant gender imbalances existed in the present samples and as 
mentioned previously, for the reason that there appears to be “…no sound scientific evidence that 
supports why there should be gender differences in moral judgment” (Christensen et al., 2014, p. 14).  
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-Twenty incident commanders comprising two females and 18 males (Mage = 
39.85, SD = 9.37 years, age range: 22 - 61 years) were recruited from the Devon and 
Somerset Fire and Rescue Service and completed the study on a voluntary basis at the 
Fire Training Centre at Exeter Airport. Incident commanders were based at different 
stations across the counties of Cornwall, Devon, and Somerset. Although having 
various roles within the fire service rank structure, all were trained in incident command. 
Measures 
Participants were asked to fill out the electronic questionnaire incorporated in 
Chapter 4, comprising the LSRP (αs = .55 - .78), components of the HEXACO-IP-R (αs 
= .66 - .79)
38
, and the Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, and Personal Distress 
components of the IRI (αs = .72 - .87)
39
 and the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale 
(αs = .64 - .80). In the present experiment, these personality traits were assessed in order 
to determine whether trait differences existed between specialist groups and control 
populations.  
Moral Decision-Making Measures  
 Following the within-groups procedure adopted in the previous chapter (see 
Chapter 4), all participants completed both the moral action and the moral judgment 
tasks. For the moral action task, participants completed the same non-moral virtual task 
and moral virtual task as described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 5.1).  
                                                          
38
 Four of the six HEXACO dimensions were included in the present experiment. Honesty-Humility was 
included given its associations with primary psychopathy (Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014). Three further 
dimensions were included as their facets have relevance to medical and healthcare professions; 
Agreeableness (gentleness and patience), Conscientiousness (diligence and organisation), and 
Emotionality (fearfulness and sentimentality). 
39
 The Fantasy Seeking subscale was not included in the present experiment given evidence suggesting 
that it does not represent modern conceptualisations of empathy (Baldner & McGinley, 2014; Batson, 
2009).   
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For the judgment task, participants were given the text-based non-moral task 
from Chapter 2. In the text-based moral task, participants were then given a vignette 
describing the comparable dilemma (adopted in Chapter 4), embedded in five additional 
distractor dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). These dilemmas were classified as personal 
and impersonal and were selected from those used in Greene et al. (2001) and in 
previous chapters of this thesis (see Chapter 4). 
All dilemmas were presented electronically in a random order. As in previous 
chapters, after each dilemma, participants were asked a judgment question (“Is it 
morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”). After a response was given, a 
second action-choice question was displayed asking (“Would you do it?”). Participants 
responded by selecting “Yes” (Y - key) or “No” (N - key).  
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Figure 5.1. Experimental Setup with Incident Commander 
 
Figure 5.1. Incident commander wearing the Oculus Rift in the setup adopted at the Fire 
Training Centre at Exeter Airport. Photograph taken by the author: June, 2016.  
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 Physiological Measures  
Heart rate was recorded using the equipment and procedure described in Chapter 
2. As in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, heart rate sampling was completed with the primary 
aims of assessing whether arousal was modality or moral specific and in this experiment 
specifically, to determine whether trained professionals demonstrated emotional 
resilience to arousing moral scenarios.  
Procedure  
The procedure adopted in the present experiment was identical to that of Chapter 
4 with the completion of the action and judgment tasks counterbalanced. Further, as an 
addition to the pre-questionnaire, all individuals were asked to record their direct 
experience working with any sector of the emergency services (in years). In the post-
questionnaire following the virtual moral task, individuals were also asked “Did you 
take the right action?” and could respond with “Yes” or “No”. This additional post-




Across groups, no order effects were found based on task presentation when 
referencing the judgment question (ps  > .490) or action-choice question (ps  > .598).  
Pre-Questionnaire Responses 
For the moral action task, endorsing a utilitarian outcome (pushing the person in 
VR) was not associated with prior gaming experience (ps > .165) or VR experience 
(ps > .262) across groups.  




 As in Chapter 4, coercion did not predict VR action responses in the control 
group (p = .187), in the paramedic group (p = .999) or in the fire service group (p 
= .691).  
Moral Responses  
In order to compare moral judgments and moral actions, simulated moral actions 
in the virtual version of the footbridge dilemma were compared to the moral judgments 
made in response to the text-based counterpart. In all groups, the proportion of 
utilitarian responses was higher when simulated action was required in VR compared to 
when judgment was required in the text-based counterpart (see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 
Percentage of Utilitarian Responses in Moral Judgment and Action Tasks  
 Moral judgment task Moral action task 
Group Judgment question Action-choice 
question 
 
Control 10% 5% 60% 
Paramedic 30% 30% 70% 
Fire service 25% 25% 60% 
 
Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) were conducted using a binary logistic 
model with task (judgment task; action task) as within-subjects factor and group 
(control; paramedics; fire service) as between-subjects factor (see Figure 5.2). As in 
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Chapter 4, two analyses were carried out, the first using the judgment question in the 
judgment task and the second using the action-choice question in the judgment task.
40
 
Judgment question. When selecting the judgment question, analysis revealed a 
main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 30.50, p < .001), with a greater proportion of 
utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment tasks. There was no 
main effect of group (p = .373) and no interaction (p = .473).  
Action-choice question. When selecting the action-choice question, analysis 
revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 24.91, p < .001), with a greater proportion 
of utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment tasks. There was 
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 This analysis was designed to compare moral actions in VR and moral judgments in text-based 
vignettes, hence the judgment and action-choice questions were referenced in separate analyses (as both 
derived from the same text-based moral dilemma). In order to determine if there were differences in 
responses to questions, an additional GEE analysis incorporating both the judgment and action-choice 
questions, revealed a main effect of task (Wald X
2
[1] = 33.36, p < .001), with a greater proportion of 
utilitarian responses overall in the action task as compared to both questions in the judgment task (ps 
< .001) but no difference between moral responses to the judgment question and action-choice question (p 
= 1.000).  










































Figure 5.2. Utilitarian responses (%) in the moral action task (VR footbridge) and the 
moral judgment task (footbridge counterpart) in the control, paramedic, and fire service 
groups. In the judgment task, participants were asked whether the action was morally 
acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of utilitarian outcomes were 
endorsed in the moral action task.
41
 Errors bars represent +- 1 SEp. 
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 Although GEE analyses revealed no significant response differences between groups, the differences 
between groups in their responses to the judgment task still appeared large (e.g., 5% versus 30% 
utilitarian responses). As such, I carried out additional separate chi-square tests comparing responses to 
the judgment question and the action-choice question between groups. These supported GEE analyses 
showing no significant differences between groups in their moral judgments made in response to either 
the judgment question (p = .381) or action question (p = .121).     
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Heart Rate Analyses 
In all groups, changes in heart rate were calculated as in Chapter 2 resulting in a 
heart rate change for non-moral tasks (judgment non-moral task; action VR non-moral 
task) and moral tasks (text counterpart dilemma; VR footbridge dilemma). Mean heart 
rate change increased in the moral action task for the control group and paramedic 
practitioners but decreased for incident command officers in the fire service (see Table 
5.2). 
Table 5.2 
Mean Heart Rate Change across Judgment and Action Tasks  
 Judgment task  Action task 
Group 
Non-moral   Moral   Non-moral   Moral  
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Control -0.45 (1.15)  0.80 (2.50)  -0.95 (2.21)  3.10 (3.21) 
Paramedics  -0.50 (0.67)  -0.05 (1.43)  -0.25 (1.74)  1.75 (3.52) 
Fire service -0.05 (1.15)  -0.10 (1.68)  0.05 (1.54)  -0.20 (3.40) 
 
 
A mixed ANOVA with task (judgment task; action task) and type (non-moral 
task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and group (control; paramedics; fire service) 
as the between-subjects factor was conducted. Analysis revealed a main effect of task, 
(F(1, 57) = 5.30, p = .025, ηp² = .09), a main effect of type, (F(1, 57) = 14.99, p < .001, 
ηp² = .21), a significant interaction of type x task, (F(2, 57) = 7.17, p = .010, ηp² = .11), 
and a significant interaction of type x group, (F(2, 57) = 6.35, p = .003, ηp² = .18)  (see 
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 The three-way interaction of type x task x condition approached marginal significance, (F(2. 57) = 2.83, 
p = .067, ηp² = .09). In this instance statistically significant two-way interactions were followed up. 







































Figure 5.3. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for non-moral and moral task type in 
judgment and action tasks by group. Increased heart rate changes were observed in 
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To further investigate the interaction of type x task, simple effects analyses were 
performed comparing heart rate changes in non-moral and moral tasks within both 
judgment and action tasks. In the judgment task, heart rate change was marginally 
significantly higher in the moral task compared to the non-moral task across groups, 
(F(1, 57) = 3.92, p = .052, ηp² = .06). In the action task, heart rate change was 
significantly higher in the moral task compared to the non-moral task, (F(1, 57) = 14.26, 
p < .001, ηp² = .20).  For the moral tasks only, there was a significant difference in heart 
rate change between the judgment and action task across groups, (F(1, 57) = 7.86, p 
= .007, ηp² = .12) with heart rate change highest in the virtual moral action task.  
To further investigate the interaction of type x group, simple effects analyses 
were performed comparing heart rate change in non-moral and moral tasks across 
groups. This analysis suggested that for the non-moral tasks, heart rate changes were not 
significantly different between the three groups, (p = .159). However for the moral tasks, 
analysis suggested that heart rate changes were different between groups, (F(2, 57) = 
5.28, p = .008, ηp² = .16). Specifically, in the control group, heart rate changes were 
significantly greater in the moral tasks than in the non-moral tasks, (F(1, 57) = 22.75, p 
= < .001, ηp² = .29) and this was also the case for the paramedic practitioners, (F(1, 57) 
= 4.86, p = .032, ηp² = .08). Analysis suggested that there was no significant difference 
in heart rate changes between non-moral and moral tasks for the incident command 
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 The ratio of greatest and least variance in heart rate change was >3 and as such, this analysis was 
repeated and using Generalised Estimating Equations, which does not assume homogeneity of variance 
(see Statistical Note (5.1)). All findings were replicated in GEE although post hoc comparisons indicated 
that there was no difference in heart rate changes between non-moral and moral tasks for both incident 
commanders and paramedic practitioners. 
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Personality Traits  
In order to assess any differences in personality trait scores between groups, a 
one-way ANOVA was used to compare traits. Several significant differences between 
personality traits were found between groups and follow-up comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections were performed to determine between which groups these 
differences were present (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3   
Personality Trait Differences  
  Group 
  Control  Paramedics  Fire service 
Measure Subscale M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
1. LPS       
 Primary 30.60 (7.43)  29.20 (5.55)  29.20 (5.15) 
 Secondary 20.85 (3.28)  21.45 (3.00)  18.60 (3.80) 
2. HEXACO       
 H 3.31 (0.53)  3.73 (0.60)  3.73 (0.39) 
 Em 3.32 (0.83)  3.23 (0.63)  2.64 (0.61) 
 A 3.23 (0.71)  3.14 (0.69)  3.16 (0.56) 
 C 3.65 (0.47)  3.56 (0.48)  3.780.49) 
3. IRI        
 PT 17.90 (3.84)  17.20 (4.96)  16.75 (4.64) 
 EC 19.30 (4.74)  19.30 (3.25)  17.70 (4.29) 









    Symbolization 2.92 (0.62)  3.04 (0.85)  3.13 (0.53) 
    Internalization 4.36 (0.44)  4.37 (0.51)  4.25 (0.43) 
Note. H = Honesty-Humility, Em = Emotionality, Ex = Extraversion, A = 
Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, O = Openness to experience. PT = Perspective 
Taking, EC = Empathic Concern, PD = Personal Distress.  
         p =.05         p <.05        p <.001   
 
No significant differences between the control group, the fire service and the 
paramedics were found for Moral Identity in either Symbolization or Internalization 
(ps > .621), the HEXACO subscales Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (ps > .368), 
primary psychopathy (p = .707), or the IRI subscales Perspective Taking and Empathic 
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Years of Experience 
Heart rate. Given that trained professionals are frequently exposed to 
emotionally aversive situations, bivariate correlations were carried out to determine 
whether heart rate change in the virtual moral task and heart rate change in the text-
based moral task were associated with years of direct experience working with any 
sector of the emergency services (see Figure 5.4). Years of experience was not 
correlated with heart rate change in the text-based moral judgment task (p = .566) or 
heart rate change in either the judgment or action non-moral tasks (ps > .227). Years of 
experience had a small negative correlation with heart rate change in the virtual moral 
task, (r(58) = -.28, p = .033) and when entered into a univariate linear regression, was 
found to explain 7.6% of the variance in the model, (R
2 
= .076, F(1,58) = 4.76, p = .033) 
when predicting heart rate change (β = -.28, p = .033).   
  










































Figure 5.4. Heart rate change (bpm) in the virtual moral action task plotted against 
direct experience working with any sector of the emergency services (years). Years of 
experience negatively predicted heart rate change in the virtual moral task. Linear 
regression trendline: R
2
 = .08.   
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Personality traits. Given that previous research has found empathy decline in 
trained professionals (Neumann et al., 2011) arguably as an adaptive function (Williams 
et al., 2012), personality traits were also correlated with years of direct experience 
working with any sector of the emergency services. Years of experience were 
negatively correlated with secondary psychopathy (r(58) = -.44, p < .001), Emotionality 
(r(58) = -.32, p = .011) and Personal Distress (r(58) = -.40, p = .001) (see Figure 5.5). A 
multivariate regression with these traits entered as dependent variables and years of 
experience entered as the predictor variable, found that experience negatively predicted 
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 Given theories regarding the relationship between empathy (and related traits) and emotional resilience 
in experienced professionals working in the emergency sector, I also performed mediation analyses. 
These revealed that heart rate change in the virtual moral task did not mediate the relationship between 
years of experience and the above traits (ps > .085).  


































































































Figure 5.5. Personality traits including (i) secondary psychopathy (ii) Emotionality (iii) 
Personal Distress plotted against direct experience working with any sector of the 
emergency services (years). Linear regression trendlines for (i) R
2
 = .20 (ii) R
2
 = .11 (iii) 
R
2
 = .16. LSRP = Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale; IRI = Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index.   
  




Univariate Outputs of Multivariate Regression with Years of Experience as Predictor of 
Traits 
Dependent Variable Included 
   
B (SE) β R
2
 
Secondary psychopathy     
 Constant 21.39 (0.51)   
 Experience -0.20 (0.05) -.44** .20 
Emotionality     
 Constant 3.23 (0.11)   
 Experience -0.03(0.01) -.32* .11 
PD     
 Constant 9.54 (0.64)   
 Experience -0.22(0.07) -.40* .16 
Note: Experience = years of direct experience working with any sector of the 
emergency services. PD = Personal Distress.  
*p <.05. **p <.001   
(SE) = standard error 
 
Post-Action Judgments 
In order to assess post-hoc evaluations of simulated moral actions in VR (or 
omission of simulated moral actions), responses to the question “Did you take the right 
action?” were compared across groups. This was done with the intention of examining 
resilience versus regret in post-hoc evaluations of moral actions. A three-way chi-square 
test was performed to examine the relation between group (control; paramedics; fire 
service) and post response (right action: yes; no) based on response type in VR (non-
utilitarian; utilitarian). Fisher’s Exact Tests (FET) are reported for instances in which 
cells have expected counts less than five. There was a significant association between 
group and whether or not participants reported that they had taken the right action. This 
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was only the case when a utilitarian action had been endorsed in VR, (χ²(2) = 14.79, p 
< .001; FET).  
In order to interpret this finding, follow-up tests using two-way chi-square tests 
were performed with Bonferroni corrections. Of the participants in the control group 
who pushed in VR, only 33.33% stated that they had taken the right action. Of the 
paramedic practitioners who pushed in VR, 100% stated that this was the right action, 
significantly more than in the control group, (p < .001; FET). Similarly, of the incident 
commanders who pushed in VR, 83.33% stated that this was the right action, again, 
significantly more than in the control group, (χ²(1) = 6.17, p = .013) (see Figure 5.6).  
There was no significant difference in post responses between paramedics and incident 
commanders (p = .203; FET).  
  



































Figure 5.6. Post responses (%) to the question “Did you take the right action?” 
following the endorsement of a utilitarian action (pushing the man) in VR by group. A 
greater number of “Yes” responses were given in both the paramedic and fire service 
groups. Error bars represent +- 1 SEp.
45
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 Note: Error bars for standard error of proportion are not visible for paramedic responses as all 
paramedic practitioners who responded in VR with a utilitarian action later said they had taken the right 
action (with no variance in responses,  SEp = 0). 




Overall, greater utilitarian endorsements were observed when simulated action 
was required in VR and this was the case across untrained individuals, individuals in-
training, and trained individuals. While moral judgments and moral actions were not 
significantly different between unspecialised and specialised individuals, there were 
differences between these populations with regards to resilience; in terms of arousal in 
virtual simulations and in post-hoc judgments of actions.   
Moral Actions versus Judgments 
In terms of moral judgment and moral action, participants endorsed the 
utilitarian response (pushing the person off the bridge) when action was required in VR 
significantly more than when judgment was required in the traditional text-based 
counterpart of the footbridge dilemma across all groups, regardless of specialised 
training. Our results support previous virtual research (Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 
2014) and the previous research presented in this thesis (Chapter 2; Chapter 3; Chapter 
4) with VR moral dilemmas offering insights into the role of immediate moral actions 
as opposed to judgments made in text-based moral dilemmas. For the helping 
professions specifically, I had hypothesised that they may demonstrate reduced moral 
inconsistency as a result of professional codes of conduct influencing and driving both 
moral judgments and moral actions. However, the present findings suggest that moral 
inconsistency remains unaffected by professional training, again supporting the theory 
that moral judgment and action are driven by distinct mechanisms (e.g., Tassy, Oullier, 
et al., 2013).   
Further, with trained professionals often exposed to aversive situations and less 
aversion to harm previously linked to utilitarian moral decision-making (e.g., Patil, 
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2015), I theorised that this might lead to greater utilitarian endorsements while previous 
research argued that exposure to single-life incidences would lead to fewer utilitarian 
endorsements (e.g., Grinberg et al., 2016). However, in the present experiment, both 
virtual moral actions and moral judgments were not significantly different between 
groups, contradicting previous research (Grinberg et al., 2016) which has subsequently 
argued that trolley-type dilemmas can have significance “…in the real world and not 
just in the lab” (Greene, 2014, p. 130). Our findings here do not directly support this 
claim and might suggest that the hypothetical nature of these trolley-type problems limit 
their application to real-life decision-making.  
However, I propose an alternative interpretation of the present finding. 
Hypothetical moral dilemmas were designed, in their experimental simplicity, to allow 
moral conflicts to play out in artificial contexts with anonymous agents; making them 
impervious to individual experience (Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Hauser et al., 2007). 
The finding that specialised training does not alter moral decisions in trolley-type 
problems, whether text-based or virtual, supports the experimental control available in 
these hypothetical scenarios. They remain unaffected by personal experiences, as was 
originally intended in their formulation, allowing moral psychologists to understand the 
“…foundational psychological processes that underlie human moral cognition” 
(Christensen & Gomila, 2012, p. 1250).   
Specialised Training and Personality Traits 
With specialised professionals often employing a “rescue personality” (Wagner 
et al., 2009) associated with emotional resilience, I predicted that there would be 
differences in empathy and associated traits between untrained individuals and helping 
professions. This was supported, with several personality trait differences found 
between untrained controls, paramedic practitioners, and incident commanders in the 
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fire service. I outlined contrasting hypotheses predicting either an associated decline or 
increase in these traits with years of experience working in the profession. The former 
hypothesis was supported with negative associations found between several personality 
traits and years of experience working with the emergency services. Secondary 
psychopathy, a trait associated with impulsivity and quick-temperedness was negatively 
predicted by years of experience. In terms of HEXACO traits, Emotionality, a trait 
associated with fearfulness and empathic sensitivity (Ashton & Lee, 2005), was 
negatively predicted by years of experience. Further and in line with this, Personal 
Distress, a trait “…negatively related to measures of social functioning” (Davis, 1983, p. 
116) and associated with feeling anxiety when observing the negative experiences of 
others, also declined with years of experience working in the emergency services. 
The finding that length of time working in helping professions results in a 
significant decline in traits associated with fearfulness and personal distress, might 
reflect the emotional resilience that is formed in response to repeated exposure to 
aversive, dangerous, and emotionally volatile situations (e.g., Eley et al., 2013; 
Grinberg et al., 2016) and suggests that helping professionals gain “…increasing 
confidence in facing emergencies” (Bellini & Shea, 2005, p. 167). Whether the present 
findings support reports of empathy decline in healthcare professionals (e.g., Neumann 
et al., 2011), is less clear. While lowered Personal Distress and Emotionality scores 
were observed, both Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking scores in both 
paramedic practitioners and experienced incident command officers were stable. Given 
that the latter components fall within conceptualisations of “empathy” and are arguably 
“…two behaviours particularly important for medicine” (Bellini & Shea, 2005, p. 167), 
our findings suggest that caring for another’s welfare and putting oneself into the mind 
of another, are not affected through healthcare and emergency training.  
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Importantly, with healthcare research disputing the adaptive function of lowered 
empathic responses versus “...the need to incorporate, promote and instil empathy” 
(Williams et al., 2012, p. 10), we are reminded that in this complex issue “…empathic 
shades of gray are needed” as trained professionals learn to “…moderate the degree to 
which they harden their hearts” (Newton, 2013, p. 9). Future research should begin to 
distinguish empathic components when investigating the supposed “empathy decline” in 
healthcare and military settings given the findings presented here.  
While years of experience working in the emergency services resulted in lower 
trait scores associated with fearlessness and personal distress, both moral judgments and 
moral actions made by these specialised populations remained the same as untrained 
individuals. Again, these findings have significance for theories regarding the roles of 
empathy and harm aversion in moral decision-making. Exposure to aversive events and 
differences in trait profiles associated with emotionality, did not influence either moral 
judgments or moral actions. As in Chapter 4, this might suggest that facets, other than 
empathy and harm aversion, underlie the relationship between psychopathic traits and 
moral actions (e.g., Cima et al., 2010; Patil, 2015) evidenced in previous experiments in 
this thesis (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3).    
Exposure and Arousal 
Heart rate change was assessed to determine whether arousal was triggered by 
modality (VR versus text) or moral content and also as a means of examining emotional 
resilience in trained professionals. With both incident commanders and paramedics 
frequently working in critical emergency situations in which they have to make 
“…quick and potentially life-saving decisions…with limited medical back-up” 
(Williams et al., 2012, p. 9), I theorised that arousal might be lower in these populations 
and influenced by experience. In the present experiment, greater heart rate change was 
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observed for moral tasks compared to non-moral tasks for both action and judgment 
tasks suggesting that the VR modality alone was not responsible for increased arousal, 
supporting previous findings in this thesis (Chapter 2). However, this increased arousal 
in moral, as compared to non-moral tasks, was only found for the untrained control 
group and paramedic practitioners in-training, and not in the trained incident 
commanders from the fire service, suggesting that trained professionals may 
demonstrate emotional resilience to arousing situations.  
Further, years of experience in the emergency services did negatively predict a 
proportion of variation in heart rate change in the virtual moral task. Whilst this 
provides some support for a resilience hypothesis, this association was small. 
Importantly, this relationship was not found for heart rate change in the text-based 
judgment task, providing further evidence that utilising VR paradigms in the moral 
domain can offer valuable insights into realistic emotional responses (Parsons, 2015; 
Rovira et al., 2009).  
Specialised Training and Regret 
Previous research has suggested that helping professions also demonstrate 
resilience in decision-making, exhibiting reduced expressions of regret (Alexander, 
2016) and resistance to imagining alternatives that may have been better than reality 
(e.g., Roese, 1997). I theorised that this resilience might surface in post-hoc judgments 
about virtual moral actions with trained professionals expressing less regret than 
untrained populations. In support of this, it was found that when utilitarian actions were 
endorsed in VR, untrained individuals in the control group, expressed feelings of regret 
reporting that they had taken the wrong action. Conversely, the majority of paramedic 
practitioners and incident commanders who had endorsed the utilitarian action in VR 
reported that they had taken the right action. This suggests that specialised training in 
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the helping professions provides post-hoc resilience following moral action. Future 
research might consider extending this investigation of resilience following moral 
action in trained professionals by incorporating counterfactual thinking and moral 
emotion measures. 
Alternative Interpretations 
As in previous experiments, gaming experience did not predict utilitarian 
responses in the virtual moral task for any group, supporting previous arguments that 
responses in VR tasks are not akin to those of a gaming environment (see Chapter 2; 
Chapter 3; Chapter 4). Further and supporting previous experiments (see Chapter 4), 
coercion did not predict the endorsement of virtual moral actions.  
Methodological Considerations 
It might be argued that the incorporation of a single hypothetical dilemma in the 
present experiment limits the reliability with which I can assert that helping professions 
produced the same moral actions and moral judgments as untrained controls. In 
previous studies that found a significant difference in healthcare professional’s moral 
judgments (e.g., Grinberg et al., 2016; Ransohoff, 2011), multiple moral dilemmas were 
incorporated. In the present experiment, additional text-based moral dilemmas were 
incorporated within the judgment task but as distracter dilemmas. However, in order to 
address the above consideration, I later analysed moral judgments across all text-based 
moral dilemmas comparing them between groups (see Appendix 5.1). Overall, greater 
utilitarian responses were observed for personal over impersonal dilemmas across all 
groups but no significant differences between groups in their judgments and no 
interactions between condition, dilemma type, or question were found. I was unable to 
carry out a similar analysis for moral actions given the incorporation of a single virtual 
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moral simulation. However, this follow-up analysis does suggest that moral judgments 
remained the same across untrained individuals, specialists in-training, and trained 
specialists, even when incorporating multiple moral dilemmas. 
In addition, in the present experiment, while differences between paramedic 
practitioners and incident command officers were investigated, I did also assess years of 
experience in the helping professions broadly without distinguishing years of 
experience as a paramedic or years of experience in the fire service. This approach to 
studying helping professions in previous research has been criticised; “…assuming 
homogeneity among professions may be unwise” (Wagner et al., 2009, p. 7). For 
example, in the present experiment, the relationship between years of experience 
working in the helping professions and changes in arousal in the virtual moral action 
task were small. Arguably, decreased arousal responses may result from working in the 
fire service specifically and may not reflect the effect of working in helping professions 
more broadly. As such, future research should explore emergency service groups 
independently prior to identifying disparities and similarities between them (Wagner et 
al., 2009). For example, future research examining the effect of years of experience 
working in the emergency services on emotional resilience, might consider recruiting 
both experienced professionals and professionals-in-training from the same helping 
profession.  
Additionally, existing research examining moral decision-making in specialist 
occupations has largely adopted the theory that exposure and experience may produce 
either utilitarian or deontological ideals (e.g., Grinberg et al., 2016; Ransohoff, 2011; 
Ransohoff et al.). However, following completion of the present investigation, I asked 
both paramedic practitioners and incident commanders whether they applied utilitarian 
principles in their profession and found a diverse range of responses (see Appendix 5.2). 
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For example, while one incident commander said that “sometimes a sacrifice needs to 
be made in order for the greater good” another said “I am totally against this idea. Go 
fast, go alone, but to go far, go together”. One paramedic practitioner said “I believe it is 
a good ideology. Harm may be needed to help people” while another commented that 
“only do an action if it is morally right to do so; as in not harming people”. In fact, 
many comments made by both groups argued that the moral ideal they would apply 
would depend on the situation. For example, a paramedic practitioner remarked that “it 
is difficult. Every case is different as nothing is ever black and white”. As such, it 
appears that these helping professions do not necessarily adopt one moral principle over 
another as previous research would suggest (e.g., Ransohoff, 2011). The diversity in 
opinions expressed by professionals and focus on incident-specific applications of 
moral ideals, supports the theory that individuals do not assume one moral label but 
instead adopt a “…particularist approach to morals that takes the details of each case 
into account” (Christensen et al., 2014, p. 16). Future research should consider this 
particularist approach when investigating moral decision-making in specialist 
occupations.  
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The trolley problem has long offered moral philosophers and psychologists a 
way of comparing utilitarian and deontological philosophies “…in one neat little puzzle” 
(Greene, 2014, p. 116). Traditional vignettes describing these trolley problems, whilst 
being ideal in their experimental simplicity, often lack peripheral contextual features 
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014). With increasing considerations of how 
moral judgments might translate into moral actions (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2012; Tassy, 
Oullier, et al., 2013), research has begun to incorporate these contextual features into 
existing paradigms in an attempt to bring judgments “…in line with moral behaviour in 
real situations” (FeldmanHall et al., 2012, p. 434). In this interdisciplinary thesis, I 
investigated the relationship between moral judgments made in response to traditional 
vignettes and moral actions simulated in contextually salient VR paradigms. I also 
investigated personality traits associated with simulated moral actions versus moral 
judgments and the emotional processes underlying these. I will end this thesis with a 
discussion summarising the findings from this investigation, outlining the limitations of 
the approaches adopted, and suggesting directions for future research.  
Moral Judgment versus Moral Action 
Whilst previous virtual research utilised virtual reconstructions of impersonal 
moral dilemmas (Navarrete et al., 2012; Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil et al., 2014; 
Skulmowski et al., 2014), emphasis was placed on the necessity of investigating virtual 
reconstructions of personal moral dilemmas, given their ability to generate conflict, 
prompting greater variation in moral responses (Patil et al., 2014). The experiments 
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presented in this thesis are the first to incorporate virtual moral dilemmas that involve 
up-close and emotionally aversive actions.  
It was found that moral actions and moral judgments were distinct in the general 
population (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3) and in populations trained in emergency response 
(see Chapter 5), supporting previous research also showing dissociation (Pan & Slater, 
2011; Patil et al., 2014). This distinction adds to the body of research suggesting that 
moral action and moral judgment may be driven by at least partially distinct 
mechanisms (Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013; Tassy et al., 2012; Tassy, Oullier, et al., 
2013).  
Consistent across this investigation was the finding that utilitarian endorsements 
were greatest when simulated action was required in virtual moral dilemmas. This was 
found when utilising visually immersive VR (see Chapter 2), physically salient VR 
dilemmas with haptic feedback (see Chapter 3, Experiment 3), and VR combining both 
visual immersion and haptic feedback (see Chapter 3, Experiment 4). Moral judgments 
made in response to judgment and action-choice questions in text-based personal 
dilemmas, were predominantly non-utilitarian (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3; Chapter 4; 
Chapter 5). These findings have significance for existing dual-process models of moral 
judgment. With moral judgments made in response to text-based personal dilemmas 
being primarily non-utilitarian, these findings support existing dual-process models; the 
emotionally evocative nature of these dilemmas prompts immediate aversive reactions, 
resulting in refusals to endorse harm (Cushman, 2013; Greene et al., 2001). Conversely, 
the finding that utilitarian actions are predominantly simulated in VR contradicts 
existing dual-process models.  
Prior to further discussion, it is important to note that these models were 
originally developed for moral judgment, and given the disparity between judgment and 
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action, may not extend adequately to action frameworks. As such, in the present 
investigation, I have adopted an alternative theory (Patil et al., 2014) that takes existing 
dual-process models and adapts them to action frameworks, when accounting for VR 
modalities. In the present investigation, increased contextual saliency, by way of visual 
or physical features, may have resulted in greater value being assigned to outcomes in 
VR environments (Cushman, 2013; Patil et al., 2014). The combined influence of 
feeling and seeing in VR, may give weight to moral decision-making with greater 
emphasis being placed on protecting victims from harm compared to performing 
harmful actions (Patil et al., 2014).  
I present this modified theory of action-outcome value assignment tentatively. In 
the present investigation, I did not directly investigate this adapted model and as such, 
the conclusions that I make here remain theoretical. In order to experimentally 
investigate this model of moral action, future research might consider incorporating eye-
tracking techniques to measure gaze durations for victims and non-victims. There are 
two important considerations for this research. Firstly, although longer gaze durations 
arguably indicate which person(s) are likely to be harmed (Skulmowski et al., 2014), 
findings in this area have been mixed with individuals also tending to avoid looking at 
victims (Kastner, 2010). Secondly, eye-tracking hardware would need to be 
incorporated within VR head-mounted devices. Presently, development kits of these 
technologies are either in the later stages of development pre-release (such as FOVE 
[apparatus and software]) or are in preliminary stages of distribution (such as Tobii 
Tech VR [apparatus and software]).  
Further, in the present investigation, the role of embodied theories in this model 
of moral action, were not explicitly examined. Given the view that “…people think, feel, 
and act inside their bodies.” (Meier et al., 2012, p. 707), this investigation is particularly 
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relevant for further research investigating simulated moral actions. Future research is 
needed in this area “… to enrich the ethical literature” (Dinh & Lord, 2013, p. 381).  
Personality Traits 
With previous research suggesting that high psychopathic and associated traits 
predict moral actions but not moral judgments (e.g., Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014; 
Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013), the experiments presented in this thesis sought to 
investigate the relationship between these personality traits and moral actions made in 
novel paradigms, in addition to moral judgments.   
It was found that primary psychopathy marginally predicted and Honesty-
Humility negatively predicted utilitarian moral actions in VR dilemmas (see Chapter 2) 
and also the power with which individuals simulated moral actions (see Chapter 3). A 
composite trait score derived from these associated traits, labelled in the present 
investigation as “anti-social tendency”, predicted utilitarian actions (see Chapter 2) and 
the power of these actions (see Chapter 3). These findings contribute to a body of 
research suggesting that moral actions are driven by self-focused evaluations (Tassy, 
Oullier, et al., 2013) and unlike judgments, reflect self-interested motivations as 
individuals consider the self-relevant consequences of their actions (Tassy, Deruelle, et 
al., 2013). These traits did not predict moral judgments (see Chapter 2; Chapter 3), 
again supporting the notion that allocentric perspectives motivate moral judgments 
(Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013) with individual responses being driven by moral norms 
(Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013). This finding also has important implications for existing 
methodologies distinguishing between judgment and action-choice questions (e.g., 
Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013; Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013); the present investigations 
support the view that both are self-reported judgments in nature, with neither being 
predicted by psychopathic or associated traits.  
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It is important to consider the replicability and power of these findings regarding 
personality traits. Firstly, primary psychopathy and associated traits did not consistently 
predict moral actions across experiments (see Chapter 2, Experiment 2). Secondly, with 
regards to investigating how these individual differences contribute to moral decision-
making, the present investigations were limited in terms of their sample sizes. In order 
to thoroughly investigate the relationship between personality trait profiles and 
simulated moral actions in VR, future research should adopt approaches from 
differential psychology in order to examine individual differences in larger sample sizes. 
Future investigations in this area are critical; the overall findings presented here do 
suggest that a group of associated traits predict moral actions or features of moral 
actions but do not appear to predict moral judgments (e.g., Cima et al., 2010; Tassy, 
Deruelle, et al., 2013).  
Emotional Processes 
Given that the relationship between psychopathic traits and utilitarian 
endorsements, is thought to be mediated by diminished affective empathy (e.g., Glenn, 
Iyer, et al., 2009) and aversion to harm (e.g., Patil, 2015), I examined these components 
specifically via an experimental manipulation (see Chapter 4) and by examining 
specialist populations with repeated exposure to aversive events (see Chapter 5). 
Investigating these emotional processes revealed a complex picture. Consuming alcohol 
at higher dosages did reduce affective empathic processing (see Chapter 4) but this did 
not alter moral decision-making; moral actions continued to be dominated by utilitarian 
responses and moral judgments primarily comprised non-utilitarian responses. In order 
to extend this investigation of empathic processing beyond state measures, I also 
investigated moral decision-making in helping professions in which personality traits 
and subsequent harm aversion were likely to be marked by extensive exposure to 
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demanding events (see Chapter 5). Repeated exposure to emergency incidences and 
distinct traits profiles in these individuals did not alter moral actions or moral judgments.  
Importantly, and in terms of peripheral features of moral actions, I did observe 
differences in the emotional arousal and post-responses of helping professionals when 
compared to control populations. Emergency service professionals showed reduced 
arousal in virtual moral simulations and demonstrated less regret following a utilitarian 
endorsement, supporting previous suggestions that these professionals develop a form 
of emotional resilience (e.g., Alexander, 2016). As outlined previously and within a 
resilience framework, future research might consider investigating the role of 
counterfactual thinking and regret more explicitly to shed light on the development of 
resilience in these professions as they learn to “…walk a fine empathic line” (Newton, 
2013, p. 9). 
Beyond Empathy and Affective Processing 
The outcomes of the present investigation might suggest that facets, beyond or 
in addition to deficits in empathic processing, mediate the relationship between 
psychopathic traits and utilitarian endorsements found in chapters of this thesis (see 
Chapter 2; Chapter 3). As outlined previously (see Chapter 4; Chapter 5), empathy 
represents only one component of trait psychopathy. Across both two-factor models of 
psychopathy (e.g., Levenson et al., 1995) and triarchic conceptualisations of 
psychopathy (e.g., Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009), there are multiple underlying 
factors ranging from callousness, to disinhibition, to boldness, among many others. 
Given the multifaceted nature of psychopathy, I now outline an alternative explanation 
for the association between psychopathy and utilitarian endorsements, beyond that of 
deficits in empathic processing.  
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As outlined previously, low anxiety has been found to play a role in the 
association between psychopathy and utilitarian endorsements (e.g., Koenigs et al., 
2012) with low anxious psychopaths endorsing greater utilitarian responses in 
emotionally aversive moral dilemmas. This relationship has also been evidenced in 
psychopharmacological investigations in which anti-anxiety drugs (Lorazepam) have 
reduced harm aversion and subsequently resulted in greater utilitarian endorsements 
(Perkins et al., 2013). Research has argued that the low anxious facets of primary 
psychopathy reflect emotional and inhibitory deficits (Koenigs et al., 2012), that 
compromise conditionability of moral norms (Blair, 1995) and subsequently reduce 
aversion to harm. For example, when facing a punishment following a transgression, we 
feel anxious, and this subsequently conditions us to avoid future transgressions. A 
diminished anxiety response is thought to compromise this conditioned response (e.g., 
Blair, 1995). Again, evidence in this area has been mixed (e.g., Schmitt & Newman, 
1999; Visser, Ashton, & Pozzebon, 2012) with research also highlighting the 
moderating role of aggression, rather than trait anxiety, in this relationship (Choe & Min, 
2011; Gao & Tang, 2013). In the present investigation, I did not include measures of 
anxiety or aggression and so this theory remains speculative. However, with research 
suggesting a critical role for these facets in the action aversion deficits in psychopathy, 
future research should consider incorporating these assessments in both moral judgment 
and moral action paradigms.    
Moral and Non-Moral Motivations 
In this thesis, I have discussed concerns regarding the identification of the 
motivations underlying utilitarian acts; are these driven by morally principled motives 
or self-interested motives and even desires to harm others (Bartels et al., 2015; Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Patil, 2015)? Despite the finding that 
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anti-social traits predicted supposedly “utilitarian” actions (see Chapter 2) and the 
power of these actions (see Chapter 3), the discussion regarding moral motivations 
remains a multifaceted one.  
Given the association between psychopathic traits and utilitarian actions, 
research has argued that endorsing a “utilitarian” action requires empathic suppression 
(e.g., Patil, 2015; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013) and has subsequently labelled 
the utilitarian response as the “harmful” action. However, given the findings presented 
here regarding empathy, and the discussion above, I would argue that this assumption 
might be more complex. For example, it is important to consider instances in which 
there are care-oriented motivations for utilitarian actions (Uhlmann et al., 2013); these 
might be found in circumstances where aggregate outcomes for the greatest number of 
people are placed at the centre of action motivation. Many individuals working in 
helping professions expressed this idea clearly when asked whether utilitarianism 
played a role in their duties. Conversely, it is also possible for non-utilitarian actions to 
be driven by self-interested motivations (Uhlmann et al., 2013). Following from this, it 
is also important to highlight a limitation of existing investigations of moral decision-
making, in their assertion that utilitarian and non-utilitarian (or deontological) 
motivations operate inversely (Patil, 2015). However, process dissociation approaches 
have revealed that moral ideologies guide moral judgments independently (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). Whether this process dissociation translates to moral actions, 
requires further investigation. One way in which future research might investigate a 
multiple-motives hypothesis in a moral action framework, would be to recreate low-
conflict personal moral dilemmas in VR. These dilemmas describe instances in which 
harm to one person serves another person’s self-interest rather than morally-focused 
outcomes (Cushman et al., 2010). Incorporating these dilemmas would offer the 
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opportunity to distinguish moral intentions from non-moral intentions and the role of 
traits in motivating self-interested or morally-driven actions.  
Overall, this preliminary line of investigation has demonstrated that the 
relationship between traits, subsequent emotional processes, and moral decision-making 
is far from straight-forward. Extending from a particularist approach to moral decision-
making (Christensen et al., 2014), it seems that identifying the processes underlying 
both moral judgment and moral action requires an “interactionist framework” that 
considers the profile of the decision maker and the context in which the decision is 
being made (Bartels et al., 2015). After all, “…most human behaviour is the joint 
product of the person and the situation” (Bartels et al., 2015, p. 6).   
Methodological Critique 
The experiments presented in this interdisciplinary thesis have incorporated 
novel and state-of-the-art technologies. With previous research outlining the advantages 
of applying VR in experimental settings as a contextually rich testing tool, I now review 
this methodological approach in light of the outcomes of the present investigation.  
Previous research has argued that even basic virtual environments can prompt an 
array of realistic behavioural and physiological responses (Rovira et al., 2009; Slater et 
al., 2006). Arguably, the life-like responses that VR can elicit make it an ecologically 
valid alternative to conventional methods that are frequently utilised in social 
experiments (Parsons, 2015; Rovira et al., 2009). In the present investigation, the 
visually immersive VR reconstruction of the footbridge dilemma did prompt a range of 
physiological responses that were otherwise absent in the text-based conventional 
paradigms. In the VR dilemma, heart rate increases were observed across experiments 
and these responses reflected a number of personal characteristics; reduced 
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physiological responses were observed for individuals under the influence of alcohol 
and for trained professionals with extensive experience working in the emergency 
services. As such, VR appears to be a compelling method with which researchers can 
examine immediate emotional responses (Parsons, 2015; Rovira et al., 2009) by 
“…reducing the opportunity for mental simulation” (FeldmanHall et al., 2012, p. 434).   
In terms of ethical considerations, attempts to investigate moral actions within 
this framework present unique challenges (Slater et al., 2006) and as such, previous 
investigations have been predominantly non-behavioural (Navarrete et al., 2012). A 
significant advantage of utilising VR paradigms in investigations of morality of harm is 
that they offer a safe context with which to examine harmful moral actions (Parsons, 
2015; Slater et al., 2006). In this thesis, the use of VR has shed light on moral actions 
made in response to virtual reconstructions of moral dilemmas while protecting the 
wellbeing of participants. The ethical advantages of utilising VR have made it a 
valuable tool in applied settings; both the fire service commanders and paramedic 
practitioners, who took part in this investigation, were currently adopting virtual 
training methods given their safe and cost-effective benefits. Further, alongside the 
ethical and methodological advantages of utilising VR, the outcomes of this thesis raise 
further considerations for healthcare and emergency professions seeking to utilise VR in 
their training programmes. With evidence of dissociation between moral judgment and 
moral action, new virtual training procedures adopted by the emergency services should 
take into account moral inconsistency; conventional assessments of strategic decision-
making on paper are likely to produce distinct outcomes to virtual training assessments 
that require simulated actions under pressure.  
It is important to acknowledge a fundamental constraint of the virtual paradigms 
used in the present experiments. Whilst VR might offer greater insight into realistic 
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behavioural and physiological responses (Parsons, 2015), the dilemmas incorporated 
into these experiments remain hypothetical in nature, whether virtual or not. Research 
seeking to expand this investigation should consider virtually reconstructing common 
moral dilemmas given that it is “…arguably rare in the real world to be faced with the 
kinds of utilitarian decisions encapsulated in these classic dilemmas” (FeldmanHall et 
al., 2012, p. 435) and that these are often perceived as improbable (e.g., Gold, Pulford, 
& Colman, 2014; Kahane et al., 2015). However, it is important to note that this thesis 
did not aim to predict real-life moral behaviours from these experiments but rather to 
investigate the disparity between action and judgment in controlled investigations of 
morality of harm. In this instance, these virtual hypothetical moral dilemmas were 
incorporated in order to allow a comparison with conventional paradigms.  
Despite these shortcomings, a significant strength of this thesis is in its 
interdisciplinarity, having combined methods and collaborated with researchers from 
experimental philosophy, social psychology, computer science, robotics, speculative 
design, healthcare professions, and emergency services. This has generated a novel 
framework with which to investigate moral decision-making. Importantly, with the 
phrase “virtual reality” typically associated with video games (Pan et al., 2016) this 
interdisciplinary investigation has highlighted the value of VR beyond these artificial 
contexts. Using VR could enhance the “realism” of existing experimental settings (e.g., 
Parsons, 2015) and beyond this, could both innovate and transform existing training and 
assessments in medicine, healthcare, and emergency response settings (e.g., Colangeli et 
al., 2015; Pan et al., 2016). Future research should utilise and maintain the unique 
interdisciplinary links established during the present investigation.  
 
 




Researchers have long attempted to interpret responses to moral dilemmas using 
paradigms that are often “impoverished and unrealistic…limit(ing) participant’s 
engagement” (Patil et al., 2014, p. 95). Although virtual moral research is in its infancy, 
by promoting “…judicious use” of these contextually-salient virtual paradigms within 
moral psychology, researchers can begin to validate their potential in assessing moral 
behaviour (Parsons, 2015, p. 7). Crucially, the finding that moral judgments in 
conventional paradigms diverge from moral actions in virtual reality paradigms (Patil et 
al., 2014) raises two points. Firstly, that moral judgment and moral action appear to be 
distinct and, secondly, that utilising immersive VR paradigms can allow the assessment 
of moral cognition in “…action-relevant environments where the stakes are immediate, 
emotionally charged and tangible” (FeldmanHall et al., 2012, p. 435). Critically, when 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of both conventional and virtual 
methodologies, it is important to remember that, in either stream, the incorporation and 
validation of both methods must continue to better our assessment of both moral 
judgments and actions. After all “…by examining only one blade of a pair of scissors, 
one will not understand how scissors cut” (Bunge & Skulmowski, 2014, p. 176). Only 
through adopting these multifaceted and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of 







Assumptions of normality were tested using Shapiro-Wilk test and visual 
inspections of Histograms and P-P plots. Violations of these assumptions are stated 
prior to analysis. However, violations are not reported and parametric procedures 
remain in analyses when sample sizes are greater than or equal to 30, given that the 
sampling distribution tends to be normal “…regardless of the shape of the data” 
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012, p. 486).  
Outliers  
Outliers were not removed unless otherwise stated. Outliers were only removed 
in instances in which the anomaly was due to measurement error (i.e., in Chapter 4 
during pupillary diameter analysis) and procedures for removal are described in specific 
chapters. In instances in which outliers were not likely due to measurement error, but 
were suspected following visual inspections of scatter plots, a footnote is included 
reporting analysis with outliers removed for comparison.   
Homogeneity of Variances 
Homogeneity of variance checks were performed for all ANOVAs using 
Levene’s tests. If Levene’s test were significant (p < .05), follow-up analyses were 
performed to determine if the ratio of largest and smallest variance was greater than 
three (Dean & Voss, 1999, pp. 112-113). If this ratio was less than three, analysis 






Extending from the assumption of homogeneity of variance and for within-
groups and mixed model ANOVAs, Mauchly’s test was used to determine if the 
variation in the differences between experimental conditions was sufficiently similar. If 




P-values < .05 are reported as statistically significant. Values between .05 
and .064 are reported as marginally significant. Given the arbitrary nature of p-value 
parameters, effect sizes are also reported as standardised measures of the strength of any 
observed effect (Field, 2009).   
Effect Sizes 
Effect sizes are reported for all parametric statistics. Partial eta-squared is 
reported for all ANOVAs and Cohen’s d is reported for t-tests. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient, r, determines effect size for correlational and regression analyses. In 
instances in which chi-square tests were performed, effect sizes are reported as odds 
ratios. Effect size categories (small, medium, large) were determined using the 
following parameters (Field, 2009): 
 Cohen’s d – small (.20), medium (.50), and large (.80) 
 Partial eta-squared – small (.01), medium (.06), and large (.14) 







When performing regression analyses to determine whether certain personality 
traits predicted moral judgment or moral action, both hierarchal and stepwise regression 
procedures were performed for each analysis. Hierarchal entry was used to enter trait 
facets based on previous theories (e.g., primary psychopathy was entered first and 
secondary psychopathy entered second given evidence that the first facet predicts 
utilitarian responses (e.g., Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013)). Stepwise entry was also used 
as a means of confirming statistical significance of individual predictors given the 
novelty of the research (Field, 2009). Across analyses reported in this thesis, both entry 
methods produced the same predictors. Separate regressions were performed for 
 LSRP traits 
 HEXACO traits 
 IRI traits 
 Self-Importance of Moral Identity traits 
Separate analyses were performed to account for multicollinearity violations and 
inverse-related coefficients for predictors (i.e. primary psychopathy and Honesty-
Humility). 
Predictor variables were not centred or standardised unless predictors had no 
meaningful “0” value or if multiple predictors from different scales were entered into 






Specific Statistical Notes 
The following notes refer to specific analyses within the main body of the thesis 
and are referenced in-text. They are listed here numerically and under chapter headings. 
Chapter 2 
(2.1)  MANOVA SPSS syntax is a suggested tool for performing simple effects analyses in 
both mixed and repeated-measures designs (Field, 2009). All simple effects analyses are 
performed using this syntax unless otherwise stated. 
(2.2)  Homogeneity of variance assumptions were violated. As such, a Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE) was used as an alternative to mixed model analyses. I conducted the 
GEE using a linear model with task (non-moral task; moral task) as within-subjects factor and 
condition (judgment; action) as between-subjects factor. A linear correlational structure was 
assumed and specified for the within-subjects variable using Identify as the link function.  
Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 44.19, p < .001), condition, (Wald X
2
[1] 
= 4.31, p = .038) and a significant interaction of task x condition, (Wald X
2
[1] = 17.26, p 
< .001). Post hoc comparisons using Bonferroni indicated that for the non-moral task, heart rate 
changes were not significantly different between judgment and action conditions (p = 1.00). 
However, for the moral task, analysis suggested that heart rate changes were significantly 
different between conditions, (p < .001). In the action condition, heart rate changes were 
significantly greater in the moral task than in the non-moral task (p < .001) but this was not the 
case in the judgment condition (p = .115).  
(2.3)  The PCA was conducted on standardised scores for primary psychopathy and Honesty-
Humility with orthogonal rotation (Varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the 
sampling adequacy for the analysis (KMO = .50), and all KMO values for individual scores 
were above the acceptable limit (.50) (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity (X²(1) = 30.06, p 




component had eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion and explained 87.13% of the variance 
and was subsequently extracted. With only two variables, the scree plot was not interpreted. 
(2.4)  I conducted the GEE using a linear model with task (non-moral task; moral task) as 
within-subjects factor and condition (judgment; action) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis 
revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 59.48, p < .001), condition, (Wald X
2
[1] = 5.20, p 
= .023) and a significant interaction of task x condition, (Wald X
2
[1] = 13.35, p < .001). Post 
hoc comparisons using Bonferroni indicated that for the non-moral task, heart rate changes were 
not significantly different between judgment and action conditions (p = .771). However, for the 
moral task, analysis suggested that heart rate changes were significantly different between 
conditions, (p =.006). In both the action and judgment conditions, heart rate changes were 
significantly greater in the moral tasks than in the non-moral tasks (ps < .001). 
Chapter 3 
(3.1)  The PCA was conducted on standardised scores for primary psychopathy and Honesty-
Humility with orthogonal rotation (Varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the 
sampling adequacy for the analysis (KMO = .50), and all KMO values for individual scores 
were above the acceptable limit (.50) (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity (X²(1) = 24.90, p 
< .001) indicated that correlations between variables were large enough for PCA. One 
component had eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion and explained 84.83% of the variance 
and was subsequently extracted. With only two variables, the scree plot was not interpreted.  
Chapter 4 
(4.1)  GEE also extends mixed model ANOVA by including additional non-linear models (in 
this case, binary logistic). 
(4.2)  Analysis was replicated with GEE using a linear model with task (judgment; action) and 
type (non-moral task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and condition (placebo; low alcohol; 






= 24.66, p < .001), type, (Wald X
2
[1] = 22.08, p < .001), and a significant interaction of task x 
type, (Wald X
2
[1] = 6.31, p = .012). Post hoc comparisons using Bonferroni indicated that there 
was a significant difference between non-moral and moral tasks in the judgment task across 
groups,  (p = .020) and in the action task across groups, (p < .001) with greater heart rate 
changes observed in moral tasks. There was a significant difference in heart rate change 
between the judgment and action task but for the moral tasks only, (p < .001) with greater heart 
rate changes observed overall in the virtual moral action task.  Heart rate change for the non-
moral tasks was not significantly different between action and judgment tasks (p = .660) 
Chapter 5 
(5.1)  Analysis was replicated with GEE using a linear model with task (judgment; action) and 
type (non-moral task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and group (control; paramedics; fire 
service) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X
2
[1] = 
5.58, p = .018), type, (Wald X
2
[1] = 15.78, p < .001), and a significant interaction of task x type, 
(Wald X
2
[1] = 7.54, p = .006) and group x type, (Wald X
2
[2] = 11.96, p = .006). Post hoc 
comparisons using Bonferroni indicated that there was a significant difference between non-
moral and moral tasks in the action task across groups, (p = .001) with greater heart rate changes 
observed in moral tasks. There was a significant difference in heart rate change between the 
judgment and action task but for the moral tasks only, (p = .024) with greater heart rate changes 
observed overall in the virtual moral action task.  Heart rate change for the non-moral tasks was 
not significantly different between action and judgment tasks (p = 1.00). Further post hoc 
comparisons indicated that, in the control group, heart rate changes were significantly greater in 
the moral tasks than in the non-moral tasks, ( p = .001) Analysis suggested that there was no 
significant difference in heart rate changes between non-moral and moral tasks for the 





Chapter 2: Moral Dilemmas 
Personal Dilemmas 
Crying Baby. Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a 
large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. 
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You press your hand over his mouth to block the sound. If you 
stop pressing, his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, 
and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your 
child to death. 
 
Footbridge. A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a 
stranger who happens to be very large. 
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where their large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do 
this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
 
Modified Bomb. You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to 
set off a bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that you have his teenage son in your 
custody. 
There is only one thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which will kill 
thousands of people if detonated. To stop him, you must contact him over satellite hook-up that 
he has established and, in front of the camera, break one of his son’s arms and then threaten to 
break the other if he does not give himself up. 
 
Vitamins. You are the leader of a mountaineering expedition that is stranded in the wilderness. 
Your expedition includes a family of six that has a genetically caused vitamin deficiency. A few 
people’s kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. 
There is one such person in your party. The only way to save the lives of the six members of 
this family is to remove one of this man’s kidneys so that the necessary vitamins may be 
extracted from it. The man will not die if you do this, but his health will be compromised. The 
man is opposed to this plan, but you have the power to do as you see fit. 
 
Vaccine Test. A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing millions of people. You have 
developed two substances in your home laboratory. You know that one of them is a vaccine, but 




Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can use it to save millions of lives. You 
have with you two people who are under your care, and the only way to identify the vaccine is 
to inject each of these people with one of the two substances. One person will live, the other 
will die, and you will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine. 
Impersonal Dilemmas 
Guarded speedboat. While on vacation on a remote island, you are fishing from a seaside dock. 
You observe a group of tourists board a small boat and set sail for a nearby island. Soon after 
their departure you hear over the radio that there is a violent storm brewing, a storm that is sure 
to intercept them. 
The only way that you can ensure their safety is to warn them by borrowing a nearby speedboat. 
The speedboat belongs to a miserly tycoon who has hired a fiercely loyal guard to make sure 
that no one uses his boat without permission. To get to the speedboat you will have to lie to the 
guard. 
 
Standard Trolley. You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the 
tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks 
extending to the right is a single railway workman. 
If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. 
The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that 
will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. 
 
Illegal Lunch. You are a lawyer working on a big case. The judge presiding over the trial 
happens to be someone you knew from law school. The two of you were rather friendly back 
then, but now, decades later, it seems that your old friend barely remembers you. 
You’re quite sure that if you were to talk to him over lunch, you could jog his memory and he 
would begin to see you as an old buddy, which would be very good for your work on this case. 
It’s illegal for judges and lawyers working on the same case to meet socially. 
 
Taxes. You are the owner of a small business trying to make ends meet. It occurs to you that 
you could lower your taxes by pretending that some of your personal expenses are business 
expenses. 
For example, you could pretend that the stereo in your bedroom is being used in the lounge at 
the office, or that your dinners out with your wife are dinners with clients. 
 
Donation. You are at home one day when the mail arrives. You receive a letter from a reputable 
international aid organization. The letter asks you to make a donation of two hundred dollars to 
their organization. 
The letter explains that a two hundred-dollar donation will allow this organization to provide 






Chapter 2: Pre-Questionnaire 
PRE-EXPERIMENT (DEMOGRAPHICS) QUESTIONAIRE  
 
Do you suffer from any panic or anxiety attacks? YES/NO 
 
And finally, since the experiment will take place in Virtual Reality ‘The computer 
animated virtual environment, we have some questions about your previous 
experience with this 
 
Please state your level of computer literacy on a scale of (1…7) 
 
  
      1           2               3                 4                  5        6               7 
   (novice)                     
(expert) 
Please rate your level of experience with computer programming: 
 
  
      1           2               3                 4                  5        6               7 




How many times did you play video games (at 




Never        
1 – 5 
6 – 10 
11 – 15 
16 – 20 
21 – 25 
>  25 
 
 
How many hours per week do you spend 
playing video games? 
 
 
0        
< 1 
1 - 3 
3 - 5 
5 - 7 
7 - 9 






Supplementary Study Chapter 2: Affordance Effects 
Method 
Participants 
Forty participants comprising 29 females and 11 males (Mage = 22.20, SD = 6.79, 
age range: 18 - 45 years) were recruited from Plymouth University, School of 
Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. This research received 
ethical approval from the Plymouth University Ethics Committee. 
Moral Judgment Measures  
The experiment comprised two conditions to which participants were randomly 
allocated; a joystick-response condition (N = 20) and a key-response condition (N = 20). 
In both conditions, participants were presented with ten personal text-based moral 
dilemmas taken from an existing database including the footbridge dilemma (Greene et 
al., 2008; Greene et al., 2001). In the final section of each dilemma, participants were 
asked (“Is it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”) followed by an action-
choice question (“Would you do it?”). Participants were given ten seconds to respond to 
each question. In the key-response condition, participants responded using the key-
responses described in the judgment condition of the previous experiment; by selecting 
“Yes” (Y) or “No” (N). In the joystick-response condition, participants responded using 
a joystick; pushing forward to elicit a “Yes” response and clicking a side button to elicit 
a “No” response. This setup allowed a direct assessment of the potential affordance 






In both conditions, moral dilemmas were presented in a random order on a 
computer running E-prime software and participants responded using either the 
keyboard or joystick based on condition assignment.  
Results 
Moral Responses 
The proportion of utilitarian responses was calculated for each participant across 
question type. A mixed ANOVA with question type (judgment, action-choice) as 
within-subjects factor and condition (key-response, joystick-response) as the between-
subjects factor revealed no significant differences between condition (p = .923), 
question (p = .472) and no interaction effect (p = .295).   
Summary and Discussion 
This follow-up experiment found no significant effect of using a joystick on 
moral decision-making. As such, I found no reason to alter the joystick response option 
from the present virtual moral dilemma; the increase in utilitarian responses was not 






Chapter 3: Moral Dilemmas 
Personal Force Moral Dilemmas 
Bomb. You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set off a 
bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that you have his teenage son in your custody. 
There is only one thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which will kill 
thousands of people if detonated. To stop him, you must contact him over satellite hook-up that 
he has established and, in front of the camera, punch his son in the face, breaking his nose and 
then threaten to do worse if he does not give himself up. 
 
Crocodiles. You are on a safari cruise that seems to be attracting the attention of several 
crocodiles, which begin to attack the boat. The force of the crocodiles and their attempts to 
board the boat, are causing it to sink. The boat is now sitting low in the water – a few inches 
lower and the crocodiles will be able to reach everyone on board. 
The crocodiles become more aggressive. If nothing is done the boat will sink and the crocodiles 
will attack everyone on board, killing them. However, if you push one person overboard, the 
crocodiles will attack them leaving the boat to stay afloat. The remaining passengers will be 
saved. 
 
Crying Baby. Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a 
large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. 
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You press your hand over his mouth to block the sound. If you 
stop pressing, his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, 
and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your 
child to death. 
 
Euthanasia. You are a leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your way back from a 
completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of your men has stepped in a trap that has 
been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is connected to a radio device that by now 
has alerted the enemy to your presence. They will soon be on their way. 
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave 
him behind, but if you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only 






Fire. You are in a house with several people. A fire has started and you and the other people are 
trapped in a back room. You have called the emergency services but you know that it will take 
several minutes for you to be rescued. The fire is spreading quickly through the house and 
towards the room you have taken refuge in. 
The fire is spreading dangerously quickly now and it is going to reach the room before you and 
the people can be rescued. The only way to save the people is to push one person into the fire, 
slowing its progress and leaving time for the emergency services to get to the house. 
 
Footbridge. A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a 
stranger who happens to be very large. 
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where their large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do 
this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
 
Lawrence of Arabia. You are the leader of a small army that consists of warriors from two 
tribes, the hill tribe and the river tribe. You belong to neither tribe. During the night a hill 
tribesman got into an argument with a river tribesman and murdered him. The river tribe will 
attack the hill tribe unless the murderer is put to death, but the hill tribe refuses to kill one of its 
own warriors. 
The only way for you to avoid a war between the two tribes that will cost hundreds of lives is to 
publicly execute the murderer by cutting off his head with your sword. 
 
Lifeboat. You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be 
abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were designed to carry. The 
lifeboat you’re in is sitting dangerously low in the water – a few inches lower and it will sink. 
The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will sink 
before the rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die. However, there is an injured 
person who will not survive in any case. If you push that person overboard the boat will stay 
afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved. 
 
Mercy. You are the law enforcer of a small tribe. A prisoner has escaped from a nearby tribe’s 
camp and he has fled into your community. After arresting him and interviewing him, you 
establish that his imprisonment was unjust. You know that the prisoner’s escape has led to 
unrest in the other tribe and a mob is on its way. 
If the mob finds the prisoner, they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to hand him 
over to them, but if you try to protect him your entire tribe will be attacked by the approaching 
mob. The only way to prevent this prisoner from being tortured and to protect your tribe is to 





Mining. You are part of a mining expedition. A cave-in has left you and the other miners 
trapped. You have established radio contact with the surface but you know that it will take 
several hours for you to be rescued. The cave-in has limited your oxygen supply and has injured 
one of the miners who is quickly losing blood. The injured crew member is going to die from 
wounds no matter what happens. 
The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the all of the miners to make it to the surface. The 
only way to save the miners is to kill the injured miner so that there will be just enough oxygen 
for the rest of the miners to survive until you are rescued. There is a large rock beside you. 
 
Sacrifice. You, your husband, and your four children are crossing a mountain range on your 
return journey to your homeland. You have inadvertently set up camp on a local clan’s sacred 
burial ground. 
The leader of the clan says that according to the local laws, you and your family must be put to 
death. However, he will let yourself, your husband, and your three other children live if you 
yourself will kill your oldest son by pushing him off a nearby cliff face. 
 
Safari. You are part of a group of ecologists who live in a remote stretch of jungle. The entire 
group, which includes eight children, has been taken hostage by a group of paramilitary 
terrorists. One of the terrorists takes a liking to you. He informs you that his leader intends to 
kill you and the rest of the hostages the following morning. 
He is willing to help you and the children escape, but as an act of good faith he wants you to kill 
one of your fellow hostages whom he does not like with a knife he has given you. If you refuse 
his offer all of the hostages including the children and yourself will die. If you accept his offer 
then the others will die in the morning but you and the eight children will escape. 
 
Submarine. You are the captain of a military submarine travelling underneath a large iceberg. 
An on-board explosion has caused you to lose most of your oxygen supply and has injured one 
of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The injured crew member is going to die from 
wounds no matter what happens. 
The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the surface. The only 
way to save the crew members is to push the injured crew member out of an emergency hatch, 
killing him, but ensuring that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to survive. 
 
Vaccine Test. A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing millions of people. You have 
developed two substances in your home laboratory. You know that one of them is a vaccine, but 
you don’t know which one. You also know that the other one is deadly 
Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can use it to save millions of lives. You 
have with you two people who are under your care, and the only way to identify the vaccine is 
to inject each of these people with one of the two substances. One person will live, the other 





 Yelling Person. You and a group of people are running away from a criminal gang. They are 
intent on killing all of you. You and some of the people have managed to out-run them and have 
sought refuge in an overgrown area of a park. At the entrance to the park, you hear the voices of 
the criminals who have come to find you. 
One of the people hiding with you seems to be very nervous and they begin to yell loudly in 
panic. You grab them and press your hand over their mouth and face to block the sound. If you 
stop pressing, their yelling will summon the attention of the gang who will kill you and 
everyone hiding with you. To save yourself and the others you must smother the panicking 
person to death. 
Non-Moral Dilemmas 
Maze. You are walking through a maze. You are approaching two diverging paths, each 
blocked by a round-shaped boulder. 
By choosing the left path you will have to push a larger boulder to continue through the maze 
but you will get to the centre faster. By choosing the path on the right, you will get to push a 
lighter boulder but you will have further to travel until you can reach the centre of the maze. 
Are you going to push the heavier boulder to the left in order to get to the centre of the maze 
faster? 
If so, move the arm forward and push the heavier boulder. If not, then pull away from the 
boulder. 
 
Taking the rubbish out. You intend to accomplish two things this afternoon: pushing the 
wheelie bin full of rubbish to the front of the garden ready for collection and watching some tv. 
The weather is nice at the moment, but the forecast says that in a couple of hours it will start to 
rain. You very much dislike taking the bin out in the rain, but you don’t care what the weather is 
like when you watch TV. 
Are you going to push the wheelie bin to the front of the garden now before it begins to rain? 
If so, move the arm forward and push the wheelie bin. If not, then pull away from the boulder. 
 
Food prep. You are preparing pasta with fresh vegetables, and you are deciding on the order in 
which you will do the various things you need to do. You are in a big hurry. 
At the moment you have a slight urge to cut vegetables. If you first start the water boiling and 
then cut the vegetables you will be done in twenty minutes. If you cut the vegetables and then 
start the water boiling you will be done in forty minutes. 
Are you going to cut the vegetables first and then start the water boiling in order to satisfy your 
slight urge to cut vegetables? 






Supplementary Study Chapter 3: Imagined Force 
Method 
Participants 
Forty participants comprising 34 females and six males (Mage = 19.90, SD = 
2.49 years, age range: 18 – 29 years) were recruited from the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. Participants 
completed the study online. This research received ethical approval from the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee.    
Procedure 
Participants were presented with the 15 personal force dilemmas incorporated 
into Experiment 3 and were given the following written instructions: “In each dilemma, 
the action you must take is already determined. We are interested in how much physical 
force you think would be required (in real life) to carry out each of the harmful actions 
described”. All dilemmas were phrased as if the participant had to carry out the harmful 
action described. Ratings were given on a 10-point Likert scale (from 1 = no force to 10 
= maximum force).   
Results 
Responses  
The mean required force was computed for each of the 15 personal force 
dilemmas and compared to the power endorsed for the same dilemmas in Experiment 3. 
A bivariate correlation revealed that there was no significant correlation between the 





Supplementary Study Chapter 3: Framing Effects 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-one participants comprising 81 females and 12 males (Mage = 20.66, SD 
= 5.42 years, age range: 18 – 50 years) were recruited from the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit. Participants 
completed the study online. This research received ethical approval from the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee.    
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which 
personal force dilemmas were followed by; “Is it morally acceptable to [specific to 
scenario]?” (N = 28) or “Would you do it?” (N = 32) or “Are you going to [specific to 
scenario]? Act now.” (N = 31).  Participants were presented with a sample of eight of 
the 15 personal force dilemmas incorporated into Experiment 3. 
Results 
Moral Responses  
The proportion of utilitarian responses for personal force dilemmas was higher 
for participants who were asked “Are you going to [specific to scenario]? Act now.” (M 
= 0.40, SD = 0.24) than for those asked “Would you do it?” (M = 0.34, SD = 0.28) and 
those asked “Is it morally acceptable to [specific to scenario]?” (M = 0.33, SD = 0.31) 


































Figure 1. Responses (%) in the three framing conditions in response to eight of the 
original 15 personal force dilemmas used in Experiment 3.  Error bars represent +- 1 SE. 
 
Although sample sizes in each condition were unequal, Levene’s test indicated 
equal variances (F = 1.90, p = .156). A univariate ANOVA comparing the proportion of 
utilitarian responses in each of the framing conditions, revealed a main effect of 


















Supplementary Study Chapter 4: Validation Studies 
In order to ensure that responses to our modified dilemma were similar to those 
given in response to the footbridge dilemma, I carried out two validation studies with 
qualitatively different populations.  
Method 
Participants 
In validation study one, participants were recruited online (N = 109) on a 
website dedicated to contributing to psychological research 
(www.reddit.com/r/samplesize) and took part on a voluntary basis. Of the original 
participants to sign up to the study, the completion rate was 67% (N = 73, Mage = 27.89, 
SD = 8.40 years, 36 females, 37 males). In the second validation study, one hundred 
participants comprising 88 females and 12 males, (Mage = 21.03, SD = 4.82 years) were 
recruited from the Plymouth University, School of Psychology, participant pool and 
completed the study for course credit. This research received ethical approval from the 
Plymouth University Ethics Committee.    
New Moral Dilemma 
In the present experiment, I incorporated the following modified dilemma 
matched to the footbridge dilemma across the moral principles of benefit-recipient, 
inevitability, moral magnitude, physical contact and personal force: 
 You are on a safari river cruise with several other tourists. Five of the tourists have 
decided to go for a swim on the other side of the river. However, they seem to be 
attracting the attention of several crocodiles, which have started to swim towards them. 
You are standing on the boat, in between the approaching crocodiles and the five 




The only way to save the lives of the five swimmers is to push this tourist off the boat 
and into the water below where their body will distract and stop the crocodiles. This 
tourist will die if you do this, but the five other swimming tourists will be saved. 
 
Procedure 
In the first validation study, participants were given both the footbridge dilemma 
and our modified dilemma embedded in a further ten distractor dilemmas borrowed 
from existing research (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2001). After each 
dilemma was presented to participants on screen, both a judgment question; (Is it 
morally acceptable to [specific to scenario]?) and action-choice question (Would you do 
it?) followed. Moral dilemmas were presented in a random order and participants 
responded to each question by selecting a binary option of “Yes” or “No”.  In the 
second validation study, the procedure was kept the same but participants were given 
both the footbridge dilemma and our modified dilemma embedded in a further eight 
distractor dilemmas. In this case, all dilemmas were personal dilemmas borrowed from 
existing research (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2001).  
Results 
The moral judgments given in response to the footbridge dilemma and the 
modified dilemma were compared for each question using non-parametric related 
samples tests. For the judgment question, no significant difference was found between 
responses to the footbridge dilemma and our modified dilemma in validation study one 
(p= .289) or validation study two (p = .549). This was also the case for the action-






Summary and Discussion 
Both validation studies found no significant difference between responses to the 
original footbridge dilemma and the modified counterpart dilemma. As such, having 
validated this dilemma in two qualitatively different populations, I incorporated it 
within Experiment 4 as a comparable dilemma (moral judgment task) for the virtually 






Chapter 4: Visual Analogue Scale for Mood 
 
AT THIS MOMENT I FEEL: 
 
 
HAPPY         
 
  _________________________________________________ 
 




DISINHIBITED/UNRESERVED         
 
  _________________________________________________ 







Chapter 4: Pre-Questionnaire for Alcohol 
PRE-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONAIRE  
(To be completed by the participant)  
 
Date of Birth: dd/mm/yy    
 
Gender: Male/Female/Transgender/Other/Not sure 
 
Current weight (stone/lb/kg) (PLEASE be accurate here as it will affect the dosage 
of alcohol or placebo that you are given): 
 
Do you suffer from any panic or anxiety attacks? YES/NO 
If ‘YES’, please record the details below. 
  
Are you currently taking any prescribed medications? YES/NO 
If ‘YES’, please record the details below. If this information is sensitive and you do not 
wish to share the details here, please inform the investigator. 
 
Do you have a personal or family history of alcoholism? YES/NO 
Do you have any individual with significant health or psychological problems? 
YES/NO 
Are you pregnant or expecting to become pregnant? YES/NO 
Have you had any aversive allergic reactions triggered by alcohol consumption? 
YES/NO 
Are you an alcohol-naïve individual (i.e. have never consumed alcohol before)? 
YES/NO 
Have you consumed alcohol within the last 12 hours? YES/NO 










How many units of alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are drinking? 
 
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9+ 
     
 
What is a Unit? : The number of units depends on the difference strength and size of 
each drink, so it can vary a lot. Here are some examples: 
 Pint of beer, 4%= 2.3 units 
 500ml can of lager, 6% = 3 units 
 250ml glass of wine, 11% = 2.8 units 
 330ml can of cider, 5% = 1.7 units 
 Single (25ml) measure of spirits (e.g., vodka or gin) = 1 unit 
 
  
Never 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days Everyday 





Chapter 4: Awareness Check 
 
Having consumed the drink prepared by the experimenter, do you know 










If ‘YES’, please explain which condition you have been assigned to and how 









Supplementary Analysis Chapter 5: Moral Judgments 
In order to examine moral judgments across multiple dilemmas between 
untrained individuals and trained professionals, an additional analysis was carried out 
incorporating the comparable moral dilemma and additional distractor dilemmas utilised 
in the present experiment’s judgment task.  
Results 
 I conducted a mixed ANOVA with dilemma type (impersonal; personal) and 
question (judgment question; action-choice question) as within-subjects factors and 
group (control, fire service, paramedics) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis 
revealed a main effect of dilemma type, (F(1, 57) = 7.88, p = .007, ηp² = .12) and a 
marginally significant main effect of question, (F(1,57) = 3.60, p = .063, ηp² = .06).  
There was no main effect of group (p = .554) and no significant interactions (ps > .151).  
Follow-up tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed that the proportion of utilitarian 
responses was higher for impersonal dilemmas than for personal dilemmas (p = .007). 
Additional follow-up tests revealed that the proportion of utilitarian responses was 
marginally significantly higher for the action-choice question than for the judgment 
question (p = .063).  
Summary and Discussion 
 Overall, when incorporating multiple moral dilemmas into analyses, moral 
judgments did not significantly differ between non-specialised controls, professionals 






Chapter 5: Comments from Paramedics and Incident Commanders 
These comments were voluntarily given following experiment completion in 
response to the following question: “What is your opinion on utilitarianism and it is 
something that you apply in your practise?” 
Paramedic Practitioners 
 “I am not sure I have this. I would rather not kill anyone” 
 “It is difficult. Every case is different as nothing is ever black or white” 
 “I can see the benefits of utilitarianism. However, situations never occur where there 
is a clear moral answer” 
 “I don't think I could cause harm to another person even if it's for the greater good” 
 “I would as a practicing paramedic, maintain an open mind and hopefully make the 
correct judgement call should the situation arise” 
 “I agree with utilitarianism but I don't like the pressure of making those decisions 
because who am I to make them?” 
 “I believe in utilitarianism as it is important to make the most amount of people happy. 
Those 4 people on the train track could have had family etc. and therefore there are 
more people getting hurt” 
 “Only do an action if it is morally right to do so; as in not harming other people” 
 “It is relevant in certain situations, but not all” 
 “No I don’t agree with utilitarianism, we are all equal and should be treated as so” 
 “I believe that in some situations you are forced to make the choice no matter what 
the outcome and as such would have to save the majority over the few” 
 “I believe it is a good ideology. Harm may be needed to help people” 
 “In principle I think being utilitarian is ok in the right environment, for example for 
health reasons and saving lives legitimately. However, I do believe that this principle 
could be neglected in conducting events that may be beneficial to people who may be 
greedy or wanting to conduct utilitarianism in a malicious way. Some individual’s idea 




 “If someone has not consented or is not knowledgeable of your action for the greater 
good, this is not moral. It is not our place to judge this idea on others” 
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